







MARS.

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE
GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH
ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

BY
GEORGE GROTE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES---VOL. IV.



NEW YORK:
W. L. ALLISON CO.,
PUBLISHERS.

52795

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THIRD EDITION

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SOUTHERN BRANCH

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Publishers.

52793

D F 214 G 91 h 2 X1 JUL 31 1934 NOV 4 CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV. --- CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. --- CHAPTER LXXIX.FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

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PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

PRODIGIOUS was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.

How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial re-constitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them; Messene had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periæki and Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting, jealous neighbors in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and Thebans against her.

Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the position and policy of Athens.

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, mili-

tary force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and Athens, especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379 B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 B.C., downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land; while the newly organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the Athenians had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (374 B.C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him. To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son; at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys on the Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia. Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated with considerable favor.

The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendancy of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and even compelled to solicit her aid—but new rivals, the Thebans, were suddenly lifted into an ascendancy inspiring her with mingled jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as had never appeared open to her since the disaster of 404 B.C. Such enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step taken two or three

months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter)—of causing the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guaranty of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens; thus silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.

On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to further maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well her past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378 B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guaranty against renovation of the previous *kleruchies* or out-possession. This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her again into naval pre-eminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against *kleruchies* out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offense is given to the prominent members of the maritime confederacy: so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterward unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince, Philip son of Amyntas.

Very different was the position of Amyntas himself toward Athens, in 371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for her help in case of need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was re-sworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, and Potidæa; all which we find a few years afterward occupied by Athenians. How much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis; and the moment was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his envoy, together with

the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.

Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony, next taken from Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the Athenian officers Eukles and Thucydides, then re-colonized under Lacedæmonian auspices—it had ever since remained an independent city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the mining district of Pangæus—rendered it a tempting prize: and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally prevented its fulfillment, was strengthened by all the sanction of a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now, as she had done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 431 B.C., and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military action—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterward, the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and Amyntas in Macedonia. The former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross enormities, by killing and banishing many of the

most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas. The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the Alcudadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting possession of Larissa and Kranon; both which cities he kept under own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron and Alexander of Pheræ.

This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason's despotism in Pheræ, and to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who dispatched Pelopidas into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance. A large portion of Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes, in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.

Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by some conspirators of Alorus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alorus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanes of Pydna as one of the agents. But besides these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias—a man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne; who, having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia—and was already master of Anthemus, Therme, Strepsa, and other places in or near the Thermaic gulf. He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas. Eurydike, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs, and those of her minor children against Pausanias.

Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydike and

Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen (369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Coriath with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydike with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the scepter to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alorus as regent for the time.

This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines in an oration delivered many years afterward at Athens. The boy, who then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, living afterward to overthrow the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterward found to occasion.

Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alorus as regent, it did not procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus. Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-65 B.C.). We make out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those *Condittieri* (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the

best bidder and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years, until he was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages, which opened a prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.

It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-65 B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-71 B.C.) to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia. That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, toward which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn, toward more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-65 B.C.) in these regions, we must notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.

Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-69 B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them. Envoys from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterward for that purpose. All pretensions to exclusive headship on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amid abundant discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, found favor both as equitable and convenient until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality, would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.

Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well calculated for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station and to guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ, so as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban invader from her frontier, had been held, during the war from 394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the Argolic Gulf from Prasîæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skylæum to the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and a large allied force (not less than 20,000 men according to Diodorus)—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians, Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta—was established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.

It was essential for Thebes to re-open communication with her Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy, just when the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got under arms—he directed an assault along the whole line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in the most assailable part of the line. So skillfully was his movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention, while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak

point of the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his own position was forced: alleging, that he might easily have found another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might have summoned re-enforcements from his allies—and that the Thebans, in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half-disposed to retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skillful and victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already high military renown.

Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellene. At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron—a citizen hitherto preponderant in the city by means of Sparta, and devoted to her interest—now altered his politics and went along with the stronger tide. We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises—the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished, and may probably have required the re-appearance of his victorious army. The little town of Phlius—situated south of Sikyon and west of Corinth—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders, and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the neighboring hill Trikaranon announced that the allied enemies were in sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without; thus preserving their

town. The fidelity of the Phlisians to Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it was only on the side of Corinth that the Phlisians had a friendly neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.

Amid general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his troops so skillfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to the walls. This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still further encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse, bringing a body of 2,000 mercenary Gauls and Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long stay; while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.

One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard them as belonging to other cities. We find him always trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary toward political opponents.

Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messene and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous depression of Sparta—that they fancied themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantineian, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod)—that while all other residents in Pelopon-

nesus were originally immigrants, they alone were indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name—of which, proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. "Let us follow no man's lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans under another name."

Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended; calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under Chabrias—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomedes with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as Asine, where the Spartan commander, Gernor, drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the suburbs of Asine were destroyed. Probably the Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of Peloponnesus was terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the winter season—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.

While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before. Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their lost supremacy. But the formation of the new "commune Arcadum" at Megalopolis interposed an obstacle never before thought

of. The Triphylian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas, solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently shown by the Germans toward Sleswick-Holstein), received as political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis. The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly alienated from the Arcadians.

Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen of Abydos named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a center, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves: hence, he observes, little progress was made toward peace; since the Spartans peremptorily insisted that Messene should again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding them in the war. We do not find, however, that he really lent them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt from Artaxerxes: and that his probable purpose in trying to close the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and abundantly. Though the threat of Philiskus produced no immediate result, however, it so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in re-constituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom Xenophon specifies as if there were no others of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount Ithome and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta

were, at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in their favor.

A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the 103rd Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.)—which occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messene—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta, no Messenian victor had even been enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three centuries, Damiskus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theory (or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe oppression of the Messenians. This Olympic festival—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.

During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed, their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counterwork the ambitious projects of that despot, who was soliciting re-enforcement from Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his cruelty—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterward, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a guaranty for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the youthful Philip son of

Amyntas, who remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the care of Pammeres. It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens. And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendancy of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and re-enforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, dispatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might co-operate in repelling or invading the Arcadians. Re-enforced by the Sicilians and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the place; and he further ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an eminence near Midea. Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the Arcadians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarcely any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory—or, as it came to be called, “the tear-

less battle"—news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demoteles to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the Ephors, setting the example;—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on these minds of iron temper!

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of 2,000 men and seven days' provision. The Theban commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia. Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or Thebans. Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfillment of their promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendancy, he agreed to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the oligarchical. Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas further liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon, which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; whither

he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was further pressed by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the displeasure of the Thebans—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend the Arcadians—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from re-electing him as Bœotarch during the ensuing year. They sent harmosts of their own to each of the Achæan cities—put down the existing oligarchies—sent the chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile—and established democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and combining their united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and active part with Sparta; vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.

The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of Lysimenes; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas instead of Lysimenes, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious and sanguinary tyranny. He caused several of his colleagues to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He further procured for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force. The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he was further ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of the town and harbor.

During the height of Euphron's power at Sikyon, the neighboring city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellene, and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens. In the ensuing year, 368 B.C., the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth. In the ensuing year, 367 B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of 2,000—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellene—and the Theban harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which looked toward Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of ground called the *Trikaranum* (which had been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach

and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasiens, passing by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.

An eminent Pellenian citizen named Proxenus having been here made prisoner, the Phliasiens, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellene, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius. Such an accession afforded sensible relief—it might almost be said, salvation—to the Phliasiens, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult to bring home in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by the aid of the Athenian general Chares and his mercenary troops from Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to Pellene, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military Phliasiens, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterward, in conjunction with Chares, surprised the fort of Thyamnia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort became not only a defense for Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the Phliasiens, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the acropolis, and there summoned the Sikyonian *notables* to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he invited Pasimelus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of

the garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself, however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured from Athens a re-enforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take by assault—his possession even of the town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the purpose of bribery. His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still further increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith, and put upon their trial before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the authorities—as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the security, of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows—taking up the language of the accusing magistrates:—

“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that *you* did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypates, whom you caught after a

career similar to that of Euphron—but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already under sentence of death by all men. Well! and was not Euphron too guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to her—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not *in* Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes—if you put me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of allies.”

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not being

entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian Senates or assemblies elsewhere.

Very different however was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished pre-eminence of being buried in the market-place. There, along with his tomb, a chapel was erected in which he was worshiped as Archegetes, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had conferred liberty and political franchise—or at least the name of a political franchise—remembered him with grateful admiration as their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit of the Many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing Few.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in the acropolis—nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long afterward, the harbor of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year

367 B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have been realized—as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthykles (after the failure of Antalkidas) at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.—it had become a sort of recognized fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messene. The vitality and chance for duration, of both—especially those of the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend with—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian rescript. To attain this object, Pelopidas and Ismenias now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in the same company.

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of prostration, was favorably received by the Persian court. Xenophon—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious toward the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid—affirms that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Plataea; and by the fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch, which could only reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still further the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emanci-

pating the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas—confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras—would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise ascendancy over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own terms. Messene was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force. In reference to the points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favor of the Eleians; probably at the instance of Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing aloud when he heard it read—"By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King." This remark, made in the King's hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: "If the Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and inform him." So vague a modification, however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in treasonable promises, and receiving large bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed. The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras. Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia, made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden planetree was not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding the battle of Plataea—who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of Antalkidas.

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied they had come with instructions, authorizing them to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless further alienated by the angry report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet further, and entered a general protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They accordingly dispatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So confident were they in the terrors of the King's name and seal, that they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a center of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths toward the Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at

such pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship; though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognized Messene, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity of that new-born city.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available toward the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Phæræ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of Phæræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Phæræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of Phæræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendancy of their neighbor and rival. They immediately dispatched to his aid thirty triremes and 1000 hoplites under Autokles; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He reached Phæræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had dispatched without delay 8,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander since his last year's proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command of Autokles, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat homeward.

But their generalship was so unskillful, and the enemy's cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty—marshaled the retreat in consummate order—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy—and conducted the army safely back to Thebes.

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Boeotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Phæræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thebe the wife of Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner, and Alexander, fearful of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted some time, before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second expedition for his release.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than a temporary truce, coupled with the engagement of evacuating Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas. That event with its conse-

quences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the Magnetes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an important point was gained in their favor on the other side of Bœotia. Oropus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of the neighboring Deme Græa. So recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished. It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens. So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general Chares with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They further requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to impartial arbitration.

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantineian Lykomedes; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had

come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript. Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiraus for his return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once. In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man and her only conspicuous orator, was dispatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. "Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native of Thebes?"—"Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply), they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while they lived at home, were innocent or reputed to be so. As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt." This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of Epaminondas, but his speech as a whole was not successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated

and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under Chares was made ready and dispatched. But on reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchiræ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians, had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learned that Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in their own pay; but while thus providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. "We are on the point of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you." The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience for peace.

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the independence of Messene. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their slaves. They proclaimed their determination of continuing the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they had lost; and although they could not directly prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recom-

mending her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor. The Spartan prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messene, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognizing the independence of Messene and affirming the independence of each separate city within its own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messene; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian States; chiefly those near the Isthmus—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Troezen and Hermione, since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and Argos—Sparta and Athens—still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states however were now somewhat complicated: for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves were losing their internal co-operation and harmony one with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and Messene as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the recognition of Messene as an independent state—so they were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas. The Athenians also were dissatisfied

with this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city. Whether that other article also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they also dispatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of his long-established military reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially, toward Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydos, with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them. Ariobarzanes was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes—yet with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship. That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, exercised extensive ascendancy, disgraced by much tyranny and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it, we do not know; but the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with 8,000 peltasts and 30 triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of it. His success was the more grati-

fying, as he had found means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies ; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting contributions from allies. An important possession was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for some time the King's authority, and absorbed his revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia—and Mausolus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy—attacked Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt ; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus. As the latter had no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years afterward, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the Persian king. Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for Sparta.

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen ; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the mere valuable boon of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him Sestus and Krithote in that peninsula ; possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of the Hellespont ; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiades and afterward down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and eventual re-entry. That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in fear

of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before. But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain their previous lands; re-enforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and Krithote, soon extended his acquisitions to Eleus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession—from its extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Eleus at its southern extremity.

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378 B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias, pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the kleruchs to Samos. However, obnoxious as the measure was to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into conflict with independent towns, like Kardia, which resisted her pretensions—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her citizens in dispossessing—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away, to make room for Timotheus and the Athenians.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys—the new Thracian enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens—was father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalkidike, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to

be explained—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contest with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact that Athens was now at war with his father-in-law, Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus to an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating. At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens. He had got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus: which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens. As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates was canceled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus wished to re-engage him, he declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself. He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve Athens.

It was against these two cities, and the general coast of Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of Alorus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander. Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia. Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just

as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself master of Torone, Potidæa, Pydna, Methone, and various other places. As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered it. Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal. Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had most at heart—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens. Timotheus first dispatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off in the face of the enemy.

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in Thrace, and to the defense of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean—a Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take the command. Afterward, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading Thessaly.

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athe-

nians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King; a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them—in language such as had been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by Hermokrates at Syracuse—that men such as the Thebans, brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been mere landmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced them to take to the sea. “We must put down this haughty rival (he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of the acropolis at Athens.”

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it should be ready, to Hellespont and the islands near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time dispatched to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with Athens. Some opposition however was made in the Theban assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in a former volume to show, that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in taste and aptitudes. Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the

glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. "By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city; while I, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta." While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be tantamount to an abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and action.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse. If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendancy on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard for her; to maintain ascendancy by land and sea at once would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both, she would probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, that the project of stretching across the *Ægean* for ultramarine dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of Athens—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet under Epaminondas crossed the *Ægean* in 363 B.C. In the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies of Athens to declare in his favor. Both he and Timotheus appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the oligarchy of the Pontic *Herakleia* against the people; and both declined to furnish aid. Timotheus is said to have liberated the besieged town of Kyzikus; by whom it was besieged, we do not certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet. Epaminondas brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any splendid victory, or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on by

Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in 364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still further; but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the last.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog's Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed succeeded in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill. Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten; while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were within his reach, this detested enemy—whose treacherous arrest and dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every one's mouth—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness, like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth and fight. The latter, declining the challenge retired among

his guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who followed him, and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds still untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been re-elected without interruption to the annual office of *Broetarch* during all the years that had since elapsed (378-364 B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendancy of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing toward conquered enemies.

All that Thebes could do was to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton, conducted a powerful force of 7,000 hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater ascendancy in northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before. The power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the ensuing year.

CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

It was during this period—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from whence he never returned—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been disaffected toward Thebes. The absence of the two great leaders, as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and richest among the citizens, 300 in number) as a favorable moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. Moreover, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery. This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred tracing its origin even to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty; a sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to have been concurrent—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of together in such manner as to make us suppose so. Thebes thus absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own city, as well as Plataea and Thespie to the south.

We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause. Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas. All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the Orchomenian

Knights, yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would never have been consummated but for the absence of Epaminondas, who was deeply chagrined on his return. He well knew the bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even more rigorous than Plataea and Thespiae; since the inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out of Boeotia, while the Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold into slavery.

On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C., Epaminondas was re-elected one of the Boeotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of Pelopidas—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom he could trust—might deter him from a second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated as to render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.

Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and Messene also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was between the Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into alliance again with Sparta, relinquishing their alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous co-operation with Sparta ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans, who, reversing the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365 B.C. And thus Sparta, though robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and Achaia—confederates not less valuable.

Triphylia, the territory touching the western sea of Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda—and the Pisatid (including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia—both of them between Messenia and Elis—had been in former times conquered and long held by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them. No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion; while the subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and

were even admitted, under pretense of kindred race, into the Pan Arcadian confederacy. The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas (367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians. But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messene, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan re-enforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.

Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with Arcadia—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius (on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia), which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate; but the Eleians, claiming it as their own, and suddenly marching in along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the Epariti, collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the choser hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of 400, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border), where they were re-enforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the coun-

try like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a re-enforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city in safety, so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste the territory around.

Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not long afterward; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country, even approaching Kyllene, the harbor of Elis on the western sea. Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them, but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress of the Eleians became greater than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of King Agesilaus), invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off the communication between that city and Messene), which he fortified and garrisoned with about 200 Spartans and Periœki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and 200 of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the remainder sold for slaves.

Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis, was joined by allies — Thebans, Argeians, and Messenians — and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all round, which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependants of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian armies, had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyvidas and Chilon slain. The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed

in battle order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan, stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice, "What need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and separate?" Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their advantage, and there erected their trophy.

Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion of it guarded by the Argeians. They broke down an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and re-enclosed the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than 100 prisoners, Spartans and Pericæi together, were distributed among the captors—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians and Messenians—one share to each. Sixty years before, the capture of 220 Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides. Now, not a trace of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan glory declined!

Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival which came about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians. Their request had been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of

Olympia for more than a year, being strongly re-enforced, preparation was made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection. The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: since doubtless the Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent round their notices as usual.

It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a considerable body of allies; 2,000 hoplites from Argos, and 400 horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling match came first in order. The running match had already been completed, and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the space between the stadium and the great altar—when suddenly the Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of the little river Kladeus—which flowed at a little distance to the westward of the Altis, or interior inclosed precinct of Zeus, falling afterward into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the further approach of the Eleians. The latter, with a boldness for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his chosen band of 300, and vigorously charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by numerous buildings—the Senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various porticoes—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent positions of defense for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas was here slain, while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defense; tearing down for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors. Such precautions rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged

to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appear in the lists like the rest.

Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of Panhellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the sacred ground—"imminentium templorum religio." Most of them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special inspiration of the gods.

If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with both, in abundant measure, from this war; the one from the farms, the stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally, more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus; the other from the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings, distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate these sacred treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus. Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better paid than ever they had been before, so that the service attracted numerous volunteers of the poorer class.

At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia. How far the project had ever

been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among their rivals. The Panarcadian communion, recently brought together and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed their ancient rivalry. The Mantineians, jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity and the Theban alliance—with a view to renewed connection with Sparta; though only five years before they had owed to Thebes the re-establishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds, offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantineian assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it, but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial before the Panarcadian assembly—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia. The Mantineian leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand—a detachment of the Epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in Arcadia toward the Mantineians, that many other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and interdicting all further participation in the Olympian treasures.

Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained, in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which had gained it immediately sought to push it further. Beginning as the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineians speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of paying the Epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members of

that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into their own. The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding, the opposite leaders brought it before the Panarcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that envoys should be dispatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned—and canceling the preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.

The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the center of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at Tegea—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of 300 Boeotians, were present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished, most of the Mantincians went home; their city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Boeotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though there were few Mantincians among them, since most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither. The authorities—while they sent round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms—dispatched heralds

to Tegea, demanding all the Mantineian prisoners there detained. They at the same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Panarcadian community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be preferred.

Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together an assembly—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of mistrust—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes, probably from the Mantineians and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.

On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get possession of the Mantineians, and that, when he found but few of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done it while the Mantineians were still in the town, instead of waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian Epariti believed in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.

The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal—reached Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own—"The arrest (he said)

was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested. You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into Peloponnesus—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make war to support our partisans in the country.”

Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia; and assist in repelling any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating Peloponnesus—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they further sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken by the Mantineians and their partisans, now forming the majority in the Panarcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon) “were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.” Why do these Thebans (said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of *them*? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?” Though this is the language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his Philo-Laconian bias—yet when we follow the facts as he himself narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messene and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas toward the Achæan cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and Achæia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably be-

lieved that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messene—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.

This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judgment of Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial witness.

I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367–366 B.C.) to the close of 363 B.C. In 366–365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas, whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Phæræ. In 364–363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363 B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention on land, without admitting further aspirations toward maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363–362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party, profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-arcadian assembly and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea: being communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban intervention could be no longer deferred. As Boeotarch, he obtained the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Boeotian force, to summon the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into Peloponnesus.

The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing. It comprised all the Boeotians and Eubœans, with a large number of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Phæræ, who

had now become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænians, and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes was for alliance purely defensive. Having passed the line of Mount Oneium—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his former entrance—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent, and where he halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect them; but the information turned out false. The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of frontier against Laconia)—and the Argeians.

The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose, was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting of the Mantineians with the major part of the other Arcadians—the Eleians—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans; and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description of force—some of them indeed having none at all.

Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the enemy. He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced. On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached Pellene. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed toward Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, “like a nest of unprotected young birds,” at a moment when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed the face of Greece. Noth-

ing saved Sparta except the providential interposition of the gods, signified by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time his further progress toward Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defense before the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.

The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied—still less to spend time before it, for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not choose to hazard a general action. He had found it impracticable to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former invasion of 370–369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in active co-operation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta (which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in number, they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of defense, with a small company of 100 hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for a space until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat. The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the palestra. Wielding in his right-hand a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back unwounded; so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The Ephors decorated him afterward with a wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.

Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance

only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put it in defense before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantium, so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march toward Sparta, and before they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendancy of Epaminondas—coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at Tegea.

Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineians doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods—as Xenophon regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the Isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or annoyance. They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea, arriving thither without having yet broken fast, either themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment—that the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the gates.

The Mantineians were terror-struck at this event. Their military citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though hungry and tired, immediately went forth—and indeed were obliged to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and property. Xenophon extols (and doubtless with good reason) the generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued. But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet more severe hunger and fatigue—that Epaminondas would never have sent them forward in such condition, had he expected serious resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander Kephisodorus, together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineians also paid distinguished honors.

Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both well-conceived, and yet both disappointed by accident, without any omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians, Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number in all, of 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse, if we could trust the assertions of Diodorus; who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas as 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Little value can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result. He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching. Moreover his stock of provisions was barely sufficient; the new crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.

But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate

position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without fighting—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his own side, and so many assembled against him—and by the necessity of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt. This is an estimate of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence, without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, Epaminondas had founded it practicable (which he could not have known beforehand) to attempt a *coup de main*, first against Sparta, next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained; but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the field, and no further opportunities of striking at them unawares by side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as the only probable way of deciding the contest.

The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign. The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by Epaminondas.

The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, 2,000 feet above the level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the greatest of that

cluster of valleys in the center of Peloponnesus, each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains themselves." Its length stretches from north to south, bordered by the mountain ranges of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea; thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position, covering the whole Mantineian territory, that the army opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.

Epaminondas having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing toward the enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction straight toward the enemy. But presently he changed his course, turning to the left toward the Mænalian range of mountains, which forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on the side which lies over against or fronts toward Tegea; until at length he neared the enemy's position, upon their right flank. He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting toward the enemy. During the march, each lochos or company had marched in single file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier in it) at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the phalanx or front toward the enemy was formed, each lochage was of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line. In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.

The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected a speedy battle. But when he turned to the left toward the mountains, so that for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day. Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even

though, by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived very close upon their right flank. They were further confirmed in the same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence—that mental preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special harangue at the moment—was allowed to slacken and run down. So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.

Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the body of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present—a point not distinctly ascertainable—he would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantinians occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory, and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the Arcadians. On the right-center and center were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians. There was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left—Eleian on the right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.

In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and Boeotians was on the left; the Argæans on the right; the Arcadians, Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the center. It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to lead the charge himself with his Boeotians on the left against the opposing right or right-center, and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and center, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should have been

thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites—occupying the left of his line in *lochi* or companies, with the *lochage* or captain at the left extremity of each—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban *lochages* thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each *lochus*, and perhaps of more than one *lochus*, being ranged in file behind them. What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the *lochus*, we do not know. At Leuktra Epaminondas had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy's phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the midship of her antagonist.

It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed in column, projected forward in advance; while the remaining allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines. Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy's phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could easily deal with them.

Against the cavalry on the enemy's right, which was marshaled only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or perhaps eight deep), and without any light infantry intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep column, so as to insure to them also a superior weight of attack. He further mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliae Gulf.

There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy's left. To guard against any such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.

All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry for attack on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.

Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the word of command to "take up arms," that they had any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving rapidly toward them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates. And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially corrected—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.

The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit, turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas on his part with his Theban column came into close conflict with the Mantincian and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force and weight. He broke through the enemy's line of infantry at this point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. The remaining troops of the enemy's line, seeing the best portion of their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The center and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly, as it would appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The Athenians, however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten, after a gallant fight, until the Eleian cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right and center—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry beaten on their own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement of Diodorus.

In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and the ultimate result. The calculations of Epaminondas were completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immedi-

ately opposed, but caused the enemy's whole army to take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was, by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this day probably exposed himself pre-eminently, as a means of encouraging those around him, and insuring the success of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear. I cannot altogether omit to notice these details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history though they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the *Iliad* than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.

The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words of the contemporary historian. "It was thus (says Xenophon) that Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx of the enemy's infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy's cavalry was also in full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten men.

The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over toward the enemy's left with the security of conquerors; but there (being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to pieces by the Athenians."

Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign—we can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier's blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall—this is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers toward their general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centered in Epaminondas; all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered if he lived to hear it—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendancy established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas on the hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of victory.

That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town—as the Athenian cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops—they too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession. This was the understood confession of defeat.

The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious. He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them had been slain. "Then (said he) you must make peace with the enemy." He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood speedily terminated his life.

Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust, shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year. Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity, after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.

The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantincians gave it to their citizen Macharion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates. At Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch, to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of Epaminondas.

How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no

positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so paralyzing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing, in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened and peace was concluded—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus. The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than the recognition of the *status quo*; to leave everything exactly as it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting Megalopolis, with the Panarcadian constitution attached to it—and admitting also Messene as an independent city. Against this last article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her allies sympathized with her feelings. Some indeed were decidedly against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of independent Messene against Sparta ranking shortly afterward as an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics. Neither Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly the peace was sworn to on these conditions. The autonomy of Messene was guaranteed by all, except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times—rather than submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.

Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion—that “there was more disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle than before it”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by Sparta as no peace at all—partly as based on the circumstance, that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state. Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity, and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results—though it was disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia (Tegea,

Megalopolis, etc.) was on the point of being crushed by the Mantineians and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the affirmation of Xenophon—that Thebes did not gain by the battle either city, or territory, or dominion—we must at the same time add, that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her anti-Spartan frontier, including Messene.

This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly indeed was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his verdict—Daiphantus and Iolaidas. He was buried on the field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration—from all, sincere and hearty—from some, enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece. The judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen, set before them Epaminondas as their model to copy.

The remark has been often made, and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent history—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harpist and garrison, and the subversion of the ruling oligarchy—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379–362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendancy belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.). Throughout this whole period, both all that we know, and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too—let it be observed—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon; for the chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta—mentions him only to record what is honorable—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath to Thebes—who a few

months afterward, not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messene, and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter of Xenophon's "Hellenica" contains a panegyric, ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes) like an unskillful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus decided—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus—how great is the superiority of the first—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the fatal spear wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other ways—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate deficiencies in another. His splendid military capacity was never prostituted to personal ends; neither to avarice, nor ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners. Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of

Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her defense as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity and good-will, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen. He once incurred the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies—the condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without any angry renunciation of patriotic duty.

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amid the precedents and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against foreign enemies, Boeotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment toward partisans, and unparalleled gentleness toward enemies. His friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the richer, as well as the inferior man of the two. To both, and to the harmonious co-operation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived splendor and ascendancy. Yet when we compare the one with the other, we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon of the Phœrean Alexander; nor would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport of frenzy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the coun-

selor, the debater of his country, as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Boeotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus. The possession of such eloquence, amid the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists set before their hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs—nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedaemonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defense could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both—and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence—that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them—trained to varied intellectual combinations, and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly—familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias foreswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom—his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate esti-

mate of permanent causes—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas would have done—whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating—if he had survived the victory of Mantinea—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said to have indulged. Among the countrymen of Pindar, devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus and Kephsodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi; the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messene, began to turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But for foreign aid, Megalop-

olis would now have been in great difficulty. A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who dispatched into Arcadia 3,000 hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory members in communion. And it appears that the interference thus obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent Pan-Arcadian community was no further disturbed.

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messene formally sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their wives and families, and convert their military population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have reconquered Messene or perished in the attempt. Yet he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money, for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been for some time in a sort of correspondence.

About the time of the battle of Mantinea—and as it would seem, for some years before—a large portion of the western dominions of the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near Propontis and the Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-66 B.C. In other parts of Asia Minor, too—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.—the subordinate princes or governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them, by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees, who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length

overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous co-operation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausolus prince of Karia, Orontes satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates satrap of Lydia—the last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phenicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief, confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.

Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with 1000 Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian hoplites—and the Athenian general Chabrias—were invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out as his counselors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messene; and as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return lend them assistance toward their views in Greece. But dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt, was received with little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems for obtaining money from the Egyptians. The army having been thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, never-

theless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian forces in Phenicia; from whence they were forced to return by the revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne, while Nektanebis also, on his side, began to bid high for the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos, who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home to Athens, either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had come to serve—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt. Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and with a public donation to Sparta of 230 talents. Agesilaus marched from the Nile toward Kyrene, in order to obtain from that town and its port ships for the passage home. But he died on the march, without reaching Kyrene. His body was conveyed home by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not to be obtained.

Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage, denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a friend and companion—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in such measure as to insure for Agesilaus constant ascendancy over the minds of others, far beyond what was naturally incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a Spartan education—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference to indulgences—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attach to him all around, were virtues not Spartan, but personal to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the

throne, with a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander, whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekararchies and harmosts as instruments of ascendancy for imperial Sparta, and, under the name of Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up the like individual dictatorship on his own account. His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign coercion (represented by the dekararchy and the harmost) which had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torone—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit. He was here employed in a Pan-Hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her near home. Here was an end of the Pan-Hellenic sentiment, and of the truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little reason, he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394–387 B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time his policy seemed to succeed. From 387 to 379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendancy of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon, and this is just the period

when the influence of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterward we find him personally forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself, allowed. And though Plutarch seems displeased with him for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messene (at the peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea) when acknowledged by all the other Greeks—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician, he deserves little esteem. We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left her at his death—"Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit." Nothing but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last expedition to Egypt had the effect of establishing firmly the dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event that did not happen until a few years afterward, during the reign of the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters, that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the exception of Egypt) unimpaired.

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five or forty-six years. His death was preceded by one of those bloody

tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of a Persian scepter. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father's harem, for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and the King caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition yet further stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him to take poison—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him; for Artaxerxes—now very old, and already struck down by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son Darius—did not survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily afterward. He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as King the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on the throne.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C. that the Athenian Timotheus—having carried on war with eminent success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis—transferred his forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistant to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his country. Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder. It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese were

safe from Kotys: for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to Κορυα toward defensive warfare; retiring from his service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis. The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Phæræ. A short time previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus, and equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethus. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about the end of August (362 B.C.), two months after the battle of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethus—met with a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes and 600 prisoners. We are even told that soon after this naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), where they seized both property on ship-board and men on the quay, before there was any force ready to repel them. The Thessalian marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death; while several trierarchs—who, instead of serving in person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract—were censured or put upon trial.

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. At least this hypothesis ex-

plains how Amphipolis came now, for the first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a possession of Macedonia. Kallisthenes thus found himself at war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince however, having gained time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against Kotys. The people were much incensed against both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath of the Dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.

Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to detain the passing corn-ships for the supply of their own markets; and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could insure the safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself. The Athenian fleet, guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inward (the chapel near the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone,

and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable, as to send him away not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy unassisted. How the trial ended or how the justice of the case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of Demosthenes.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war; not merely for provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361–360 B.C., Kotys, with the co-operation of a body of Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos; the most important place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking Elaëus and Krithote, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defense against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos. In spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and had undergone accusation at home. Timomachus was now superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity toward both Iphikrates and Kotys. But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to re-enforce Kotys—Charidemus

with the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending to hold them as a little principality. Finding his position, however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against her; so that Elæus and Krithote, her chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic military character. Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy. Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, Python is said to have replied—"It was a god who did the deed; we only lent our hands;" an anecdote, which, whether it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of tyrannicide.

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only a youth; moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to share in the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese. These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial

ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfillment of those fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western coast—Alopekonnessus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable, that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated. Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.

Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that the Greek city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile to Athens—became his principal station. He was fortunate enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had co-operated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes would thus have been saved; it not being the custom of Thracians, in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death. We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and bloodthirsty than the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and then drowned the father himself. It is not improbable that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians toward Miltokythes, and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any successor came

from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus the general of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens; and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be surrendered to Athens also.

This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese, insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes; if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358 B.C.)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus. And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its principal town Sestos, to Athens; yet he retained for himself *Kardia*, which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.

It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it

would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also various continental possessions: Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia with other places on the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methone, and Potidæa, with most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf. This last portion of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of Greece, had made war with an inauspicious success. The Macedonian king Perdikkas, with a just instinct toward the future aggrandizement of his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens, even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-63 B.C., was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither was found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its room.

The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese, lasted but for a moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among his principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future conqueror of Charoneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained this inauspicious eminence—will be recounted presently.

In 403 B.C., after the surrender of Athens, Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent city-communities were

more completely regimented under one chief than they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered among the followers of Sparta.

But the conflicts already recounted (during an interval of forty-four years—404–403 B.C. to 360–359 B.C.) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.

It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defense, that the aggressor from Macedonia arises.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

IN the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413 B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island—for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral. Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them. But both this city and

Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city further; while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last months of the siege, and fatally misleading his judgment—were so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens—there would probably be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the siege.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude toward the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens could not hold out for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy, which had been friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament), a Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the *Ægean* to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus, and a further re-enforcement from Tarentum and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to this effort. Throughout the trying months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defense of Syracuse,

seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens in the *Ægean* (events already described in my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior toward those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement toward the armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid seamen—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself. They were the more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than the remaining fleet.

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily—that one single effort would gloriously close the war—was far from being realized. Athens resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta. Accordingly the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of the *Ægean*. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont (one at Kynossema—411 B.C.—a second between Abydos and Dardanus—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and calamitous than the preceding—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amid the satrapy of Pharnabazus. That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and pro-

vision for two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them who chose to accept it.

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude dispatch, addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of the defeated armament—"Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men are hungry. We know not what to do." This curious dispatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and his colleagues; who—having instigated their countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens—had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced to be incapable of further resistance.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under, any other leaders. But the admirals repressed this disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land

and sea, which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amid universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.

Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or omission on his part; in regard to personal incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal. But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force. We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the Xerxian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens after the battles of Salamis and Plataea, so at Syracuse after

the destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful defense had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the causes of the successful defense, by rendering the citizens unanimous in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting intestine discontent. But in the period immediately after the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named Diokles, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offenses minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. It was known by the name of the Laws of Diokles, the chief of the Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the dominion of the Romans.

We have the austere character of Diokles illustrated by a story (of more than dubious credit, and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at Athens. Aristotle, too, states that the Syracusan people, after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six years afterward, as pushing himself up to the despotism by the most vio-

lent demagogic opposition ; and as having accused, disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions of government. If the constitutional forms were rendered more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still continued to be rich men.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after continuing more than three years, was brought to a close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas, Carthage.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480 B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse ; which same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage, had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical government, and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and westward from her city ; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs ; the more so, as her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In

the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome. While the connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries B.C.; yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than 700,000 souls were computed in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally) was within the distance of seven miles from Carthage on the one side, and Tunis seemingly not much further off on the other. Even at that time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed 300 tributary cities in Libya. Yet this was but a small fraction of the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C. That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis—westward all along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country. These Liby-Phœnicians dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness

of their soil. Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than 200. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having 50 towns.

A few of the towns along the coast—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, etc.—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce, and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or 365 talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the tax-payer of all that he possessed; and even tearing him from his family to be sold in person for a slave. Accordingly the general sentiment among the dependencies toward Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of obviating discontent among their town population at home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.

In the fifth century, B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the Syracusan, Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes, half naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of ditch to keep them off. But these barbarians did not acquire sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For

these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians, though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No less than forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots. An immense public magazine—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage. A chosen division of 2,500 citizens, men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage, distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily; but most part of the Carthaginian army consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought—seldom, to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction. A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in Sicily these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, like Persians, upon numbers—manifesting little or no military skill; until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence were, the two Kings or Suffetes, who presided over the Senate. They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same persons were re-eligible or actually re-chosen, we do not know; but they were always selected out of some few principal families or *gentes*. There is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty *curiæ*, and three hundred *gentes*—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these *gentes* emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty *principes* representing the *curiæ*; sometimes a still smaller, of only ten *principes*. These little councils are both frequently mentioned in the

political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius called the Gerusia or Council of Ancients—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate. Aristotle assimilates the two Kings (Suffetes) of Carthage to the two Kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta; which latter consisted of thirty members, including the Kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five—the Pentarchies. He compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan Ephors; yet again he talks of the Pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or *Ordo Judicum*; of which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its members perpetual, and so powerful that it overruled all the other assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year, instead of being perpetual.

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage may be said to be unknown. But it seems clear that the general spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and powerful families divided among themselves the great offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude; that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through these violent party antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, was cruel in the extreme. It appears that wealth was one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of such corruption, one variety was the habit of constantly regaling the citizens in collective banquets of the *curiæ*, or the political associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the *phiditia*, or public mess of Sparta. There was a *Demos* or people at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the Suffetes and the small Council were not all of one mind. How numerous this *Demos* was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families by stratagems such as the

banquets, the lucrative appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded, and the great offices held—Suffetes, Senators, Generals, or Judges—by the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity, as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is Mago (seemingly about 530–500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a victorious career in Sardinia; the other, Hamilkar, commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus. But the sons of Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so powerful, that a check upon their ascendancy was supposed to be necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators sitting as Judges were now nominated for the first time. Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480–410 B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us—and down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage. The inhabitants of Eggesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success, before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war, indeed, had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Eggesteans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostil-

ity from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident, as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them, except to Carthage.

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements—Motye, Panormus (now Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency of Selinus—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily—which had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections—at a moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was at this moment King, or rather first of the two Suffetes, chief executive magistrate of Carthage, as his grandfather had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen the Greek city of Selinus, where probably Hannibal had also spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to his family consequence—and from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for their protection.

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to

remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with further instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to proceed with the Eggestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the representations from Eggesta and Carthage; but declined to refer their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage; thus leaving the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent over a body of troops to the aid of Eggesta: 5,000 Libyans or Africans; and 800 Campanian mercenaries, who had been formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.

In spite of the re-enforcement and the imposing countenance of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Eggesta. Under such persuasion they invaded the territory with their full force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order and precaution: but presently, finding no enemy in the field to oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Eggestæans and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines by surprise, defeated them with a loss of 1000 men, and recaptured the whole booty.

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their ancient enemy Eggesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defense of the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by a citizen named Empedion urgently recommended: for Selinus appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar; a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, which the Syracusans, under present

circumstances, promised to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement, by which Hannibal at once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were willing to take service.

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and 1500 transports or vessels of burden; conveying an army, which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than 100,000 men; while Ephorus extended the number to 200,000 infantry, and 4,000 cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motye—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage further eastward along the southern coast toward their city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction.

The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles

and chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to forestall the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast—Agrigentum, Gela, and especially Syracuse—all of whom they had sent to warn and to supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually—though their own strength was every day failing—and though not a single friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city. Still, however, the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing

down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them closed their gallant defense by an honorable death. A small minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites—murderous, lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished heads on the points of their spears and javelins. The Greeks (seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum. These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any account of the entire population in its different categories—old and young—men and women—freemen and slaves—citizens and metics. We can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger after messenger dispatched, as the defense became more and more critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos—next, to muster a large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate siege—and not reflecting that he

was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls recently erected—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture.

The Syracusan soldiers, a select body of 3,000, who at length joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by the three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic—"The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended with them, and have taken their departure from the town." To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; moreover, permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to return if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed. What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.

Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder, Hannibal now quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the enemy of Eggesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success, but a numbers of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera and disposed his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at the same time to undermine them. The Himereans defended themselves with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defense was not unassisted, for 4,000 allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed by the Syracusan Diokles,

had come to their city as a re-enforcement. For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the Selinuntines in confining themselves to defense, but to sally out at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. Ten thousand gallant men—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian allies—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew the assault, looked for nothing less than a sally, were taken by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the Greeks. At length they gave way and fled toward the neighboring hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and slaughtered great numbers (6,000 according to Timæus, but not less than 20,000, if we are to accept the broad statements of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera when the flower of her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. So important a re-enforcement ought to have revived the spirit of the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the statement that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in the bay of Motye, in order that it might sail round Cape Lilybæum and along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenseless through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the

bay of Motye, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more than sufficient to excite alarm for home in the bosom of Diokles and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now reigning. Diokles not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the further defense of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the Himereans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Diokles to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off the Himerean population, when the city was relinquished to the besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely at Messene; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the only chance of refuge now open to these unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler part of the population—elders, women, and children—crowding on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the northern coast to Messene. On the same night Diokles also marched out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. Many of the Himereans, with their wives and children, took their departure along with Diokles, as their only chance of escape; since it was but too plain that the triremes would not carry away all. The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himerean warriors still remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day the triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo in some place of safety not so far off as Messene. If the defenders could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the physical force, of these brave men was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the

Iberian assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into the hands of the victor.

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfill the duty, and satisfy the exigences, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the soldiers. But all the male captives, 3,000 in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity, as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.

No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfillment only so much the more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no

examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing uninterrupted prosperity—had both of them been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three months. No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.), which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities. The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust. Hannibal carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily—and Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of a second Carthaginian invasion—had stronger motives for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defense. Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messene in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat of Kysikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means

of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against their common city and country: upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his restoration.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism, had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own restoration. Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messene rather before the capture of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messene he caused five fresh triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay 1000 of the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had already come back along with Empedion), and invited

many fresh colonists from other quarters. Re-establishing a portion of the demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of 6,000 chosen hoplites—probably independent of other soldiers of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motye and Panormus. Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceedings of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning toward him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain-fellow citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the law—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of battle. "It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment." Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here

the feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amid the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command—that his re-admission would have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent maneuver. Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of 3,000 soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela, and reached the concerted spot near the gate of Archradina during the night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimelus at Corinth) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a condemnation.

Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt to make himself master of his country was powerfully

seconded, and might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years afterward in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius—for the next coming generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world—now appears for the first time in history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential, function. He was the son of Hermokrates—not that eminent person whose death has been just described, but another person of the same name, whether related or not, we do not know. It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents for military action—bravery, force of will, and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead by his relations. In this manner he escaped the sentence of banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced as unexpectedly living—we may presume that his opponents and the leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his daring and address to the Hermokratean party, as the person most fit to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs of their late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party lent their aid to exalt him.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing the sentiments of the rich—and that they seem to have manifested but little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies at Motye and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects, the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to

remonstrate against them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had been got together during the winter, greater than that which had sacked Selinus and Himera; 300,000 men, according to Ephorus—120,000, according to Xenophon and Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed across, in a fleet of 120 triremes, with no less than 1500 transports. To protect the landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to the Bay of Motye. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and watchfulness, immediately dispatched the like number of triremes to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the further arrival of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans to retire. Presently afterward the grand armament appeared, disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western cape of Sicily.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of mercenaries for the defense of that town, they engaged him in their service, with 1500 hoplites; re-enforced by 800 of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and

magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population was very great; comprising, according to one account, 20,000 citizens among an aggregate total of 200,000 males—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an aggregate total of no less than 800,000 persons; numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted further than as indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticoes, especially the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius—its statues and pictures—its abundance of chariots and horses—its fortifications—its sewers—its artificial lake of nearly a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked with fish—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities of the Hellenic world. Of the numerous prisoners taken at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage or ornament of the city. The hospitality of the wealthy citizens—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others—was carried even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses, which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93d Olympiad—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him home in procession with 300 chariots, each drawn by a pair of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amid all this wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, not very consistent with soldierlike efficiency, were allowed to the citizens on guard.

Such was Agrigentum in May, 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both propositions were declined.

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum, with its citadel, was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated from each

other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the loftiest, being about 1100 feet above the level of the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side toward the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled inclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine sepulchers.

Re-enforced by 800 Campanian mercenaries, with the 1500 other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from Gela—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was forced to retire at night-fall; and even lost his battering train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged. Desisting from further attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was arrested by a thunder-bolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every night the specters of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as offerings to Poseidon.

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon, while desisting from all further meddling with the tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but the maneuver produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Re-enforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse, on reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon dispatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians; who, however, after a strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day—as had happened in the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than remissness, cowardice, or corruption (so it was contended), on the part of the generals—first the Syracusan generals, and next the Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the Agri-

gentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menes—himself one of the leaders, seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The concurrence of Menes, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was severely censured.

How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really guilty, or how far their defense, had it been fairly heard, would have been valid—is a point which our scanty information does not enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for provision and with menace of deserting, round the tent of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him, coupled with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian triremes from Motye and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the Syracusan convoy, noway expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan triremes were destroyed, the remainder were driven ashore, and the whole fleet of transport fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians, while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defense, and was even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from

the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer tenable for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired, and marched away to Messene, affirming that the time stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.

A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning's dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.

For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest; a fate which Gellias only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments and trophies of the city—the bull of Phakaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures—were preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decora-

tions to Carthage. While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months' siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterward, by permission of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.

I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world—when the surviving Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests farther after a winter of repose—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property. Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.

Amid so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause. For the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan storeships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and famine in Agrigentum. The efficiency of Dexippus and the other generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before Syracuse, as described by Thucydides. And we can hardly wonder that by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigen-

times—or in extreme alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.

Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of others, with little further result. But it became of far graver import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition-party—repelled during the preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed—now re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more aggressive even than Hermokrates himself.

Throughout ancient as well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in the preceding year. But alarms of every kind now over hung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned; as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia. The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism; Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the scepter into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.

Amid the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians—and as the persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds, real or alleged, not merely with fullness and acrimony, but with a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible de-

bate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. "There they sit, the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict, but lay hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice." Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he caused the execution of Theramenes, in the oligarchical senate, was an offense against law as well as against parliamentary order. The presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order, and fined him, as they were empowered by law. But his partisans were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed—and incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper. That which he had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open defiance of the law. Yet so feeble was the authority of the magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having curruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical sway—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness. His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius, Hipparinus, and others. This latter statement is, in my opinion, the more probable.

Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot's progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes, in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse, or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new Board of Generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed

by his colleagues, and to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus; while probably the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any rate his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the situation to suspect every one. The new Board of Generals being thus discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their country, and burning to save her, having already refused the offers of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus. His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with party antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.

The second step of the despot's progress was now accomplished. Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived from Gela, entreating re-enforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be about to march thither. Dionysius, being empowered to conduct thither a body of 2,000 hoplites with 400 horsemen, turned the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the public

assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote, testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they dispatched envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently return with a larger force.

A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of the double pay—and with the means of coining and circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached the town just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the theater. Amid the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire. What news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within among you. Your magistrates—these very men upon whose watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival—they are the traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretense of treating about the prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their treachery.”

Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd pressing round him—renewed at length, with emphatic formality, in the regular assembly held the next day—and concluding with actual resignation—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed, but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed

with enthusiasm by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood, was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by the restored exiles. What defense the accused generals made, or tried to make, we are not told. It is not likely to prevail, nor did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his partisans to come forward with their main proposition: "Why not get rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious victory over the 300,000 Carthaginians at Himera was achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers." Such rhetoric was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly—when the partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation—when his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without any positive scheme to propose—and when the storm which had already overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers, by what majority we do not know.

The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his dignity, was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense, there need be no hesitation, the money might easily be provided.

This was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the despot's progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power unknown to and above the laws—unlimited and irresponsible. But he was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no intention of permanently abnegating their freedom—that they meant only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving their freedom against a foreign enemy—and that even thus much had been obtained by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed than symptoms of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke. It therefore now remained for Dionysius

to insure the perpetuity of his power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and insuring their pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a further vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.

But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a maneuver, proclaiming that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days' provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there, besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him. For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view, than an outmarch of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host of Agri-
gentum.

Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the darkness around his own tent—ordered fires to be kindled—summoned on a sudden his most intimate friends—and affected to retire under their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in *Comitia Centuriata*—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman repub-

lie. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed during the preceding night—calling upon them emphatically to stand by him against the incessant snares of his enemies—and demanding for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous partisans, met with complete success. The assembly—Syracusan or quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini—passed a formal decree, granting to Dionysius a body-guard of 600 men, selected by himself and responsible to him alone. One speaker indeed proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many. But such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered, when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned, Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He immediately enrolled more than 1000 men, selected as well for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized, regiment of household troops, he added further a sort of standing army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers; choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating slaves for the purpose. Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer away to Peloponnesus—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering them anew with men devoted to himself.

This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope of open resistance desperate. And the popular assem-

bly—convoked under the pressure of his force, and probably composed of none but his partisans—was found so subservient as to condemn and execute, upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the previous public assemblies. One step alone remained to decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased chief.

Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot's progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than usual, since he had before him not merely Euphorus and Timæus, but also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the public mind, he was enabled to stimulate an ultra-democratical ardor both in defense of the people against the rich, and in denunciation of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in 406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 B.C. the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius—who took up the trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and then

shutting the door by force against all future voting and all correction—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.

In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and never afterward to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing protector.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

THE proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice of 406 B.C. He was not molested during this period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage—and in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not be carried away. In the spring Imilkon moved forward toward Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines. He insured his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus—the Geloans despatched pressing entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving

to send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defense was brave and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against the Carthaginian plunderers—the mass of the citizens repelled the assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the walls themselves—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum—gave way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; re-establishing during the night the breaches which had been made during the day. The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defense was thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected re-enforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to 50,000 men, according to Ephorus—to 30,000 foot, and 1000 horse, as Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus to co-operate with them off Gela.

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks. At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius, finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side toward the sea, as no danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there, accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks, sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies, was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the

attack proved successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but re-enforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the center never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions recently taken for defense. And thus the Sicilians on the right, not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been already repulsed, were compelled to retreat after a brave struggle, by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the one and the other—we are unable certainly to determine. There will appear reasons for suspecting that Dionysius was not displeased at a repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnaeus and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial truce for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of 2,000 light troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians. Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them.

All hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina—Kamarina the immovable, as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced all the Kamarinaean population to become partners in the flight of the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road from Gela to Syracuse; a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy. The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind; old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.

Amid the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before was now himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army. He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans, intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders, might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries especially, the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss, but had never been brought into action; that while his measures taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his flight—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all—except his own mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italian allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the center of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the

principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in this recent enterprise, but, still more from the despotism which he had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having been commenced in gross fraud, and consummated by violence, was now deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn—since Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the Carthaginians, as those other generals whom he had denounced and superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of re-establishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterward died of the outrage. Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed against him. After having betrayed his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted)—he had been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina (the outer city) against his re-entry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the

army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers—100 horsemen and 600 foot—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse; a distance of 400 stadia, or about 45 English miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them. Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen—who but the the evening before were masters of the city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in it—were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves in the town of Ætna.

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by the Sicilian allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their betrayer—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius. Leontini thus became again an independent city,

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The horsemen whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were

for the most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before which he was liable to be arraigned—as he himself had arraigned his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All such popular securities he had already over-ridden or subverted. The superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might still have found defense difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of this sort, he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions, and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep, besides, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messene, as well as all the Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.

3. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore of Sicily—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina, the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper, which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event, however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way somewhat confused. And when we read, as one of the articles in the treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius”—we discern plainly that there was also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints against Dionysius, which charged him with having

betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and Agathokles—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterward—availed themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of Syracuse.

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army, is said to have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers. The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.

It was in the summer of 405 B. C. that this treaty was concluded, which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendancy and power of Athens, and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The Dekarchies and Harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls—with all traces of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers—and under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Amid the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the

withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius. It had been brought about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defenses of every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient places for transacting business, porticoes spacious enough to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort, destined for a public magazine of corn. It suited his purpose that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling him to attack them whenever he chose—and making him master, at the same time, of the grand means of war and defense against foreign enemies.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step toward perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the islet or interior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans

and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in the citadel—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept Syracuse in subjection. Having provided houses for his soldiers, by extruding the residents in Ortygia—he proceeded to assign to them a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command of his mercenaries—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to have no further information than is contained in two or three brief sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion not very long afterward, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as amounting to about 10,000. To insure landed properties to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterward, prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native Syracusan residents.

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that the pecuniary cost of such fortification must have been very heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five

years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is, twenty per cent per annum upon their whole property. To what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burden of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius when the Horsemen were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came back from Gela.

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly of armed Syracusan citizens, under a commander named Dorikus. While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers; upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again with loud shouts free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan

enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily re-enforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messene and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess themselves further of the outer city Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as to the Lesser Harbor. A considerable naval force was sent to their aid from Messene and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him up on the sea-side; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no further assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser. The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert him.

Several of the mercenaries attracted by such offers, as well as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue; to purchase the immediate aid of a body of 1200 mercenary Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law, Polyxenus, advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends—Heloris and Megakles—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting his post at full

speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged away by the leg. Accordingly Dionysius determined to hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians, with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his defense. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to oppose this, having insured to Dionysius by special article of treaty the possession of Syracuse.

To gain time for their arrival by deluding and disarming the assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged defense, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all further attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust and ungrateful, to be sent back to *Ætna*; while the hoplites dispersed about the country to their various lands and properties. The same difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis, was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival of the Campanians, who, attacking and defeating them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a re-enforcement of 300 fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining the Horsemen at *Ætna*; a resolution, which they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newton, on the south-west of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to *Ætna*, where no less than 7,000 hoplites were now assem-

bled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance toward the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained in exile at *Ætna*. Such as did return were well-treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and re-established in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from *Gela*), the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for his restoration, he was well-aware that they were utterly faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against him. But he adopted other more efficient means for strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named *Aristus*, recently dispatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While *Nikoteles*, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or less of free government—*Aristus*, on the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from *Nikoteles*, whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next pretending himself to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendancy of Sparta in defense of their freedom, he gained their confidence, and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses in the city to be searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he further proceeded to construct additional fortifications round the islet of *Ortygia*, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded himself with precautions probably stronger than any other

Grecian despot had ever accumulated. He was yet further strengthened by the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her imperial ascendancy; and by the presence of the mighty Lysander at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him. The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and Kephallenia with no other possession left except their arms—and whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years afterward, has been described in a preceding chapter.

So large a mercenary force, while the people at Syracuse were prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian (Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—and the Sikels, toward the center of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians, when it had been declared independent. Naxos and Katana had contrived to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation, yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation made for a strenuous defense; so that he could do nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the interior Sikel territory, toward Enna and Erbita.

His march in this direction, however, was little more than a feint, for the purpose of masking his real views upon Naxos and Katana, with both of which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxos, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennean citizen named Acimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the scepter of his native town—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself admitted afterward. Acimnestus made the attempt and succeeded, but did not fulfill his engagement to Dionysius: who resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted

the Ennæans in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without further meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxos and Katana had taken effect.

At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison. Naxos was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his possession hostages for their fidelity; the site of Naxos, to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of Alæsa.

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to insure the defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea

to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have been entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal evidence. In a preceding volume, I have already described the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the summit of the slope, called, Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed, the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs. This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep, though less steep on the northern side than on the southern. Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope of Epipolæ. I have already described how the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half finished—having been carried from the center of Epipolæ southward down to the Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how he next intercepted their further progress, by carrying out, from the outer wall of Achradina, a cross-wall traversing their intended line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, inclosing the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or excres-

cences, Tyche and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He carried out an outer line of defense, starting from the sea near the port called Trogilus, inclosing the suburb called Tyche (which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected together—not as in the time of Gylippus, by a single cross-wall out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but—by one continuous new line bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its length, to serve both as means of defense and as permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length. The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected 60,000 of the most effective hands to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry, while 6,000 teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of 100 feet each to regiments of suitable number, each under the direction of an overseer.

As yet we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud, violence, and spoliation for the purpose of establishing his own dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia, a guard-house both of defense and aggression merely for himself against the people of Syracuse—it was a valuable protection to the people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers. It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly, it was exceedingly popular among the Syracusans, and produced between them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amid the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor, proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way. Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the

numbers assembled, often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution, at least in its complete consummation. For the defenses provided at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us of ancient fortification. To bring them into such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterward.

To provide defense for Syracuse against a besieging army, however, was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both toward the Syracusans and toward the other Sicilian Greeks.

Toward the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change. The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and conciliation. Where the system had before been so fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius had enforced spoliation and transfers of land and house-property by wholesale. Now, while the despot himself was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquility of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly appetites of the

subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians, thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made it now his interest to conciliate some measure of good-will from the Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage, the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a restoration of the arms snatched from them.

Toward the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines, in spite of their fellowship of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias to lend assistance, being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxos and Katana, with the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become yet more formidable; a resolution in which they were greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven from *Ætna* and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to Messene, soliciting co-operation against Dionysius, upon the urgent plea that the ruin of Naxos and Katana could not be passed over, either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of the strait. These representations made so much impression on the generals of Messene, that without consulting the public assembly, they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched along with the Rhegines toward the Syracusan frontier—6,000 Rhégine and 4,000 Messenian hoplites—

600 Rhegine and 400 Messenian horsemen—with 50 Rhegine triremes. But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian soldiers turned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single-handed, went home also.

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now re-conducted them back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messene. He was anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find no Grecian allies to co-operate with them in Sicily. He acquired an influence in Messene, by making to the city large concessions of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired, we do not know. He further endeavored to open an intimate connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxos and Katana; and it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for him. Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or resolution of the assembly), it left the bitterest animosity; a feeling which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request, with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-balanced aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri. And even among the Lokrians, the

request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named Aristides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristides to be put to death.

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to establish with the Greek cities near the strait of Messene, were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage, which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint, partly by allurements, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers, artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric tribes round the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc., from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a bustling military workshop—not only the market-places, porticoes, palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he further offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties; especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation were not less than 140,000 in number, and the breast-plates 14,000, many of them unrivaled in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion. The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of his son.

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on the well-clothed slopes of *Ætna* and the Calabrian Apennines; teams of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment of Syracuse comprised 110 triremes; the existing docks contained 150 ship-houses, or covered slips for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith undertook the construction of 160 new ship-houses, each competent to hold two vessels—and then commenced the building of new ship of war to the number of 200; while he at the same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As yet, the largest ships of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles; it was not until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood pre-eminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of maneuvering consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship's direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy's ship with the beak of their own—so, if the size of their ship had been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse, they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of triremes. Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the previous defenses on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius. Their sympathy and

concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

After the material means for war had thus been completed—an operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three years—it remained to levy men. On this point the ideas of Dionysius were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well as from cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one half was manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also. He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native and appropriate weapons.

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two wives—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman named Aristomache, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomache was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white horses. He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bed-chamber he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the younger; and four by Aristomache: but the latter was for a considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences. It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomache was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of them

equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius as he seems at this moment, when every man's mind was full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among the people, without that fear of assassination which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bed-chamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives or his daughters.

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans, this ought to be an imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join him.

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was lucrative. But though such may have been the case in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances, any

Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage) can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily, as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second and third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was however no alternative, so that they forthwith dispatched some of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defense of their Sicilian possessions.

The first news that reached them was appalling. Dionysius had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe at the superiority of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject to Carthage; cities whose number and importance had since fearfully augmented.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special occasion and then to disband them afterward. Accordingly, as soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to

death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities. The Hellenic war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These "Sicilian vespers," which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learned from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear, however, from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its own home.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Silenus joined Dionysius on his march along the coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened by all these re-enforcements, he mustered a force of 80,000 men, besides more than 3,000 cavalry; while the ships of war which accompanied him along the coast were nearly 200, and the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than 500. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian settlement of Motye, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately north of Cape Lilybæum.

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily—Motye, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis—Motye was at once the nearest to the mother-city, the most important, and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, though narrow footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force—the Motyenes put themselves in the best condition of defense. They broke up their mole, again insulated themselves from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motye the sufferings of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in

cojunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but Ankyræ, Soloëis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella all held out, though the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands. Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motye with the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) which divided Motye from the main island, or at least as much of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general Imilkon tried two successive maneuvers. He first sent a squadron of ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to detach a portion of his fleet from Motye. Though the attack, however, was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor, yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious impression, or creating the diversion intended. Imilkon next made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius as they lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motye. Crossing over from Carthage by night, with 100 ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybaeum, and appeared at day-break off Motye. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared to attack, while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed had it not been saved by his numerous land-force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles from this assembled crowd, as well as from the decks of the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapultæ, of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially effective; projecting large masses

to a great distance, it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus arrested Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward, across a level tongue of land more than two miles in breadth, which separated the harbor of Motye from the outer sea. Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships, and in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned at once back to Africa.

Though the citizens of Motye saw from the walls the mournful spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motye itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault. While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the walls, with yards projecting outward. Upon these yards stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the wood-work, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses behind into a state of defense, and barricaded the streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the

ground by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night's repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defenses. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position within the town before resistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial earthway to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after it had become hopeless.

The victorious host who now poured into Motye, incensed not merely by the length and obstinacy of the defense, but also by antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples—a step which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained from further slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of active prosperity, fell into their hands, and Dionysius allowed to them the full plunder of the town as a recompense for the toils of the siege. He further distributed special recompenses to those who had distinguished themselves, 100 minæ being given to Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery, but he reserved for a more cruel fate Daimenes and various other Greeks who had been taken among them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified, a specimen of the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic neighbors and enemies.

The siege of Motye having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius now re-conducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a large portion of his fleet, 120 ships, under the command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the neigh-

boring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy's camp, with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus, to 100,000 men, re-enforced afterward in Sicily by 30,000 more—and in the more ample computations of Ephorus, to 300,000 foot, 4,000 horse, 400 chariots of war, 400 ships of war, and 6,000 transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at Carthage, even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place of rendezvous. The transports made directly for that port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of war approached the harbor of Motye and sailed from thence along the coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost vessels of the large transport fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with 5,000 men, and 200 chariots of war; yet the remaining fleet reached the port in safety, and were joined by Imilkon with the ships of war. The land-force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led them to Motye, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motye, which he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout defence.

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised to learn that he made no effort to prevent its re-capture,

though he was then not far off, besieging Egesta—and though his soldiers, elate with the successes of the preceding year, were eager for a general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous, resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better homes elsewhere. Most of them however declined his offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result of moment—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak against him shortly afterward at Syracuse.

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished by recent misfortune—resolved to turn his arms against Messene in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good repair—and moreover at the present moment yet further enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius. Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his fleet coasting in the same direction to co-operate with him. He made terms with Kephalædium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and at length reached Cape Pelorus a few miles from Messene. His rapid march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many of them, conceiving defense to be impossible against so numerous a host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should one day carry water in Messene. The interpreters affirmed that “to carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave;” hence the Messenians, persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelorus, and oppose his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders. A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side

almost unguarded. The troops who had marched out toward Pelorus hastened back, but were too late; while Imilkon himself also, pushing forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected parts of the wall. Messene was taken; and its unhappy population fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels; while about 200 of them near the harbor, cast themselves into the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly defended—yet his capture of Messene itself was an event both imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally, and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motye in the preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly burnt and demolished; a task, which his numerous hosts are said to have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything but ruins without a trace of human residence. He received adhesion and re-enforcements from most of the Sikels of the interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with their city probably unwallled. But anxious as they were to escape from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxos—to the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of Taurus, a fortified post which formed the beginning of the city afterward known as Tauromenium. Magon was sent with the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messene, exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defense on her northern frontier. Naxos and Katana being both unfortified, he was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called Etna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts, wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile plains around. He had still a force of 30,000 foot and

more than 3,000 horse; he had also a fleet of 180 ships of war—triremes and others. During the year preceding, he had brought out both a land-force and a naval force much superior to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he could now command no more, even for defense and at home—or what had become of the remainder—we are not told. Of the 180 ships of war, 60 were only manned by the extraordinary proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes in the amount of military force from year to year are perceptible among Carthaginians as well as Greeks—indeed throughout most part of Grecian history: the armies being got together chiefly for special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther dispatched envoys to Sparta, soliciting a re-enforcement of 1000 mercenary auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defense that he could throughout the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, having his fleet also moving in co-operation, immediately off shore.

Toward this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon intended himself to march with the land-force on shore, keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption took place from *Ætna*; so that the stream of lava from the mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon was sailing southward toward Katana.

Dionysius availed himself of this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of 500 sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen—that is, furnished with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to co-operate with his fleet; an advantage, which in ancient naval warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy's means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to attack him—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral—though ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his inferior numbers—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and being apparently farther out to

sea than the enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers presently closed round him, and after a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than 100 of the Syracusan ships, with 20,000 men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewn, both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the Carthaginians were unable to save many of their own seamen, either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was dearly purchased.

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged, yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterward yet farther to Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable—partly as visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph for encouragement to his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the arrival of Imilkon. The latter, after no very long interval, came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians were now again in co-operation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Eutella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians. The Campanians of

Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at Messene. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.

Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messene; for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing, if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies. He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth. Polyxenus his brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward toward Syracuse both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force. Two hundred and eight ships of war first rowed in, marshaled in the best order and adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed by transports, 500 of them carrying soldiers, and 1000 others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The total number of vessels,

we are told, reached almost 2,000, covering a large portion of the Great Harbor. The numerous land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his head-quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of war also, being divided into two fleets of 100 ships each, showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the mainland) wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.

Having by such defiance further raised the confidence of his own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor, midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at the little bay called Daskon. He further encircled his whole camp, near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating Gelon and his wife Damarete. In these various fortified posts he was able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that city, afterward separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephone, which he stripped of their rich treasures. But if such was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the center of Epipokæ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left arm northward to the seat of Trogilus. As far as we are able to make out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipokæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipokæ; so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around remained partially

open on two sides—westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolæ—and northward toward Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger than the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and insure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits.

One naval conflict, especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon's fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They captured the admiral's ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still further accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public with unbounded exultation. "Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any longer?" Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort freedom—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when a citizen named Theodorus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman or Knight—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius and anxiety for freedom, which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately and were well known to feel.

Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodorus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an emphatic denunciation of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his dominion. "Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a worse enemy than the Carthaginians; who, if victorious, would be satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel against us by means of these slaves, together with a host of other mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise his voice in defense of the laws and constitution. He has abused our confidence—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate him general—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has compelled him to restore—and these, if we are men, we shall now employ for the recovery of our own freedom."

"If the conduct of Dionysius toward Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no better toward the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered Messene to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxos and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their

landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to insure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors of Carthage as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodorus) in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens—or from our metropolis Corinth—or from the Spartans, the presidents of all Greece.”

Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodorus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the Syracusans—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterward upheld, his dominion over them—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words Theodorus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were now lending aid in the defense, under the command of Pharakidas. That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodorus. Among various other sentiments of traditional respect toward Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier period of her history. Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even ex-

pected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodorus, and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in Sicily. Bitterly, indeed, were they disappointed. Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the Thirty tyrants of Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis. Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians—not to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this declaration was denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste round his person—having probably been sent for as soon as the voice of a free spokesman was heard. And he was thus enabled to dismiss an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodorus, well aware that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between the victory of *Ægeospotami* and the defeat of *Knidus*), pursued throughout the Grecian world.

Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been assisted to escape. Under the first impression of alarm, he strove to gain something like popularity, by conciliatory language and demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and Persephone, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us) by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper—the rapidity with which it spread from man to man—and the countless victims which it speedily accumulated—appear to have equaled, if not surpassed, the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of 150,000 unburied bodies. The military strength of the Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and land, he intrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines, with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he surprised Plemmyrium), and making a circuit until he came, on the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyane; thus getting on the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first dispatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of 1000 mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same time gave

secret directions to the horse to desert their comrades and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been made jointly, in the heat of the combat the horsemen fled, leaving their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians. We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a fact which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed to keep them under his command.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack, first upon the fort of Polichne, next upon that near the naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put them on their defense, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against them on the quarter or mid-ships, and broke through the line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the best ships were thus speedily disabled. Following up their success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land, the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonteres were hauled up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonteres; upon which the flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard; while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land. But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen. The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, **children, and aged men**, testifying their exultation by loud shouts,

and stretching their hands to heaven—as on the memorable day, near twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and towing away some of the enemy's vessels deserted but not yet on fire. The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans victorious by land as well as by sea, encamped near the temple of Olympian Zeus, which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though they had succeeded in forcing the defenses of the latter both at Polichne and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected and deplorable condition.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence—near Agrigentum and near Gela—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise impracticable—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army, with the Sikels of the interior on his side—had he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon dispatched a secret envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of 300 talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested. Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The sum of 300 talents was accordingly sent across by night to Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius. During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians, put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the rest, with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.

Dionysius—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing—applied

himself with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon, speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No command—no common cause—no bond of union—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amid the general dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were probably sold as slaves.

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at Syracuse—yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amid the extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was suspended; all the temples were shut; while the authorities and the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his impiety toward the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans, who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the temples, with words of atonement and supplication—replied to all the inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper—and then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved himself to death.

Yet the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection; but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom

lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject-towns had on this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to have reached 120,000 men. They established their head-quarters at Tunes (Tunis), a town within short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in the field that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephone; who, not content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice of human victims—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or Persephone; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and Persephone were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left at liberty to push his conquests in another direction against the Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign—successful against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage—will come to be recounted in my next succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS (*continued*).—FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B.C. 394-367.

In my preceding chapter I described the first eleven years of the reign of Dionysius called the elder, as despot at Syracuse, down to his first great war against the Carthaginians; which war ended by a sudden turn of fortune in his favor, at a time when he was hard pressed and actually besieged. The victorious Carthaginian army before Syracuse was utterly ruined by a terrible pestilence, followed by ignominious treason on the part of its commander Imilkon.

Within the space of less than 30 years we read of four distinct epidemic distempers, each of frightful severity, as having afflicted Carthage and her armies in Sicily, without touching either Syracuse or the Sicilian Greeks. Such epidemics were the most irresistible of all enemies to the Carthaginians, and the most effective allies to Dionysius. The second and third—conspicuous among the many fortunate events of his life—occurred at the exact juncture necessary for rescuing him from a tide of superiority in the Carthaginian arms, which seemed in a fair way to overwhelm him completely. Upon what physical conditions the frequent repetition of such a calamity depended, together with the remarkable fact that it was confined to Carthage and her armies, we know partially in respect to the third of the four cases, but not at all in regard to the others.

The flight of Imilkon with the Carthaginians from Syracuse left Dionysius and the Syracusans in the full swing of triumph. The conquests made by Imilkon were altogether lost, and the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily was now cut down to that restricted space in the western corner of the island, which it had occupied prior to the invasion of Hannibal in 409 B.C. So prodigious a success probably enabled Dionysius to put down the opposition recently manifested among the Syracusans to the continuance of his rule. We are told that he was greatly embarrassed by his mercenaries, who, having been for some time without pay, manifested such angry discontent as to threaten his downfall. Dionysius seized the person of their commander, the Spartan Aristoteles: upon which the soldiers mutinied and flocked in arms round his residence, demanding in fierce terms both the liberty of their commander and the payment of their arrears. Of these demands Dionysius eluded the first by saying that he would send away Aristoteles to Sparta, to be tried and dealt with among his own countrymen: as to the second, he pacified the soldiers by assigning to them, in exchange for their pay, the town and territory of Leontini. Willingly accepting this rich bribe, the

most fertile soil of the island, the mercenaries quitted Syracuse to the number of 10,000 to take up their residence in the newly assigned town, while Dionysius hired new mercenaries in their place. To these (including perhaps the Iberians or Spaniards who had recently passed from the Carthaginian service into his) and to the slaves whom he had liberated, he intrusted the maintenance of his dominion.

These few facts, which are all that we hear, enable us to see that the relations between Dionysius and the mercenaries by whose means he ruled Syracuse were troubled and difficult to manage. But they do not explain to us the full cause of such discord. We know that a short time before Dionysius had rid himself of 1000 obnoxious mercenaries by treacherously betraying them to death in a battle with the Carthaginians. Moreover, he would hardly have seized the person of Aristoteles, and sent him away for trial, if the latter had done nothing more than demand pay really due to his soldiers. It seems probable that the discontent of the mercenaries rested upon deeper causes, perhaps connected with that movement in the Syracusan mind against Dionysius, manifested openly in the invective of Theodorus. We should have been glad also to know how Dionysius proposed to pay the new mercenaries, if he had no means of paying the old. The cost of maintaining his standing army, upon whomsoever it fell, must have been burdensome in the extreme. What became of the previous residents and proprietors at Leontini, who must have been dispossessed when this much coveted site was transferred to the mercenaries? On all these points we are unfortunately left in ignorance.

Dionysius now set forth toward the north of Sicily to re-establish Messene; while those other Sicilians, who had been expelled from their abodes by the Carthaginians, got together and returned. In reconstituting Messene after its demolition by Imilkon, he obtained the means of planting there a population altogether in his interests, suitable to the aggressive designs which he was already contemplating against Rhegium and the other Italian Greeks. He established in it 1000 Lokrians—4,000 persons from another city the name of which we cannot certainly make out—and 600 of the Peloponnesian Messenians. These latter had been expelled by Sparta from Zakynthus and Naupaktus at the close of the Peloponnesian war, and had taken service in Sicily with Dionysius. Even here the hatred of Sparta followed them. Her remonstrances against his project of establishing them in a city of consideration bearing their own ancient name, obliged him to withdraw them: upon which he planted them on a portion of the Abakene territory on the northern coast. They gave to their new city the name of Tyndaris, admitted many new residents, and conducted their affairs so prudently as presently to attain a total of 5,000 citizens. Neither here nor at Messene do we find any mention made of the re-establishment of

those inhabitants who had fled when Imilkon took Messene, and who formed nearly all the previous population of the city, for very few are mentioned as having been slain. It seems doubtful whether Dionysius readmitted them when he reconstituted Messene. Renewing with care the fortifications of the city, which had been demolished by Imilkon, he placed in it some of his mercenaries as garrison.

Dionysius next undertook several expeditions against the Sikels in the interior of the island, who had joined Imilkon in his recent attack upon Syracuse. He conquered several of their towns, and established alliances with two of their most powerful princes, at Agyrium and Kentoripæ. Enna and Kephalaedium were also betrayed to him, as well as the Carthaginian dependency of Solus. By these proceedings, which appear to have occupied some time, he acquired powerful ascendancy in the central and north-east parts of the island, while his garrison at Messene insured to him the command of the strait between Sicily and Italy.

His acquisition of this important fortified position was well understood to imply ulterior designs against Rhegium and the other Grecian cities in the south of Italy, among whom accordingly a lively alarm prevailed. The numerous exiles whom he had expelled, not merely from Syracuse, but also from Naxos, Katana, and the other conquered towns, having no longer any assured shelter in Sicily, had been forced to cross over into Italy, where they were favorably received both at Kroton and Rhegium. One of these exiles, Heloris, once the intimate friend of Dionysius, was even appointed general of the forces of Rhegium; forces at that time not only powerful on land, but sustained by a fleet of 70 or 80 triremes. Under his command, a Rhegine force crossed the strait for the purpose partly of besieging Messene, partly of establishing the Naxian and Katanean exiles at Mylæ on the northern coast of the island, not far from Messene. Neither scheme succeeded: Heloris was repulsed at Messene with loss, while the new settlers at Mylæ were speedily expelled. The command of the strait was thus fully maintained to Dionysius: who, on the point of undertaking an aggressive expedition over to Italy, was delayed only by the necessity of capturing the newly established Sikel town on the hill of Taurus—or Tauromenium. The Sikels defended this position, in itself high and strong, with unexpected valor and obstinacy. It was the spot on which the primitive Grecian colonists who first came to Sicily had originally landed, and from whence therefore the successive Hellenic encroachments upon the pre-established Sikel population had taken their commencement. This fact, well known to both parties, rendered the capture on one side as much a point of honor as the preservation on the other; Dionysius spent months in the siege, even throughout midwinter, while the snow covered this hill-top. He made reiterated assaults, which were always repulsed. At last, on one moonless winter night, he found means to scramble over some almost inaccessible crags to

a portion of the town less defended, and to effect a lodgment in one of the two fortified portions into which it was divided. Having taken the first part, he immediately proceeded to attack the second. But the Sikels, resisting with desperate valor, repulsed him, and compelled the storming party to flee in disorder, amid the darkness of night and over the most difficult ground. Six hundred of them were slain on the spot, scarcely any escaped without throwing away their arms. Even Dionysius himself, being overthrown by the thrust of a spear on his cuirass, was with difficulty picked up and carried off alive; all his arms except the cuirass being left behind. He was obliged to raise the siege, and was long in recovering from his wound: the rather as his eyes also had suffered considerably from the snow.

So manifest a reverse, before a town comparatively insignificant, lowered his military reputation, and encouraged his enemies throughout the island. The Agrigentines and others, throwing off their dependence upon him, proclaimed themselves autonomous; banishing those leaders among them who upheld his interest. Many of the Sikels also, elated with the success of their countrymen at Tauromenium, declared openly against him; joining the Carthaginian general Magon, who now, for the first time since the disaster before Syracuse, again, exhibited the force of Carthage in the field.

Since the disaster before Syracuse, Magon had remained tranquil in the western or Carthaginian corner of the island, recruiting the strength and courage of his countrymen, and taking unusual pains to conciliate the attachment of the dependent native towns. Re-enforced in part by the exiles expelled by Dionysius, he was now in a condition to assume the aggressive, and to espouse the cause of the Sikels after their successful defense of Tauromenium. He even ventured to overrun and ravage the Messenian territory; but Dionysius, being now recovered from his wound, marched against him, defeated him in a battle near Abakæna, and forced him to retire again westward, until fresh troops were sent to him from Carthage.

Without pursuing Magon, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, from whence he presently set forth to execute his projects against Rhegium, with a fleet of 100 ships of war. So skillfully did he arrange or mask his movements, that he arrived at night at the gates and under the walls of Rhegium, without the least suspicion on the part of the citizens. Applying combustibles to set fire to the gate (as he had once done successfully at the gate of Achradina), he at the same time planted his ladders against the walls, and attempted an escalade. Surprised and in small numbers, the citizens began their defense; but the attack was making progress, had not the general Heloris, instead of trying to extinguish the flames, bethought himself of encouraging them by heaping on dry fagots and other matters. The conflagration became so violent, that even the assailants themselves were kept off until time was given for the citizens to mount the walls in force; and the city was saved from capture by burning a portion of it.

Disappointed in his hopes, Dionysius was obliged to content himself with ravaging the neighboring territory; after which, he concluded a truce of one year with the Rhegines, and then returned to Syracuse.

This step was probably determined by news of the movements of Magon, who was in the field anew with a mercenary force reckoned at 80,000 men—Libyan, Sardinian, and Italian—obtained from Carthage, where hope of Sicilian success was again reviving. Magon directed his march through the Sikel population in the center of the island, receiving the adhesion of many of their various townships. Agyrium, however, the largest and most important of all, resisted him as an enemy. Agyris, the despot of the place, who had conquered much of the neighboring territory, and had enriched himself by the murder of several opulent proprietors, maintained strict alliance with Dionysius. The latter speedily came to his aid, with a force stated at 20,000 men, Syracusans and mercenaries. Admitted into the city, and co-operating with Agyris, who furnished abundant supplies, he soon reduced the Carthaginians to great straits. Magon was encamped near the river Chrysas, between Agyrium and Morgantine; in an enemy's country, harassed by natives who perfectly knew the ground, and who cut off in detail all his parties sent out to obtain provisions. The Syracusans indeed, disliking or mistrusting such tardy methods, impatiently demanded leave to make a vigorous attack: and when Dionysius refused, affirming that with a little patience the enemy must be speedily starved out, they left the camp and returned home. Alarmed at their desertion, he forthwith issued a requisition for a large number of slaves to supply their places. But at this very juncture, there arrived a proposition from the Carthaginians to be allowed to make peace and retire; which Dionysius granted, on condition that they should abandon to him the Sikels and their territory—especially Tauromenium. Upon these terms peace was accordingly concluded, and Magon again returned to Carthage.

Relieved from these enemies, Dionysius was enabled to restore those slaves, whom he had levied under the recent requisition, to their masters. Having established his dominion fully among the Sikels, he again marched against Tauromenium, which on this occasion was unable to resist him. The Sikels, who had so valiantly defended it, were driven out to make room for new inhabitants, chosen from among the mercenaries of Dionysius.

Thus master both of Messene and Tauromenium, the two most important maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, Dionysius prepared to execute his ulterior schemes against the Greeks in the south of Italy. These still powerful, though once far more powerful, cities were now suffering under a cause of decline common to all the Hellenic colonies on the continent. The indigenous population of the interior had been re-enforced, or enslaved, by more warlike emigrants

from behind, who now pressed upon the maritime Grecian cities with encroachment difficult to resist.

It was the Samnites, a branch of the hardy Sabellian race, mountaineers from the central portion of the Apennine range, who had been recently spreading themselves abroad as formidable assailants. About 420 B.C. they had established themselves in Capua and the fertile plains of Campania, expelling or dispossessing the previous Tuscan proprietors. From thence, about 416 B.C., they reduced the neighboring city of Cumæ, the most ancient western colony of the Hellenic race. The neighboring Grecian establishments of Neapolis and Dikæarchia seem also to have come, like Cumæ, under tribute and dominion to the Campanian Samnites, and thus became partially dis-hellenized. These Campanians of Samnite race have been frequently mentioned in the two preceding chapters, as employed on mercenary service both in the armies of the Carthaginians and in those of Dionysius. But the great migration of this warlike race was farther to the south-east, down the line of the Apennines toward the Tarentine Gulf and the Sicilian strait. Under the name of Lucanians they established a formidable power in these regions, subjugating the Cœnотrian population there settled. The Lucanian power seems to have begun and to have gradually increased from about 430 B.C. At its maximum (about 380–360 B.C.) it comprehended most part of the inland territory and considerable portions of the coast, especially the southern coast—bounded by an imaginary line drawn from Metapontum, on the Tarentine Gulf, across the breadth of Italy to Poseidonia or Pæstum, near the mouth of the river Silaris, on the Tyrrhenian or Lower sea. It was about 356 B.C. that the rural serfs called Bruttians rebelled against the Lucanians and robbed them of the southern part of this territory; establishing an independent dominion in the inland portion of what is now called the Farther Calabria—extending from a boundary-line drawn across Italy between Thurii and Laus, down to near the Sicilian strait. About 332 B.C. commenced the occasional intervention of the Epirotic kings from the one side, and the persevering efforts of Rome from the other, which, after long and valiant struggles, left Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, all Roman subjects.

At the period which we have now reached these Lucanians, having conquered the Greek cities of Poseidonia (or Pæstum) and Laus, with much of the territory lying between the Gulfs of Poseidonia and Tarentum, severely harassed the inhabitants of Thurii, and alarmed all the neighboring Greek cities down to Rhegium. So serious was the alarm of these cities that several of them contracted an intimate defensive alliance, strengthening for the occasion that feeble synodical band, and sense of Italiot communion, the form and trace of which seem to have subsisted without the reality, even under marked enmity between particular cities. The conditions of the newly contracted alliance were most stringent; not only binding each city to assist at the first summons any other city invaded by the Lucanians,

but also pronouncing that, if this obligation were neglected, the generals of the disobedient city should be condemned to death. However, at this time the Italiot Greeks were not less afraid of Dionysius and his aggressive enterprises from the south than of the Lucanians from the north; and their defensive alliance was intended against both. To Dionysius, on the contrary, the invasion of the Lucanians from land-ward was a fortunate incident for the success of his own schemes. Their concurrent designs against the same enemies speedily led to the formation of a distinct alliance between the two. Among the allies of Dionysius, too, we must number the Epizephyrian Lokrians; who not only did not join the Italiot confederacy, but espoused his cause against it with ardor. The enmity of the Lokrians against their neighbors the Rhegines was ancient and bitter; exceeded only by that of Dionysius, who never forgave the refusal of the Rhegines to permit him to marry a wife out of their city, and was always grateful to the Lokrians for having granted to him the privilege which their neighbors had refused.

Wishing as yet, if possible, to avoid provoking the other members of the Italiot confederacy, Dionysius still professed to be revenging himself exclusively upon Rhegium; against which he conducted a powerful force from Syracuse. Twenty thousand foot, 1000 horse, and 120 ships of war, are mentioned as the total of his armament. Disembarking near Lokri, he marched across the lower part of the peninsula in a westerly direction, ravaged with fire and sword the Rhegian territory, and then encamped near the strait on the northern side of Rhegium. His fleet followed coastwise round Cape Zephyrium to the same point. While he was pressing the siege, the members of the Italiot synod dispatched from Kroton a fleet of 60 sail, to assist in the defense. Their ships, having rounded Cape Zephyrium, were nearing Rhegium from the south, when Dionysius himself approached to attack them, with fifty ships detached from his force. Though inferior in number, his fleet was probably superior in respect to size and equipment; so that the Krotoniate captains, not daring to hazard a battle, ran their ships ashore. Dionysius here attacked them, and would have towed off all the ships (without their crews) as prizes, had not the scene of action lain so near to Rhegium that the whole force of the city could come forth in re-enforcement while his own army was on the opposite side of the town. The numbers and courage of the Rhegines baffled his efforts, rescued the ships, and hauled them all up upon the shore in safety. Obligated to retire without success, Dionysius was farther overtaken by a terrific storm, which exposed his fleet to the utmost danger. Seven of his ships were driven ashore; their crews, 1500 in number, being either drowned or falling into the hands of the Rhegines. The rest, after great danger and difficulty, either rejoined the main fleet or got into the harbor of Messene, where Dionysius himself in his quinquereme also found refuge, but only at midnight, and after imminent risk for several

hours. Disheartened by this misfortune as well as by the approach of winter, he withdrew his forces for the present and returned to Syracuse.

A part of his fleet, however, under Leptines, was dispatched northward along the south-western coast of Italy to the Gulf of Elea, to co-operate with the Lucanians; who from that coast and from inland were invading the inhabitants of Thurii on the Tarentine Gulf. Thurii was the successor, though with far inferior power, of the ancient Sybaris; whose dominion had once stretched across from sea to sea, comprehending the town of Laus, now a Lucanian possession. Immediately on the appearance of the Lucanians, the Thurians had dispatched an urgent message to their allies, who were making all haste to arrive, pursuant to covenant. But before such junction could possibly take place the Thurians, confiding in their own native force of 14,000 foot and 10,000 horse, marched against the enemy single-handed. The Lucanian invaders retreated, pursued by the Thurians; who followed them even into that mountainous region of the Appenines which stretches between the two seas, and which presents the most formidable danger and difficulty for all military operations. They assailed successfully a fortified post or village of the Lucanians, which fell into their hands with a rich plunder. By such partial advantage they were so elated that they ventured to cross over all the mountain passes even to the neighborhood of the southern sea, with the intention of attacking the flourishing town of Laus—once the dependency of their Sybaritan predecessors. But the Lucanians, having allured them into these impracticable paths, closed upon them behind with greatly increased numbers, forbade all retreat, and shut them up in a plain surrounded with high and precipitous cliffs. Attacked in this plain by numbers double their own, the unfortunate Thurians underwent one of the most bloody defeats recorded in Grecian history. Out of their 14,000 men, 10,000 were slain, under merciless orders from the Lucanians to give no quarter. The remainder contrived to flee to a hill near the sea shore, from whence they saw a fleet of ships of war coasting along at no great distance. Distracted with terror, they were led to fancy or to hope that these were the ships expected from Rhegium to their aid; though the Rhegians would naturally send their ships when demanded, to Thurii, on the Tarentine Gulf, not to the lower sea near Laus. Under this impression, 1000 of them swam off from the shore to seek protection on ship-board. But they found themselves, unfortunately, on board the fleet of Leptines, brother and admiral of Dionysius, come for the express purpose of aiding the Lucanians. With a generosity not less unexpected than honorable, this officer saved their lives, and also, as it would appear, the lives of all the other defenseless survivors; persuading or constraining the Lucanians to release them, on receiving one mina of silver per man.

This act of Hellenic sympathy restored three or four thousand cit-

izens on ransom to Thurii, instead of leaving them to be massacred or sold by the barbarous Lucanians, and procured the warmest esteem for Leptines personally among the Thurians and other Italiot Greeks. But it incurred the strong displeasure of Dionysius, who now proclaimed openly his project of subjugating these Greeks, and was anxious to encourage the Lucanians as indispensable allies. Accordingly he dismissed Leptines, and named as admiral his other brother Thearides. He then proceeded to conduct a fresh expedition; no longer intended against Rhegium alone, but against all the Italiot Greeks. He departed from Syracuse with a powerful force—20,000 foot and 3,000 horse, with which he marched by land in five days to Messene; his fleet under Thearides accompanying him—40 ships of war and 300 transports with provisions. Having first successfully surprised and captured near the Lipari isles a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, the crews of which he constituted prisoners at Messene; he transported his army across the strait into Italy, and laid siege to Kaulonia—on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, and conterminous with the northern border of his allies the Lokrians. He attacked this place vigorously, with the best siege machines which his arsenal furnished.

The Italiot Greeks, on the other hand, mustered their united force to relieve it. Their chief center of action was Kroton, where most of the Syracusan exiles, the most forward of all champions in the cause, were now assembled. One of these exiles, Heloris (who had before been named general by the Rhegines), was intrusted with the command of the collective army; an arrangement neutralizing all local jealousies. Under the cordial sentiment prevailing, an army was mustered at Kroton, estimated at 25,000 foot and 2,000 horse; by what cities furnished, or in what proportions, we are unable to say. At the head of these troops, Heloris marched southward from Kroton to the river Elleporus not far from Kaulonia; where Dionysius, raising the siege, met him. He was about four miles and a half from the Krotoniate army, when he learnt from his scouts that Heloris with a chosen regiment of 500 men (perhaps Syracusan exiles like himself) was considerably in advance of the main body. Moving rapidly forward in the night, Dionysius surprised this advanced guard at break of day, completely isolated from the rest. Heloris, while he dispatched instant messages to accelerate the coming up of the main body, defended himself with his small band against overwhelming superiority of numbers. But the odds were too great. After a heroic resistance, he was slain, and his companions nearly all cut to pieces before the main body, though they came up at full speed, could arrive.

The hurried pace of the Italiot army, however, though it did not suffice to save the general, was of fatal efficacy in deranging their own soldierlike array. Confused and disheartened by finding that Heloris was slain, which left them without a general to direct the

battle or restore order, the Italiots fought for some time against Dionysius, but were at length defeated with severe loss. They effected their retreat from the field of battle to a neighboring eminence, very difficult to attack, yet destitute of water and provisions. Here Dionysius blocked them up, without attempting an attack, but keeping the strictest guard round the hill during the whole remaining day and the ensuing night. The heat of the next day, with total want of water, so subdued their courage, that they sent to Dionysius a herald with propositions entreating to be allowed to depart on a stipulated ransom. But the terms were peremptorily refused; they were ordered to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. Against this terrible requisition they stood out yet awhile, until the increasing pressure of physical exhaustion and suffering drove them to surrender, about the eighth hour of the day.

More than 10,000 disarmed Greeks descended from the hill and defiled before Dionysius, who numbered the companies as they passed with a stick. As his savage temper was well known, they expected nothing short of the harshest sentence. So much the greater was their astonishment and delight, when they found themselves treated not merely with lenity, but with generosity. Dionysius released them all without even exacting a ransom; and concluded a treaty with most of the cities to which they belonged, leaving their autonomy undisturbed. He received the warmest thanks, accompanied by votes of golden wreaths, from the prisoners as well as from the cities; while among the general public of Greece, the act was hailed as forming the prominent glory of his political life. Such admiration was well deserved, looking to the laws of war then prevalent.

With the Krotoniates and other Italiot Greeks (except Rhegium and Lokri) Dionysius had had no marked previous relations, and therefore had not contracted any strong personal sentiment either of antipathy or favor. With Rhegium and Lokri the case was different. To the Lokrians he was strongly attached: against the Rhegines his animosity was bitter and implacable, manifesting itself in a more conspicuous manner by contrast with his recent dismissal of the Krotoniate prisoners; a proceeding which had been probably dictated, in great part, by his anxiety to have his hands free for the attack of isolated Rhegium. After having finished the arrangements consequent upon his victory, he marched against that city and prepared to besiege it. The citizens, feeling themselves without hope of succor, and intimidated by the disaster of the Italiot allies, sent out heralds to beg for moderate terms, and imploring him to abstain from extreme or unmeasured rigor. For the moment, Dionysius seemed to comply with their request. He granted them peace, on condition that they should surrender all their ships of war, seventy in number—that they should pay to him 300 talents in money—and that they should place in his hands 100 hostages. All these demands

were strictly complied with, upon which Dionysius withdrew his army, and agreed to spare the city.

His next proceeding was, to attack Kaulonia and Hipponium; two cities which seem between them to have occupied the whole breadth of the Calabrian peninsula, immediately north of Rhegium and Lokri; Kaulonia on the eastern coast, Hipponium on or near the western. Both these cities he besieged, took, and destroyed; probably neither of them, in the hopeless circumstances of the case, made any strenuous resistance. He then caused the inhabitants of both of them, such at least as did not make their escape, to be transported to Syracuse, where he domiciliated them as citizens, allowing them five years of exemption from taxes. To be a citizen of Syracuse meant, at this moment, to be a subject of his despotism, and nothing more: how he made room for these new citizens, or furnished them with lands and houses, we are unfortunately not informed. But the territory of both these towns, evacuated by its free inhabitants (though probably not by its slaves, or serfs), was handed over to the Lokrians and annexed to their city. That favored city, which had accepted his offer of marriage, was thus immensely enriched both in lands and in collective property. Here again it would have been interesting to hear what measures were taken to appropriate or distribute the new lands; but our informant is silent.

Dionysius had thus accumulated into Syracuse, not only all Sicily (to use the language of Plato), but even an inconsiderable portion of Italy. Such wholesale changes of domicile and property must probably have occupied some months; during which time the army of Dionysius seems never to have quitted the Calabrian peninsula, though he himself may probably have gone for a time in person to Syracuse. It was soon seen that the depopulation of Hipponium and Kaulonia was intended only as a prelude to the ruin of Rhegium. Upon this Dionysius had resolved. The recent covenant into which he had entered with the Rhegines, was only a fraudulent device for the purpose of entrapping them into a surrender of their navy, in order that he might afterward attack them at greater advantage. Marching his army to the Italian shore of the strait, near Rhegium, he affected to busy himself in preparations for crossing to Sicily. In the mean time, he sent a friendly message to the Rhegines, requesting them to supply him for a short time with provisions, under assurance that what they furnished should speedily be replaced from Syracuse. It was his purpose, if they refused, to resent it as an insult, and attack them; if they consented, to consume their provisions, without performing his engagement to replace the quantity consumed; and then to make his attack after all, when their means of holding out had been diminished. At first the Rhegines complied willingly, furnishing abundant supplies. But the consumption continued, and the departure of the army was deferred—first on pretense of the illness of Dionysius, next on other grounds—so that they at

length detected the trick, and declined to furnish any more. Dionysius now threw off the mask, gave back to them their hundred hostages, and laid siege to the town in form.

Regretting too late that they had suffered themselves to be defrauded of their means of defense, the Rhegines nevertheless prepared to hold out with all the energy of despair. Phyton was chosen commander, the whole population was armed, and all the line of wall carefully watched. Dionysius made vigorous assaults, employing all the resources of his battering machinery to effect a breach. But he was repelled at all points obstinately, and with much loss on both sides; several of his machines were also burnt or destroyed by opportune sallies of the besieged. In one of the assaults, Dionysius himself was seriously wounded by a spear thrust in the groin, from which he was long in recovering. He was at length obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, and to rely upon famine alone for subduing these valiant citizens. For eleven months did the Rhegines hold out, against the pressure of want gradually increasing, and at last terminating in the agony and distraction of famine. We are told that a medinnus of wheat came to be sold for the enormous price of five minæ; at the rate of about £14 sterling per bushel: every horse and every beast of burden was consumed: at length hides were boiled and eaten, and even the grass on parts of the wall. Many perished from absolute hunger, while the survivors lost all strength and energy. In this intolerable condition, they were constrained, at the end of near eleven months, to surrender at discretion.

So numerous were these victims of famine, that Dionysius, on entering Rhegium, found heaps of unburied corpses, besides 6,000 citizens in the last stage of emaciation. All these captives were sent to Syracuse, where those who could provide a mina (about £3 17s.) were allowed to ransom themselves, while the rest were sold as slaves. After such a period of suffering, the number of those who retained the means of ransom was probably very small. But the Rhegine general, Phyton, was detained with all his kindred, and reserved for a different fate. First, his son was drowned, by order of Dionysius: next, Phyton himself was chained to one of the loftiest siege-machines, as a spectacle to the whole army. While he was thus exhibited to scorn, a messenger was sent to apprise him, that Dionysius had just caused his son to be drowned. "He is more fortunate than his father by one day," was the reply of Phyton. After a certain time, the sufferer was taken down from this pillory, and led round the city, with attendants scourging and insulting him at every step; while a herald proclaimed aloud, "Behold the man who persuaded the Rhegines to war, thus signally punished by Dionysius!" Phyton, enduring all these torments with heroic courage and dignified silence, was provoked to exclaim in reply to the herald, that the punishment was inflicted because he had refused to betray the city to Dionysius, who would himself soon be overtaken by the divine

vengeance. At length the prolonged outrages, combined with the noble demeanor and high reputation of the victim, excited compassion even among the soldiers of Dionysius himself. Their murmurs became so pronounced, that he began to apprehend an open mutiny for the purpose of rescuing Phyton. Under this fear he gave orders that the torments should be discontinued, and that Phyton with his entire kindred should be drowned.

The prophetic persuasion under which this unhappy man perished, that divine vengeance would soon overtake his destroyer, was noway borne out by the subsequent reality. The power and prosperity of Dionysius underwent abatement by his war with the Carthaginians in 383 B.C., yet remained very considerable even to his dying day. And the misfortunes which fell thickly upon his son the younger Dionysius, more than thirty years afterward, though they doubtless received a religious interpretation from contemporary critics, were probably ascribed to acts more recent than the barbarities inflicted on Phyton. But these barbarities, if not avenged, were at least laid to heart with profound sympathy by the contemporary world, and even commemorated with tenderness and pathos by poets. While Dionysius was composing tragedies (of which more presently) in hopes of applause in Greece, he was himself furnishing real matter of history, not less tragical than the sufferings of those legendary heroes and heroines to which he (in common with other poets) resorted for a subject. Among the many acts of cruelty, more or less aggravated, which it is the melancholy duty of an historian of Greece to recount, there are few so revolting as the death of the Rhegine general; who was not a subject, nor a conspirator, nor a rebel, but an enemy in open warfare—of whom the worst that even Dionysius himself could say, was, that he had persuaded his countrymen into the war. And even this could not be said truly; since the antipathy of the Rhegines toward Dionysius was of old standing, traceable to his enslavement of Naxos and Katana, if not to causes yet earlier—though the statement of Phyton may very probably be true, that Dionysius had tried to bribe him to betray Rhegium (as the generals of Naxos and Katana had been bribed to betray their respective cities), and was incensed beyond measure at finding the proposition repelled. The Hellenic war-practice was in itself sufficiently cruel. Both Athenians and Lacedæmonians put to death prisoners of war by wholesale, after the capture of Melos, after the battle of Ægospotami, and elsewhere. But to make death worse than death by a deliberate and protracted tissue of tortures and indignities, is not Hellenic; it is Carthaginian and Asiatic. Dionysius had shown himself better than a Greek when he released without ransom the Krotoniate prisoners captured at the battle of Kaulonia; but he became far worse than a Greek, and worse even than his own mercenaries, when he heaped aggravated suffering, beyond the simple death-warrant, on the heads of Phyton and his kindred.

Dionysius caused the city of Rhegium to be destroyed or dismantled. Probably he made over the lands to Lokri, like those of Kaulonia and Hipponium. The free Rhegine citizens had all been transported to Syracuse for sale; and those who were fortunate enough to save their liberty by providing the stipulated ransom, would not be allowed to come back to their native soil. If Dionysius was so zealous in enriching the Lokrians, as to transfer to them two other neighboring town-domains, against the inhabitants of which he had no peculiar hatred—much more would he be disposed to make the like transfer of the Rhegine territory, whereby he would gratify at once his antipathy to the one state and his partiality to the other. It is true that Rhegium did not permanently continue incorporated with Lokri; but neither did Kaulonia nor Hipponium. The maintenance of all the three transfers depended on the ascendancy of Dionysius and his dynasty; but for the time immediately succeeding the capture of Rhegium, the Lokrians became masters of the Rhegine territory as well as of the two other townships, and thus possessed all the Calabrian peninsula south of the gulf of Squillace. To the Italiot Greeks generally, these victories of Dionysius were fatally ruinous, because the political union formed among them, for the purpose of resisting the pressure of the Lucanians from the interior, was overthrown, leaving each city to its own weakness and isolation.

The year 387, in which Rhegium surrendered, was also distinguished for two other memorable events; the general peace in Central Greece under the dictation of Persia and Sparta, commonly called the peace of Antalkidas; and the capture of Rome by the Gauls.

The two great ascendant powers in the Grecian world were now, Sparta in Peloponnesus, and Dionysius in Sicily; each respectively fortified by alliance with the other. I have already in a former chapter described the position of Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas; how greatly she gained by making herself the champion of that Persian rescript—and how she purchased, by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Artaxerxes, an empire on land equal to that which she had enjoyed before the defeat of Knidus, though without recovering the maritime empire forfeited by that defeat.

To this great imperial state, Dionysius in the west formed a suitable counterpart. His recent victories in southern Italy had already raised his power to a magnitude transcending all the far-famed recollections of Gelon; but he now still farther extended it by sending an expedition against Kroton. This city, the largest in Magna Græcia, fell under his power; and he succeeded in capturing, by surprise or bribery, even its strong citadel, on a rock overhanging the sea. He seems also to have advanced yet farther with his fleet to attack Thurii; which city owed its preservation solely to the violence of the north winds. He plundered the temple of Here near Cape Lakinium, in the domain of Kroton. Among the ornaments of this temple was one of pre-eminent beauty and celebrity, which at

the periodical festivals was exhibited to admiring spectators; a robe wrought with the greatest skill, and decorated in the most costly manner, the votive offering of a Sybarite named Alkimenēs. Dionysius sold this robe to the Carthaginians. It long remained as one of the permanent religious ornaments of their city, being probably dedicated to the honor of those Hellenic Deities recently introduced for worship: whom (as I have before stated) the Carthaginians were about this time peculiarly anxious to propitiate, in hopes of averting or alleviating the frightful pestilences wherewith they had been so often smitten. They purchased the robe from Dionysius at the prodigious price of 120 talents, or about £27,000 sterling. Incredible as this sum may appear, we must recollect that the honor done to the new Gods would be mainly estimated according to the magnitude of the sum laid down. As the Carthaginians would probably think no price too great to transfer an unrivaled vestment from the wardrobe of the Lakinian Here to the newly established temple and worship of Demeter and Persephone in their city—so we may be sure that the loss of such an ornament, and the spoliation of the holy place, would deeply humiliate the Krotoniates, and with them the crowd of Italiot Greeks who frequented the Lakinian festivals.

Thus master of the important city of Kroton, with a citadel near the sea capable of being held by a separate garrison, Dionysius divested the inhabitants of their southern possession of Skyllētium, which he made over to aggrandize yet further the town of Lokri. Whether he pushed his conquests farther along the Tarentine Gulf so as to acquire the like hold on Thurii or Metapontum, we cannot say. But both of them must have been overawed by the rapid extension and near approach of his power: especially Thurii, not yet recovered from her disastrous defeat by the Lucanians.

Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, Dionysius was enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine enterprises. To escape from his long arm, Syracusan exiles were obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions either founded, or was admitted into, the city of Ancona, high up the Adriatic Gulf. On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity and alliance with the Illyrian tribes, Dionysius on his part sent a fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the Epirotic Molossians, named Alketas, who, residing at Syracuse as an exile, had gained his confidence. He founded the town of Lissus (now Alessio) on the Illyrian coast, considerably north of Epidamnus; and he assisted the Parians in their plantation of two Grecian settlements, in sites still farther northward up the Adriatic Gulf—the islands of Issa and Pharos. His admiral at Lissus defeated the neighboring Illyrian coast-boats, which harassed these newly settled Parians; but with the Illyrian tribes near to Lissus, he maintained an intimate alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with Grecian panoplies. It is

affirmed to have been the purpose of Dionysius and Alketas to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading Epirus and restoring Alketas to his Molossian principality; next in pillaging the wealthy temple of Delphi—a scheme far-reaching, yet not impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a Syracusan fleet, if circumstances favored its execution. The invasion of Epirus was accomplished, and the Molossians were defeated in a bloody battle, wherein 15,000 of them are said to have been slain. But the ulterior projects against Delphi were arrested by the intervention of Sparta, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all farther march southward. Alketas, however, seems to have remained prince of a portion of Epirus, in the territory nearly opposite to Korkyra; where we have already recognized him, in a former chapter, as having become the dependent of Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly.


Another enterprise undertaken by Dionysius about this time was a maritime expedition along the coasts of Latium, Etruria, and Corsica; partly under color of repressing the piracies committed from their maritime cities; but partly, also, for the purpose of pillaging the rich and holy temple of Leukothea at Agylla, or its sea-port Pyrgi. In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments to the amount of 1000 talents. The Agylleans came forth to defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much both in plunder and in prisoners, that Dionysius, after returning to Syracuse and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of 500 talents.

Such was the military celebrity now attained by Dionysius, that the Gauls from Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, sent to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition; from whence perhaps the Gallic mercenaries, whom we afterward find in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms now reached from Lissus on one side to Agylla on the other. Master of most of Sicily and much of Southern Italy, as well as of the most powerful standing army in Greece—the unscrupulous plunderer of the holiest temples everywhere—he inspired much terror and dislike throughout Central Greece. He was the more vulnerable to this sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also a tragic poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we can form no judgment of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn that he had stood second or third, and that one of his compositions gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens, in 368-367 B.C.—the favorable judgment of an Athenian audience affords good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.

During the years immediately succeeding 387 B.C., however, Dionysius the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere. For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud

every word—on the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be biased against what they heard by their fear and hatred of the author. If we believe the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He gave an unfavorable opinion, for which he was sent to prison : on the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and he contrived afterward, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases, to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B.C., Dionysius had sent some of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed ; moreover the actors in coming back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems intrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said), still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy, was infallible ; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose tragedies without being disheartened.

Amid such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B.C., but certainly in the year 384 B.C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in festival at Olympia. The year 387 B.C. was a memorable year both in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalized by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general war of eight years' standing : in the latter, it marked the close of the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation of Kroton and the other Italian Greeks, and subversions of three Grecian cities—Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium—the fate of the Rhegines having been characterized by incidents most pathetic and impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B.C. was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately preceding (those of 392 B.C. and 388 B.C.) having been celebrated in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large proportion of the Hellenic body ; so that the next ensuing festival, the 99th Olympiad in 384 B.C., was stamped with a peculiar character (like the 90th Olympiad in 420 B.C.) as bringing together in religious fraternity those who had long been separated. To every ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiades in 420 B.C.) it was an object of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival. To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seduc-



OLYMPIAN GAMES. CHARIOT RACES.



tive, since he was triumphant over all neighboring enemies—at the pinnacle of his power—and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command. Accordingly he sent thither his *Theory*, or solemn legation for sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve for their lodging on the sacred ground of Olympia. He farther sent several chariots-and-four to contend in the regular chariot races; and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skillful as well as highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before such as were willing to hear them. We must remember that poetical recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.

All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearides, brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons present peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries—the numerous sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had thrown into exile;—and their answers would be of a nature to raise the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three years, extinguished three free Grecian communities—Rhegium, Kaulonia, Hipponium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in 384 B.C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulona. He was a man pre-eminently swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with the title of his native city—"Dikon the Kauloniate." To hear this well-known runner now proclaimed as "Dikon the Syracusan," gave painful publicity to the fact that the free community of Kaulonia no longer existed—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by Dionysius.

In following the history of affairs in central Greece, I have already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic festival in 384 B.C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a citizen of Thurii, Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy

with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. "The Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our western under the despotism of Dionysius. These two are the great potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments of dominion: if both of them combine, they will extinguish what remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the leading Grecian cities; but it is now high time that these cities should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their insolence at once, while it is yet in our power."

Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic harangue (a panegyric harangue, in the ancient sense of the word) delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture of the time which he labored to impress: Hellas already enslaved, both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates of the age, Artaxerxes and Dionysius, and now threatened in her center by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding year Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple. The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their progress. No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against central Greece; and as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but of terror for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great enemy from the east.

Of these two enemies, one (the Persian king) was out of reach. But the second—Dionysius—though not present in person, stood forth by his envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation beyond any man on the ground. His Theory or solemn legation outshone every other by the splendor of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence, bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths of the Adriatic Gulf: his poems, recited by the best artists in Greece, solicited applause—by excellent delivery and fine choric equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display, contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom

he had dispossessed, but was also furnished with something to strike at and vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which insulted them by its showy decorations. He adjured them to interfere and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy Pan-Hellenic festival.

We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming violence of his practical recommendations—how far they actually laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the race—we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder the tents: how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival, and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is further certain, as far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents, disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.

To any one, however, who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its solemnity and its competition for honors of various kinds, it will appear that the mere manifestation of so violent an antipathy, even though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the case would be far worse when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such persons as chose to come and hear; not comprised in the regular solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here, therefore, the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most unreserved explosions. And when we are told that the badness of the poems caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon his verses. Of course the hissing and hooting would make it clearly understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full

license of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophokles or Pindar, could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation, inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being the only channel through which retributive chastisement of Hellas could be made to reach the author. Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to be slain. Even his brother Leptines, and his ancient partisan Philistus, men who had devoted their lives first to his exaltation, and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptines had peculiarly merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile of Leptines did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen years: not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.

Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 384 B.C., together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by recognizing nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by referring to the years 388 B.C. and 386 B.C. that which properly belongs to 384 B.C. Now it is improbable, in the first place, that the poem of Dionysius—himself a man of ability and having every opportunity of profiting by good critics whom he had purposely assembled around him—should have been so ridiculously bad as to disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we conceive the full cir-

cumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B.C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing himself off, like Kresus in his interview with Solon, as the most prosperous and powerful man in the Hellenic world; means beyond the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain; and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognized vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high-wrought state of expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground equal or superior, but simply because it came from *him*; that its very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy against him louder and more violent; that his tents in the sacred ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice, as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the interposition of authority. We learn, indeed, that his chariots failed in the field by unlucky accidents; but in the existing temper of the crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world. Never in any other case do we read of public antipathy, against an individual, being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of the Olympic festival.

Here then were the real and sufficient causes—not the mere ill-success of his poem—which penetrated the soul of Dionysius, driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had silenced the *Vox Populi* at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships, and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd at Olympia.

It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B.C., that Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher Plato. The latter, having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry and curiosity, especially to see Mount Ætna, was introduced by his friends the philosophers of Tarentum to Dion, then a young man, resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomache, the wife of Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere; here I notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character of Diony-

sus. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue, enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably miserable—that true happiness belonged only to the virtuous—and that despots could not lay claim to the merit of courage. This meager abstract does not at all enable us to follow the philosopher's argument. But it is plain that he set forth his general views on social and political subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius as before any simple citizen; and we are further told, that the bystanders were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of twenty minæ, which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis to cause him to be slain on the voyage, or at least to sell him as a slave. Plato was accordingly landed at Ægina, and there sold. He was purchased, or repurchased, by Annikeris of Kyrene, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a moment a slave.

That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon was wont to show toward ideologists, was an event naturally to be expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his way as political opponents.

Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions, military, civil, and religious, at Syracuse. He enlarged the fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb called Neapolis, which suburb was now, it would appear, surrounded by a separate wall of its own, or perhaps may have been so surrounded a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B.C. At the same time, probably, the fort at the Euryalis was enlarged and completed to the point of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now comprised five separately fortified portions—Epipolæ,

Neapolis, Tyche, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own fortification, though the four first were included within the same outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while the Phaleric wall was yet standing.

Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for 200 men of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river Anapus, without the city walls, and he further decorated the city with various new temples in honor of different gods.

Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse, and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious legation to Olympia in 384 B.C.; a legation of which the result had been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended to console, and doubtless did in part console, the Syracusan people for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But this, though an aggression, was a Pan-Hellenic aggression, calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue his name from the like opprobrium in future.

The sum of 1500 talents, recently pillaged from the temple at Agylla, enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his projected war. Entering into intrigues with some of the disaffected dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt, and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some of the Italiot Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon himself and 10,000 men of his army were slain; 5,000 were made prisoners, while the remainder were driven to retreat to a neighboring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were forced to send envoys entreating peace, which Dionysius consented to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be immediately

withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.

The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but stated (what was probably the truth), they could not pledge themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation of Sicily from the Punic yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he triumphantly exalted him on a pedestal higher even than that of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military proceeding. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually recovered their spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganize his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and ruinous defeat. His brother Leptines, who commanded on one wing, was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back. The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by the shelter of their camp.

Such was the signal victory—the salvation of the army, perhaps even of Carthage herself—gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon. Immediately after it, he retired to Panormus. His army probably had been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake further offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no regular appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the prudence to seize this favorable moment for making peace, and sent to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory—all that lay to the west of the river Halykus; and further covenanting to pay to Carthage the sum of 1000 talents. To these unfavorable conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual install

ments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.

Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for thirteen years after the peace of 383-382 B.C. It seems that the Carthaginians (in 379 B.C.) sent an armament to the southern portion of Italy for the purpose of re-establishing the town of Hipponium and its inhabitants. But their attention appears to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of previous misfortunes—fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Lybian dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city. Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Skylletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate the territory of Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we are told) Dionysius wished to cut off the connection between Lokri and the other Greeks in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we sure that the wall was even begun.

During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B.C., the Spartans made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B.C., they put down the Olynthian confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379 B.C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens, together with other allies, the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground, and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B.C., which left them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendancy altogether. These incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus, he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to re-enforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered any very conspicuous service.

In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought the

opportunity favorable for trying to recover what the peace of 383 B.C. had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretense being readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of Sicily with a large land-force of 30,000 foot, and 3,000 horse; together with a fleet of 300 sail, and store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx—and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western cape of Sicily, appears to have arisen as a substitute for the neighboring town of Motye (of which we hear little more since its capture by Dionysius in 396 B.C.), and to have become the principal Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself to blockade. His fleet kept the harbor guarded, so as to intercept supplies from Africa. Not long afterward, however, he received intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage, he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum; keeping 130 men-of-war near at hand, in the harbor of Eryx, and sending the remainder home to Syracuse. Of this incautious proceeding the Carthaginians took speedy advantage. The conflagration in their port had been much overstated. There still remained to them 200 ships of war, which, after being equipped in silence, sailed across in the night to Eryx. Appearing suddenly in the harbor, they attacked the Syracusan ships completely by surprise; and succeeded, without serious resistance, in capturing and towing off nearly all of them. After so capital an advantage, Lilybæum became open to re-enforcement and supplies by sea, so that Dionysius no longer thought it worth while to prosecute the blockade. On the approach of winter, both parties resumed the position which they had occupied before the recent movement.

The despot had thus gained nothing by again taking up arms, nor were the Sicilian dependencies of the Carthaginians at all cut down below that which they acquired by the treaty of 383 B.C. But he received (about January or February, 367 B.C.) news of a different species of success, which gave him hardly less satisfaction than a victory by land or sea. In the Lenæan festival of Athens, one of his tragedies had been rewarded with the first prize. A chorist who had been employed in the performance—eager to convey the first intelligence of this success to Syracuse and to obtain the recompense which would naturally await the messenger—hasted from Athens to Corinth, found a vessel just starting for Syracuse, and reached Syracuse by a straight course with the advantage of favorable winds. He was the first to communicate the news, and received the full reward of his diligence. Dionysius was overjoyed at the distinction conferred upon him; for though on former occasions he had obtained

the second or third place in the Athenian competitions, he had never before been adjudged worthy of the first prize. Offering sacrifice to the gods for the good news, he invited his friends to a splendid banquet, wherein he indulged in an unusual measure of conviviality. But the joyous excitement, coupled with the effects of the wine, brought on an attack of fever, of which he shortly afterward died, after a reign of 38 years.

Thirty-eight years of a career so full of effort, adventure, and danger, as that of Dionysius, must have left a constitution sufficiently exhausted to give way easily before acute disease. Throughout this long period he had never spared himself. He was a man of restless energy and activity, bodily as well as mental; always personally at the head of his troops in war—keeping a vigilant eye and a decisive hand upon all the details of his government at home—yet employing spare time (which Philip of Macedon was surprised that he could find) in composing tragedies of his own, to compete for prizes fairly adjudged. His personal bravery was conspicuous, and he was twice severely wounded in leading his soldiers to assault. His effective skill as an ambitious politician—his military resource as a commander—and the long-sighted care with which he provided implements of offense as well as of defense before undertaking war,—are remarkable features in his character. The Roman Scipio Africanus was wont to single out Dionysius and Agathokles (the history of the latter begins about fifty years after the death of the former), both of them despots of Syracuse, as the two Greeks of greatest ability for action known to him—men who combined, in the most memorable degree, daring with sagacity. This criticism, coming from an excellent judge, is borne out by the biography of both, so far as it comes to our knowledge. No other Greek can be pointed out, who, starting from a position humble and unpromising, raised himself to so lofty a pinnacle of dominion at home, achieved such striking military exploits abroad, and preserved his grandeur unimpaired throughout the whole of a long life. Dionysius boasted that he bequeathed to his son an empire fastened by adamantine chains; so powerful was his mercenary force—so firm his position in Ortygia—so completely had the Syracusans been broken in to subjection. There cannot be a better test of vigor and ability than the unexampled success with which Dionysius and Agathokles played the game of the despot, and to a certain extent that of the conqueror. Of the two, Dionysius was the most favored by fortune. Both indeed profited by one auxiliary accident, which distinguished Syracuse from other Grecian cities; the local specialty of Ortygia. That islet seemed expressly made to be garrisoned as a separate fortress,—apart from, as well as against, the rest of Syracuse,—having full command of the harbor, docks, naval force, and naval approach. But Dionysius had, besides, several peculiar interventions of the gods in his favor, sometimes at the most critical moments: such was the interpretation put by his

enemies (and doubtless by his friends also) upon those repeated pestilences which smote the Carthaginian armies with a force far more deadly than the spear of the Syracusan hoplite. On four or five distinct occasions during the life of Dionysius, we read of this unseen foe as destroying the Carthaginians both in Sicily and in Africa, but leaving the Syracusans untouched. Twice did it arrest the progress of Imilkon, when in the full career of victory; once, after the capture of Gela and Kamarina—a second time, when, after his great naval victory off Katana, he had brought his numerous host under the walls of Syracuse, and was actually master of the open suburb of Achradina. On both these occasions the pestilence made a complete revolution in the face of the war; exalting Dionysius from impending ruin, to assured safety in the one, and to unmeasured triumph in the other. We are bound to allow for this good fortune (the like of which never befell Agathokles), when we contemplate the long prosperity of Dionysius, and when we adopt, as in justice we must adopt, the panegyric of Scipio Africanus.

The preceding chapter has detailed the means whereby Dionysius attained his prize, and kept it; those employed by Agathokles—analogueous in spirit but of still darker coloring in the details—will appear hereafter. That Hermokrates—who had filled with credit the highest offices in the state and whom men had acquired the habit of following—should aspire to become despot, was no unusual phenomenon in Grecian politics; but that Dionysius should aim at mounting the same ladder, seemed absurd or even insane—to use the phrase of Isokrates. If, then, in spite of such disadvantage he succeeded in fastening round his countrymen, accustomed to a free constitution as their birthright, those “adamantine chains” which they were well known to abhor—we may be sure that his plan of proceeding must have been dexterously chosen, and prosecuted with consummate perseverance and audacity; but we may be also sure that it was nefarious in the extreme. The machinery of fraud whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission, as a prelude to the machinery of force whereby such submission was to be perpetuated against their consent—was the stock in trade of Grecian usurpers. But seldom does it appear prefaced by more impudent calumnies, or worked out with a larger measure of violence and spoliation, than in the case of Dionysius. He was indeed powerfully seconded at the outset by the danger of Syracuse from the Carthaginian arms. But his scheme of usurpation, far from diminishing such danger, tended materially to increase it, by disuniting the city at so critical a moment. Dionysius achieved nothing in his first enterprise for the relief of Gela and Kamarina. He was forced to retire with as much disgrace as those previous generals whom he had so bitterly vituperated; and apparently even with greater disgrace—since there are strong grounds for believing that he entered into traitorous collusion with the Carthaginians. The salvation of

Syracuse, at that moment of peril, arose not from the energy or ability of Dionysius, but from the opportune epidemic which disabled Imilkon in the midst of a victorious career.

Dionysius had not only talents to organize, and boldness to make good, a despotism more formidable than anything known to contemporary Greeks, but also systematic prudence to keep it unimpaired for 38 years. He maintained carefully those two precautions which Thucydides specifies as the causes of permanence to the Athenian Hippias, under similar circumstances—intimidation over the citizens, and careful organization, with liberal pay among his mercenaries. He was temperate in indulgences; never led by any of his appetites into the commission of violence. This abstinence contributed materially to prolong his life, since many a Grecian despot perished through desperate feelings of individual vengeance provoked by his outrages. With Dionysius, all other appetites were merged in the love of dominion, at home and abroad; and of money as a means of dominion. To the service of this master-passion all his energies were devoted, together with those vast military resources which an unscrupulous ability served both to accumulate and to recruit. How his treasury was supplied, with the large exigencies continually pressing upon it, we are but little informed. We know, however, that his exactions from the Syracusans were exorbitant; that he did not hesitate to strip the holiest temples; and that he left behind him a great reputation for ingenious tricks in extracting money from his subjects. Besides the large garrison of foreign mercenaries by whom his orders were enforced, he maintained a regular body of spies, seemingly of both sexes, disseminated among the body of the citizens. The vast quarry-prison of Syracuse was his work. Both the vague general picture, and the fragmentary details which come before us of his conduct toward the Syracusans, present to us nothing but an oppressive and extortionate tyrant, by whose fiat numberless victims perished; more than 10,000 according to the general language of Plutarch. He enriched largely his younger brothers and auxiliaries; among which latter, Hipparinus stood prominent, thus recovering a fortune equal to or larger than that which his profligacy had dissipated. But we hear also of acts of Dionysius, indicating a jealous and cruel temper, even toward near relatives. And it appears certain that he trusted no one, not even them; that though in the field he was a perfectly brave man, yet his suspicion and timorous anxiety as to every one who approached his person, were carried to the most tormenting excess, and extended even to his wives, his brothers, his daughters. Afraid to admit any one with a razor near to his face, he is said to have singed his own beard with a burning coal. Both his brother and his son were searched for concealed weapons, and even forced to change their clothes in the presence of his guards, before they were permitted to see him. An officer of the guards named Marsyas, having dreamt that he was assassinating Dionysius,

was put to death for this dream, as proving that his waking thoughts must have been dwelling upon such a project. And it has already been mentioned that Dionysius put to death the mother of one of his wives, on suspicion that she had by incantations brought about the barrenness of the other—as well as the sons of a Lokrian citizen named Aristides, who had refused, with indignant expressions, to grant to him his daughter in marriage.

Such were the conditions of existence—perpetual mistrust, danger even from the nearest kindred, enmity both to and from every dignified freeman, and reliance only on armed barbarians or liberated slaves—which beset almost every Grecian despot, and from which the greatest despot of his age enjoyed no exemption. Though philosophers emphatically insisted that such a man must be miserable, yet Dionysius himself, as well as the great mass of admiring spectators, would probably feel that the necessities of his position were more than compensated by its awe-striking grandeur, and by the full satisfaction of ambitious dreams; subject indeed to poignant suffering when wounded in the tender point, and when reaping insult in place of admiration, at the memorable Olympic festival of 384 B.C., above-described. But the Syracusans, over whom he ruled, enjoyed no such compensation for that which they suffered from his tax-gatherers—from his garrison of Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in Orygia—from his spies—his prison—and his executioners.

Nor did Syracuse suffer alone. The reign of the elder Dionysius was desolating for the Hellenic population generally, both of Sicily and Italy. Syracuse became a great fortress, with vast military power in the hands of its governor, 'whose policy it was to pack all Sicily into it;' while the remaining free Hellenic communities were degraded, enslaved, and half depopulated. On this topic, the mournful testimonies already cited from Lysias and Isokrates are borne out by the letters of the eye-witness Plato. In his advice, given to the son and successor of Dionysius, Plato emphatically presses upon him two points: first, as to the Syracusans, to transform his inherited oppressive despotism into the rule of a king, governing gently and by fixed laws; next, to reconstitute and repopulate, under free constitutions, the other Hellenic communities in Sicily, which at his accession had become nearly barbarized and half-deserted.

The elder Dionysius had imported into Sicily large bodies of mercenaries, by means of whom he had gained his conquests, and for whom he had provided settlements at the cost of the subdued Hellenic cities. In Naxos, Katana, Leontini, and Messene, the previous residents had been dispossessed and others substituted, out of Gallic and Iberian mercenaries. Communities thus transformed, with their former free citizens degraded into dependence or exile, not only ceased to be purely Hellenic, but also became far less populous and flourishing. In like manner Dionysius had suppressed, and absorbed into Syracuse and Lokri, the once autonomous Grecian communities

of Rhegium, Hipponium, and Kaulonia, on the Italian side of the strait. In the inland regions of Italy, he had allied himself with the barbarous Lucanians, who, even without his aid, were gaining ground and pressing hard upon the Italic Greeks on the coast.

If we examine the results of the warfare carried on by Dionysius against the Carthaginians, from the commencement to the end of his career, we shall observe that he began by losing Gela and Kamarina, and that the peace by which he was enabled to preserve Syracuse itself, arose, not from any success of his own, but from the pestilence which ruined his enemies; to say nothing about traitorous collusion with them, which I have already remarked to have been the probable price of their guarantee to his dominion. His war against the Carthaginians in 397 B.C. was undertaken with much vigor, recovered Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus, and promised the most decisive success. But presently again the tide of fortune turned against him. He sustained capital defeats, and owed the safety of Syracuse, a second time, to nothing but the terrific pestilence which destroyed the army of Imilkon. A third time, in 383 B.C., Dionysius gratuitously renewed the war against Carthage. After brilliant success at first, he was again totally defeated, and forced to cede to Carthage all the territory west of the river Halykus, besides paying a tribute. So that the exact difference between the Sicilian territory of Carthage—as it stood at the beginning of his command and at the end of his reign—amounts to this: that at the earlier period it reached to the river Himera—at the later period only to the river Halykus. The intermediate space between the two comprehends Agrigentum with the greater part of its territory; which represents therefore the extent of Hellenic soil rescued by Dionysius from Carthaginian dominion.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS— DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER—AND DION.

THE elder Dionysius, at the moment of his death, boasted of having left his dominion “fastened by chains of adamant;” that is, sustained by a large body of mercenaries, well trained and well paid—by impregnable fortifications in the islet of Ortygia—by 400 ships of war—by immense magazines of arms and military stores—and by established intimidation over the minds of the Syracusans. These were really “chains of adamant”—so long as there was a man like Dionysius to keep them in hand. But he left no successor competent to the task; nor indeed an unobstructed succession. He had issue by two wives, whom he had married both at the same time, as

has been already mentioned. By the Lokrian wife, Doris, he had his eldest son named Dionysius, and two others; by the Syracusan wife, Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, he had two sons, Hipparinus and Nysæus—and two daughters, Sophrosyne and Arete. Dionysius the younger can hardly have been less than twenty-five years old at the death of his father and namesake. Hipparinus, the eldest son by the other wife, was considerably younger. Aristomache his mother had long remained childless; a fact which the elder Dionysius ascribed to incantations wrought by the mother of the Lokrian wife, and punished by putting to death the supposed sorceress.

The offspring of Aristomache, though the younger brood of the two, derived considerable advantage from the presence and countenance of her brother Dion. Hipparinus, father of Dion and Aristomache, had been the principal abettor of the elder Dionysius in his original usurpation, in order to retrieve his own fortune, ruined by profligate expenditure. So completely had that object been accomplished, that his son Dion was now among the richest men in Syracuse, possessing property estimated at above 100 talents (about 23,000*l.*). Dion was, besides, son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, who had given his daughter Sophrosyne in marriage to his son (by a different mother) the younger Dionysius; and his daughter Arete, first to his brother Thearides—next, on the death of Thearides, to Dion. As brother of Aristomache, Dion was thus brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and uncle both to Arete his own wife and to Sophrosyne the wife of the younger Dionysius; as husband of Arete, he was son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and brother-in-law (as well as uncle) to the wife of the younger. Marriages between near relatives (excluding any such connection between uterine brother and sister) were usual in Greek manners. We cannot doubt that the despot accounted the harmony likely to be produced by such ties between the members of his two families and Dion, among the “adamantine chains” which held fast his dominion.

Apart from wealth and high position, the personal character of Dion was in itself marked and prominent. He was of an energetic temper, great bravery, and very considerable mental capacities. Though his nature was haughty and disdainful toward individuals, yet as to political communion, his ambition was by no means purely self-seeking and egoistic, like that of the elder Dionysius. Animated with vehement love of power, he was at the same time penetrated with that sense of regulated polity, and submission of individual will to fixed laws, which floated in the atmosphere of Grecian talk and literature, and stood so high in Grecian morality. He was moreover capable of acting with enthusiasm, and braving every hazard in prosecution of his own convictions.

Born about the year 408 B.C., Dion was twenty-one years of age in 387 B.C., when the elder Dionysius, having dismantled Rhegium and subdued Kroton, attained the maximum of his dominion, as master

of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Standing high in the favor of his brother-in-law Dionysius, Dion doubtless took part in the wars whereby this large dominion had been acquired; as well as in the life of indulgence and luxury which prevailed generally among wealthy Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which to the Athenian Plato appeared alike surprising and repulsive. That great philosopher visited Italy and Sicily about 387 B.C., as has been already mentioned. He was in acquaintance and fellowship with the school of philosophers called Pythagoreans, the remnant of that Pythagorean brotherhood, who had once exercised so powerful a political influence over the cities of those regions—and who still enjoyed considerable reputation, even after complete political downfall, through individual ability and rank of the members, combined with habits of recluse study, mysticism, and attachment among themselves. With these Pythagoreans Dion also, a young man of open mind and ardent aspirations, was naturally thrown into communication by the proceedings of the elder Dionysius in Italy. Through them he came into intercourse with Plato, whose conversation made an epoch in his life.

The mystic turn of imagination, the sententious brevity, and the mathematical researches, of the Pythagoreans, produced doubtless an imposing effect upon Dion; just as Lysis, a member of that brotherhood, had acquired the attachment and influenced the sentiments of Epaminondas at Thebes. But Plato's power of working upon the minds of young men was far more impressive and irresistible. He possessed a large range of practical experience, a mastery of political and social topics, and a charm of eloquence, to which the Pythagoreans were strangers. The stirring effect of the Sokratic talk, as well as of the democratical atmosphere in which Plato had been brought up, had developed all the communicative aptitude of his mind; and great as that aptitude appears in his remaining dialogues, there is ground for believing that it was far greater in his conversation; greater perhaps in 387 B.C., when he was still mainly the Sokratic Plato—than it became in later days, after he had imbibed to a certain extent the mysticism of these Pythagoreans. Brought up as Dion had been at the court of Dionysius—accustomed to see around him only slavish deference and luxurious enjoyment—unused to open speech or large philosophical discussion—he found in Plato a new man exhibited and a new world opened before him.

The conception of a free community—with correlative rights and duties belonging to every citizen, determined by laws and protected or enforced by power emanating from the collective entity called the City—stood in the foreground of ordinary Grecian morality—reigned spontaneously in the bosoms of every Grecian festival crowd—and had been partially imbibed by Dion, though not from his own personal experience, yet from teachers, sophists, and poets. This conception, essential and fundamental with philosophers as well as with the vulgar, was not merely set forth by Plato with commanding

powers of speech, but also exalted with improvements and refinements into an ideal perfection. Above all, it was based upon a strict, even an abstemious and ascetic, canon, as to individual enjoyment; and upon a careful training both of mind and body, qualifying each man for the due performance of his duties as a citizen; a subject which Plato (as we see by his dialogues) did not simply propound with the direct enforcement of a preacher, but touched with the quickening and pungent effect, and re-enforced with the copious practical illustrations, of Sokratic dialogue.

As the stimulus from the teacher was here put forth with consummate efficacy, the predisposition of the learner enabled it to take full effect. Dion became an altered man both in public sentiment and in individual behavior. He recollected that twenty years before, his country Syracuse had been as free as Athens. He learned to abhor the iniquity of the despotism by which her liberty had been overthrown, and by which subsequently the liberties of so many other Greeks in Italy and Sicily had been trodden down also. He was made to remark, that Sicily had been half-barbarized through the foreign mercenaries imported as the despot's instruments. He conceived the sublime idea or dream of rectifying all this accumulation of wrong and suffering. It was his wish first to cleanse Syracuse from the blot of slavery, and to clothe her anew in the brightness and dignity of freedom; yet not with the view of restoring the popular government as it had stood prior to the usurpation, but of establishing an improved constitutional polity, originated by himself, with laws which should not only secure individual rights, but also educate and moralize the citizens. The function which he imagined to himself, and which the conversation of Plato suggested, was not that of a despot like Dionysius, but that of a despotic legislator like Lykurgus, taking advantage of a momentary omnipotence, conferred upon him by grateful citizens in a state of public confusion, to originate a good system; which, when once put in motion, would keep itself alive by fashioning the minds of the citizens to its own intrinsic excellence. After having thus both liberated and reformed Syracuse, Dion promised to himself that he would employ Syracusan force, not in annihilating, but in recreating, other free Hellenic communities throughout the island; expelling from thence all the barbarians—both the important mercenaries and the Carthaginians.

Such were the hopes and projects which arose in the mind of the youthful Dion as he listened to Plato; hopes pregnant with future results which neither of them contemplated—and not unworthy of being compared with those enthusiastic aspirations which the young Spartan kings Agis and Kleomenes imbibed a century afterward, in part from the conversation of the philosopher Spharus. Never before had Plato met with a pupil who so quickly apprehended, so profoundly meditated, or so passionately laid to heart his lessons. Inflamed with his newly communicated impulse toward philosophy,

as the supreme guide and directress of virtuous conduct, Dion altered his habits of life; exchanging the splendor and luxury of a Sicilian rich man for the simple fare and regulated application becoming a votary of the Academy. In this course he persisted without faltering throughout all his residence at the court of Dionysius, in spite of the unpopularity contracted among his immediate companions. His enthusiasm even led him to believe that the despot himself, unable to resist that persuasive tongue by which he had been himself converted, might be gently brought round into an employment of his mighty force for beneficent and reformatory purposes. Accordingly Dion, inviting Plato to Syracuse, procured for him an interview with Dionysius. How miserably the speculation failed has been recounted in my last chapter. Instead of acquiring a new convert, the philosopher was fortunate in rescuing his own person, and in making good his returning footsteps out of that lion's den, into which the improvident enthusiasm of his young friend had inveigled him.

The harsh treatment of Plato by Dionysius was a painful, though salutary warning to Dion. Without sacrificing either his own convictions, or the philosophical regularity of life which he had thought fit to adopt—he saw that patience was imperatively necessary, and he so conducted himself as to maintain unabated the favor and confidence of Dionysius. Such a policy would probably be recommended to him even by Plato, in prospect of a better future. But it would be strenuously urged by the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy; among whom was Archytas, distinguished not only as a mathematician and friend of Plato, but also as the chief political magistrate of Tarentum. To these men, who dwelt all within the reach, if not under the dominion of this formidable Syracusan despot, it would be an unspeakable advantage to have a friend like Dion near him, possessing his confidence, and serving as a shield to them against his displeasure or interference. Dion so far surmounted his own unbending nature as to conduct himself toward Dionysius with skill and prudence. He was employed by the despot in other important affairs, as well as in embassies to Carthage, which he fulfilled well, especially with conspicuous credit for eloquence; and also in the execution of various cruel orders, which his humanity secretly mitigated. After the death of Thearides, Dionysius gave to Dion in marriage the widow Arete (his daughter), and continued until the last to treat him with favor, accepting from him a freedom of censure such as he would tolerate from no other adviser.

During the many years which elapsed before the despot died, we cannot doubt that Dion found opportunities of visiting Peloponnesus and Athens, for the great festivals and other purposes. He would thus keep up his friendship and philosophical communication with Plato. Being as he was minister and relative, and perhaps successor presumptive, of the most powerful prince in Greece, he would enjoy

everywhere great importance, which would be enhanced by his philosophy and eloquence. The Spartans, at that time the allies of Dionysius, conferred upon Dion the rare honor of a vote of citizenship; and he received testimonies of respect from other cities also. Such honors tended to exalt his reputation at Syracuse; while the visits to Athens and the cities of Central Greece enlarged his knowledge both of politicians and philosophers.

At length occurred the death of the elder Dionysius, occasioned by an unexpected attack of fever, after a few days' illness. He had made no special announcement about his succession. Accordingly, as soon as the physicians pronounced him to be in imminent danger, a competition arose between his two families: on the one hand Dionysius the younger, his son by the Lokrian wife Doris; on the other, his wife Aristomache and her brother Dion, representing her children Hipparinus and Nysæus, then very young. Dion, wishing to obtain for these two youths either a partnership in the future power, or some other beneficial provision, solicited leave to approach the bedside of the sick man. But the physicians refused to grant his request without apprising the younger Dionysius; who, being resolved to prevent it, directed a soporific potion to be administered to his father, from the effects of which the latter never awoke so as to be able to see any one. The interview with Dion being thus frustrated, and the father dying without giving any directions, Dionysius the younger succeeded as eldest son, without opposition. He was presented to that which was called an assembly of the Syracusan people, and delivered some conciliatory phrases, requesting them to continue to him that good will which they had so long shown to his father. Consent and acclamation were of course not wanting to the new master of the troops, treasures, magazines, and fortifications in Ortygia; those "adamantine chains" which were well known to dispense with the necessity of any real popular good will.

Dionysius II. (or the younger), then about 25 years of age, was a young man of considerable natural capacity, and of quick and lively impulses; but weak and vain in his character, given to transitory caprices, and eager in his appetite for praise without being capable of any industrious or resolute efforts to earn it. As yet he was wholly unpracticed in serious business of any kind. He had neither seen military service nor mingled in the discussion of political measures; having been studiously kept back from both by the extreme jealousy of his father. His life had been passed in the palace or acropolis of Ortygia, amid all the indulgences and luxuries belonging to a princely station, diversified with amateur carpenter's work and turnery. However, the tastes of the father introduced among the guests at the palace a certain number of poets, reciters, musicians, etc., so that the younger Dionysius had contracted a relish for poetical literature, which opened his mind to generous sentiments, and large conceptions of excellence, more than any other portion of his

very confined experience. To philosophy, to instructive conversation, to the exercise of reason, he was a stranger. But the very feebleness and indecision of his character presented him as impressive, perhaps improveable, by a strong will and influence brought to bear upon him from that quarter, at least as well as from any other.

Such was the novice who suddenly stepped into the place of the most energetic and powerful despot of the Grecian world. Dion—being as he was of mature age, known service and experience, and full enjoyment of the confidence of the elder Dionysius—might have probably raised material opposition to the younger. But he attempted no such thing. He acknowledged and supported the young prince with cordial sincerity, dropping altogether those views, whatever they were, on behalf of the children of Aristomache, which had induced him to solicit the last interview with the sick man. While exerting himself to strengthen and facilitate the march of the government, he tried to gain influence and ascendancy over the mind of the young Dionysius. At the first meeting of council which took place after the accession, Dion stood conspicuous not less for his earnest adhesion than for his dignified language and intelligent advice. The remaining councilors—accustomed, under the self-determining despot who had just quitted the scene, to the simple function of hearing, applauding, and obeying, his directions—exhausted themselves in phrases and compliments, waiting to catch the tone of the young prince before they ventured to pronounce any decided opinion. But Dion, to whose freedom of speech even the elder Dionysius had partially submitted, disdained all such tampering, entered at once into a full review of the actual situation, and suggested the positive measures proper to be adopted. We cannot doubt that, in the transmission of an authority which had rested so much on the individual spirit of the former possessor, there were many precautions to be taken, especially in regard to the mercenary troops both at Syracuse and in the outlying dependencies. All these necessities of the moment Dion sent forth, together with suitable advice. But the most serious of all the difficulties arose out of the war with Carthage still subsisting, which it was foreseen that the Carthaginians were likely to press more vigorously, calculating on the ill-assured tenure and inexperienced management of the new prince. This difficulty Dion took upon himself. If the council should think it wise to make peace, he engaged to go to Carthage and negotiate peace—a task in which he had been more than once employed under the elder Dionysius. If, on the other hand, it were resolved to prosecute the war, he advised that imposing forces should be at once put in equipment, promising to furnish, out of his own large property, a sum sufficient for the outfit of fifty triremes.

The young Dionysius was not only profoundly impressed with the superior wisdom and suggestive resource of Dion, but also grateful for his generous offer of pecuniary as well as personal support. Lu

all probability Dion actually carried the offer into effect, for to a man of his disposition, money had little value except as a means of extending influence and acquiring reputation. The war with Carthage seems to have lasted at least throughout the next year, and to have been terminated not long afterward. But it never assumed those perilous proportions which had been contemplated by the council as probable. As a mere contingency, however, it was sufficient to inspire Dionysius with alarm, combined with the other exigencies of his new situation. At first he was painfully conscious of his own inexperience; anxious about hazards which he now saw for the first time, and not merely open to advice, but eager and thankful for suggestions, from any quarter where he could place confidence. Dion, identified by ancient connection as well as by marriage with the Dionysian family—trusted, more than any one else, by the old despot, and surrounded with that accessory dignity which ascetic strictness of life usually confers in excess—presented every title to such confidence. And when he was found not only the most trustworthy but the most frank and fearless of counselors, Dionysius gladly yielded both to the measures which he advised and to the impulses which he inspired.

Such was the political atmosphere of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the new accession, while the splendid obsequies in honor of the departed Dionysius were being solemnized; coupled with a funeral pile so elaborate as to confer celebrity on Timæus the constructor—and commemorated by architectural monuments, too grand to be permanent, immediately outside of Ortygia, near the Regal Gates leading to that citadel. Among the popular measures, natural at the commencement of a new reign, the historian Philistus was recalled from exile. He had been one of the oldest and most attached partisans of the elder Dionysius; by whom, however, he had at last been banished, and never afterward forgiven. His recall now seemed to promise a new and valuable assistant to the younger, whom it also presented as softening the rigorous proceedings of his father. In this respect it would harmonize with the views of Dion, though Philistus afterward became his great opponent.

Dion was now both the prime minister and the confidential monitor of the young Dionysius. He upheld the march of the government with undiminished energy, and was of greater political importance than Dionysius himself. But success in this object was not the end for which Dion labored. He neither wished to serve a despot, nor to become a despot himself. The moment was favorable for resuming that project which he had formerly imbibed from Plato, and which, in spite of contemptuous disparagement by his former master, had ever since clung to him as the dream of his heart and life. To make Syracuse a free city, under a government, not of will, but of good laws, with himself as lawgiver in substance, if not in name—to

enfranchise and replant the semi-barbarized Hellenic cities in Sicily—and to expel the Carthaginians—were schemes to which he now again devoted himself with unabated enthusiasm. But he did not look to any other means of achieving them than the consent and initiative of Dionysius himself. The man who had been sanguine enough to think of working upon the iron soul of the father was not likely to despair of shaping anew the more malleable metal of which the son was composed. Accordingly, while lending to Dionysius his best service as minister, he also took up the Platonic profession, and tried to persuade him to reform both himself and his government. He endeavored to awaken in him a relish for a better and nobler private conduct than that which prevailed among the luxurious companions around him. He dwelt with enthusiasm on the scientific and soul-stirring conversation of Plato; specimens of which he either read aloud or repeated, exalting the hearer not only to a higher intellectual range, but also to the full majesty of mind requisite for ruling others with honor and improvement. He pointed out the unrivaled glory which Dionysius would acquire in the eyes of Greece, by consenting to employ his vast power, not as a despot working on the fears of subjects, but as a king enforcing temperance and justice, by his own paternal example as well as by good laws. He tried to show that Dionysius, after having liberated Syracuse, and enrolled himself as a king limited and responsible amidst grateful citizens, would have far more real force against the barbarians than at present.

Such were the new convictions which Dion tried to work into the mind of the young Dionysius, as a living faith and sentiment. Penetrated as he was with the Platonic idea—that nothing could be done for the improvement and happiness of mankind, until philosophy and ruling power came together in the same hands; but everything, if the two did so come together—he thought that he saw before him a chance of realizing the conjunction, in the case of the greatest among all Hellenic potentates. He already beheld in fancy his native country and fellow citizens liberated, moralized, ennobled, and conducted to happiness, without murder or persecution, simply by the well-meaning and instructed employment of power already organized. If accident had thrown the despotism into the hands of Dion himself, at this period of his life, the Grecian world would probably have seen an experiment tried, as memorable and generous as any event recorded in its history: what would have been its result, we cannot say. But it was enough to fire his inmost soul, to see himself separated from the experiment only by the necessity of persuading an impressible young man over whom he had much influence; and for himself, he was quite satisfied with the humbler position of nominal minister, but real originator and chief, in so noble an enterprise. His persuasive powers, strengthened as they were by intense earnestness as well as by his imposing station and practical capacity, actually wrought a great effect upon Dionysius. The

young man appeared animated with a strong desire of self-improvement, and of qualifying himself for such a use of the powers of government as Dion depicted. He gave proof of the sincerity of his feelings by expressing eagerness to see and converse with Plato, to whom he sent several personal messages, warmly requesting him to visit Syracuse.

This was precisely the first step which Dion had been laboring to bring about. He well knew, and had personally felt, the wonderful magic of Plato's conversation when addressed to young men. To bring Plato to Syracuse, and to pour his eloquent language into the predisposed ears of Dionysius, appeared like realizing the conjunction of philosophy and power. Accordingly he sent to Athens, along with the invitation from Dionysius, the most pressing and emphatic entreaties from himself. He represented the immense prize to be won—nothing less than the means of directing the action of an organized power, extending over all the Greeks of Italy and Sicily—provided only the mind of Dionysius could be thoroughly gained over. This (he said) was already half done; not only Dionysius himself, but also his youthful half-brothers of the other line, had been impressed with earnest mental aspirations, and longed to drink at the pure fountain of true philosophy. Everything presaged complete success, such as would render them hearty and active proselytes, if Plato would only come forthwith—before hostile influences could have time to corrupt them—and devote to the task his unrivaled art of penetrating the youthful mind. These hostile influences were indeed at work, and with great activity; if victorious, they would not only defeat the project of Dion, but might even provoke his expulsion, or threaten his life. Could Plato, by declining the invitation, leave his devoted champion and apostle to fight so great a battle, alone and unassisted? What could Plato say for himself afterward, if by declining to come, he not only let slip the greatest prospective victory which had ever been opened to philosophy, but also permitted the corruption of Dionysius and the ruin of Dion?

Such appeals, in themselves emphatic and touching, reached Athens, reinforced by solicitations, hardly less strenuous, from Archytas of Tarentum and the other Pythagorean philosophers in the south of Italy; to whose personal well-being, over and above the interests of philosophy, the character of the future Syracusan government was of capital importance. Plato was deeply agitated and embarrassed. He was now 61 years of age. He enjoyed pre-eminent estimation, in the grove of Akademos near Athens, amid admiring hearers from all parts of Greece. The Athenian democracy, if it accorded to him no influence on public affairs, neither molested him nor dimmed his intellectual glory. The proposed voyage to Syracuse carried him out of this enviable position into a new field of hazard and speculation; brilliant indeed and flattering, beyond any-

thing which had ever been approached by philosophy, if it succeeded; but fraught with disgrace, and even with danger to all concerned, if it failed. Plato had already seen the elder Dionysius surrounded by his walls and mercenaries in Ortygia, and had learned by cruel experience the painful consequences of propounding philosophy to an intractable hearer, whose displeasure passed so readily into act. The sight of contemporary despots nearer home, such as Euphron of Sikyon and Alexander of Phere, was by no means reassuring; nor could he reasonably stake his person and reputation on the chance, that the younger Dionysius might prove a glorious exception to the general rule. To out-weigh such scruples, he had indeed the positive and respectful invitation of Dionysius himself; which however would have passed for a transitory, though vehement, caprice on the part of a young prince, had it not been backed by the strong assurances of a mature man and valued friend like Dion. To these assurances, and to the shame which would be incurred by leaving Dion to fight the battle and incur the danger alone, Plato sacrificed his own grounds for hesitation. He went to Syracuse, less with the hope of succeeding in the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence—as fit only for the discussions of the school, shrinking from all application to practice, betraying the interest of his Pythagorean friends, and basely deserting that devoted champion who had half opened the door to him for triumphant admission.

Such is the account which the philosopher gives of his own state of mind in going to Syracuse. At the same time, he intimates that his motives were differently interpreted by others. And as the account which we possess was written fifteen years after the event—when Dion had perished, when the Syracusan enterprise had realized nothing like what was expected and when Plato looked back upon it with the utmost grief and aversion, which must have poisoned the last three or four years of his life—we may fairly suspect that he partially transfers back to 367 B.C. the feelings of 352 B.C.; and that at the earlier period, he went to Syracuse, not merely because he was ashamed to decline, but because he really flattered himself with some hopes of success.

However desponding he may have been before, he could hardly fail to conceive hopes from the warmth of his first reception. One the royal carriages met him at his landing, and conveyed him to his lodging. Dionysius offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods for his safe arrival. The banquets at the acropolis became distinguished for their plainness and sobriety. Never had Dionysius been seen so gentle in answering suitors or transacting public business. He began immediately to take lessons in geometry from Plato. Every one around him, of course, was suddenly smitten with a taste for geometry; so that the floors were all spread with sand, and noth-

ing was to be seen except triangles and other figures inscribed upon it, with expositors and a listening crowd around them. To those who had been inmates of the acropolis under the reign of the former despot, this change was surprising enough. But their surprise was converted into alarm, when, at a periodical sacrifice just then offered, Dionysius himself arrested the herald in pronouncing the customary prayer to the gods—"That the despotism might long remain unshaken." "Stop! (said Dionysius to the herald) imprecate no such curse upon us!" To the ears of Philistus, and the old politicians, these words portended nothing less than revolution to the dynasty, and ruin to Syracusan power. A single Athenian sophist (they exclaimed), with no other force than his tongue and his reputation, had achieved the conquest of Syracuse; an attempt in which thousands of his countrymen had miserably perished half a century before. Ineffably were they disgusted to see Dionysius abdicate in favor of Plato, and exchange the care of his vast force and dominion for geometrical problems and discussions on the *summum bonum*.

For a moment Plato seemed to be despot of Syracuse: so that the noble objects for which Dion had labored were apparently within his reach, either wholly or in part. And as far as we can judge, they really were to a great degree within his reach—had this situation, so interesting and so fraught with consequences to the people of Sicily, been properly turned to account. With all reverence for the greatest philosopher of antiquity, we are forced to confess that upon his own showing, he not only failed to turn the situation to account, but contributed even to spoil it by an unseasonable rigor. To admire philosophy in its distinguished teachers, is one thing; to learn and appropriate it, is another stage, rarer and more difficult, requiring assiduous labor, and no common endowments; while that which Plato calls "the philosophical life," or practical predominance of a well-trained intellect and well-chosen ethical purposes, combined with the minimum of personal appetite—is a third stage, higher and rarer still. Now Dionysius had reached the first stage only. He had contracted a warm and profound admiration for Plato. He had imbibed this feeling from the exhortations of Dion; and we shall see by his subsequent conduct that it was really a feeling both sincere and durable. But he admired Plato without having either inclination or talent to ascend higher, and to acquire what Plato called philosophy. Now it was an unexpected good fortune, and highly creditable to the persevering enthusiasm of Dion, that Dionysius should have been wound up so far as to admire Plato, to invoke his presence, and to instal him as a sort of spiritual power by the side of the temporal. Thus much was more than could have been expected; but to demand more, and to insist that Dionysius should go to school and work through a course of mental regeneration—was a purpose hardly possible to attain, and positively mischievous if it failed. Unfortunately, it was exactly this error which

Plato, and Dion in deference to Plato, seem to have committed. Instead of taking advantage of the existing ardor of Dionysius to instigate him at once into active political measures beneficial to the people of Syracuse and Sicily, with the full force of an authority which at that moment would have been irresistible—instead of heartening him up against groundless fear or difficulties of execution, and seeing that full honor was done to him for all the good which he really accomplished, meditated, or adopted—Plato postponed all these as matters for which his royal pupil was not yet ripe. He and Dion began to deal with Dionysius as a confessor treats his penitent; to probe the interior man—to expose to him his own unworthiness—to show that his life, his training, his companions, had all been vicious—to insist upon repentance and amendment upon these points, before he could receive absolution, and be permitted to enter upon active political life—to tell him that he must reform himself, and become a rational and temperate man, before he was fit to enter seriously on the task of governing others.

Such was the language which Plato and Dion held to Dionysius. They well knew indeed that they were treading on delicate ground—that while irritating a spirited horse in the sensitive part, they had no security against his kicks. Accordingly, they resorted to many circumlocutory and equivocal expressions, so as to soften the offense given. But the effect was not the less produced, of disgusting Dionysius with his velleities toward political good. Not only did Plato decline entering upon political recommendations of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing. Dionysius announced freely, in the presence of Plato, his wish and intention to transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited kingship, and to replant the dis-hellenized cities in Sicily. These were the two grand points to which Dion had been laboring so generously to bring him, and which he had invoked Plato for the express purpose of seconding. Yet what does Plato say when this momentous announcement is made? Instead of bestowing any praise or encouragement, he drily remarks to Dionysius—"First go through your schooling, and then do all these things; otherwise leave them undone." Dionysius afterward complained, and with good show of reason (when Dion was in exile, menacing attack upon Syracuse, under the favorable sympathies of Plato), that the great philosopher had actually deterred him (Dionysius) from executing the same capital improvements which he was now encouraging Dion to accomplish by an armed invasion. Plato was keenly sensitive to this reproach afterward; but even his own exculpation proves it to have been in the main not undeserved.

Plutarch observes that Plato felt a proud consciousness of philosophical dignity in disdaining respect to persons, and in refusing to the defects of Dionysius any greater measure of indulgence than he would have shown to an ordinary pupil of the Academy. If we

allow him credit for a sentiment in itself honorable, it can only be at the expense of his fitness for dealing with practical life; by admitting (to quote a remarkable phrase from one of his own dialogues) that "he tried to deal with individual men without knowing those rules of art or practice which bear on human affairs." Dionysius was not a common pupil, nor could Plato reasonably expect the like unmeasured docility from one for whose ear so many hostile influences were competing. Nor were Plato and Dionysius the only parties concerned. There was, besides, in the first place, Dion, whose whole position was at stake—next, and of yet greater moment, the relief of the people of Syracuse and Sicily. For them, and on their behalf, Dion had been laboring with such zeal, that he had inspired Dionysius with readiness to execute the two best resolves which the situation admitted; resolves not only pregnant with benefit to the people, but also insuring the position of Dion—since if Dionysius had once entered upon this course of policy, Dion would have been essential to him as an auxiliary and man of execution.

It is by no means certain, indeed, that such schemes could have been successfully realized, even with full sincerity on the part of Dionysius, and the energy of Dion besides. With all governments, to do evil is easy—to effect beneficial change, difficult; and with a Grecian despot this was true in a peculiar manner. Those great mercenary forces and other instruments, which had been strong as adamant for the oppressive rule of the elder Dionysius, would have been found hardly manageable, perhaps even obstructive, if his son had tried to employ them for more liberal purposes. But still the experiment would have been tried, with a fair chance of success—if only Plato, during his short-lived spiritual authority at Syracuse, had measured more accurately the practical influence which a philosopher might reasonably hope to exercise over Dionysius. I make these remarks upon him with sincere regret; but I am much mistaken if he did not afterward hear them in more poignant language from the banished Dion, upon whom the consequences of the mistake mainly fell.

Speedily did the atmosphere at Syracuse become overclouded. The conservative party—friends of the old despotism, with the veteran Philistus at their head—played their game far better than that of the reformers was played by Plato, or by Dion since the arrival of Plato. Philistus saw that Dion, as the man of strong patriotic impulses and of energetic execution, was the real enemy to be aimed at. He left no effort untried to calumniate Dion, and to set Dionysius against him. Whispers and misrepresentations from a thousand different quarters beset the ear of Dionysius, alarming him with the idea that Dion was usurping to himself the real authority in Syracuse, with the view of ultimately handing it over to the children of Aristomache, and of reigning in their name. Plato had been brought thither (it was said) as an agent in the conspiracy, for the

purpose of winning over Dionysius into idle speculations, enervating his active vigor, and ultimately setting him aside; in order that all serious political agency might fall into the hands of Dion. These hostile intrigues were no secret to Plato himself, who, even shortly after his arrival, began to see evidence of their poisonous activity. He tried sincerely to counterwork them; but unfortunately the language which he himself addressed to Dionysius was exactly such as to give them the best chance of success. When Dionysius recounted to Philistus or other courtiers how Plato and Dion had humiliated him in his own eyes, and told him that he was unworthy to govern until he had undergone a thorough purification—he would be exhorted to resent it as presumption and insult; and would be assured that it could only arise from a design to dispossess him of his authority, in favor of Dion, or perhaps of the children of Aristomache with Dion as regent.

It must not be forgotten that there was a real foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius toward Dion, who was not merely superior to him in age, in dignity, and in ability, but also personally haughty in his bearing, and rigid in his habits, while Dionysius relished conviviality and enjoyments. At first this jealousy was prevented from breaking out—partly by the consciousness of Dionysius that he needed some one to lean upon—partly by what seems to have been great self-command on the part of Dion, and great care to carry with him the real mind and good-will of Dionysius. Even from the beginning the enemies of Dion were doubtless not sparing in their calumnies to alienate Dionysius from him; and the wonder only is how, in spite of such intrigues and in spite of the natural causes of jealousy, Dion could have implanted his political aspirations, and maintained his friendly influence over Dionysius until the arrival of Plato. After that event the natural causes of antipathy tended to manifest themselves more and more powerfully, while the counteracting circumstances all disappeared.

Three important months thus passed away, during which those precious public inclinations, which Plato found instilled by Dion into the bosom of Dionysius, and which he might have fanned into life and action—to liberalize the government of Syracuse, and to restore the other free Grecian cities—disappeared never to return. In place of them Dionysius imbibed an antipathy, more and more rancorous, against the friend and relative with whom these sentiments had originated. The charges against Dion, of conspiracy and dangerous designs, circulated by Philistus and his cabal, became more audacious than ever. At length in the fourth month Dionysius resolved to get rid of him.

The proceedings of Dion being watched, a letter was detected which he had written to the Carthaginian commanders in Sicily (with whom the war still subsisted, though seemingly not in great activity), inviting them, if they sent any proposition for peace to Syracuse, to

send it through him, as he would take care that it should be properly discussed. I have already stated that, even in the reign of the elder Dionysius, Dion had been the person to whom the negotiations with Carthage were habitually intrusted. Such a letter from him, as far as we make out from the general description, implied nothing like a treasonable purpose. But Dionysius, after taking council with Philistus, resolved to make use of it as a final pretext. Inviting Dion into the acropolis, under color of seeking to heal their growing differences,—and beginning to enter into an amicable conversation,—he conducted him unsuspectingly down to the adjacent harbor, where lay moored, close in shore, a boat with the rowers aboard, ready for starting. Dionysius then produced the intercepted letter, handed it to Dion, and accused him to his face of treason. The latter protested against the imputation, and eagerly sought to reply. But Dionysius stopped him from proceeding, insisted on his going aboard the boat, and ordered the rowers to carry him off forthwith to Italy.

This abrupt and ignominious expulsion, of so great a person as Dion, caused as much consternation among his numerous friends as triumph to Philistus and the partisans of the despotism. All consummation of the liberal projects conceived by Dion was now out of the question, not less from the incompetency of Dionysius to execute them alone, than from his indisposition to any such attempt. Aristomache the sister, and Arete the wife of Dion (the latter half-sister of Dionysius himself), gave vent to their sorrow and indignation; while the political associates of Dion, and Plato beyond all others, trembled for their own personal safety. Among the mercenary soldiers, the name of Plato was particularly odious. Many persons instigated Dionysius to kill him, and rumors even gained footing that he had been killed, as the author of the whole confusion. But the despot, having sent away the person whom he most hated and feared, was not disposed to do harm to any one else. While he calmed the anxieties of Arete by affirming that the departure of her husband was not to be regarded as an exile, but only as a temporary separation, to allow time for abating the animosity which prevailed—he at the same time ordered two triremes to be fitted out, for sending to Dion his slaves and valuable property, and everything necessary to personal dignity as well as to his comfort. Toward Plato—who was naturally agitated in the extreme, thinking only of the readiest means to escape from so dangerous a situation—his manifestations were yet more remarkable. He soothed the philosopher's apprehensions—entreated him to remain, in a manner gentle, indeed, but admitting no denial—and conveyed him at once into his own residence, the acropolis, under color of doing him honor. From hence there was no possibility of escaping, and Plato remained there for some time. Dionysius treated him well, communicated with him freely and intimately, and proclaimed everywhere that they were on

the best terms of friendship. What is yet more curious—he displayed the greatest anxiety to obtain the esteem and approbation of the sage, and to occupy a place in his mind higher than that accorded to Dion; shrinking, nevertheless, from philosophy, or the Platonic treatment and training, under the impression that there was a purpose to ensnare and paralyze him, under the auspices of Dion. This is a strange account, given by Plato himself; but it reads like a real picture of a vain and weak prince, admiring the philosopher—coquetting with him, as it were—and anxious to captivate his approbation, so far as it could be done without submitting to the genuine Platonic discipline.

During this long and irksome detention, which probably made Plato sensible of the comparative comforts of Athenian liberty, he obtained from Dionysius one practical benefit. He prevailed upon him to establish friendly and hospitable relations with Archytas and the Tarentines, which to these latter was a real increase of security and convenience. But in the point which he strove most earnestly to accomplish he failed. Dionysius resisted all entreaties for the recall of Dion. Finding himself at length occupied with a war (whether the war with Carthage previously mentioned, or some other, we do not know), he consented to let Plato depart, agreeing to send for him again as soon as peace and leisure should return, and promising to recall Dion at the same time; upon which covenant Plato, on his side, agreed to come back. After a certain interval, peace arrived, and Dionysius reinvited Plato, yet without recalling Dion—whom he required still to wait another year. But Plato, appealing to the terms of the covenant, refused to go without Dion. To himself personally, in spite of the celebrity which his known influence with Dionysius tended to confer, the voyage was nothing less than repugnant, for he had had sufficient experience of Syracuse and its despotism. Nor would he even listen to the request of Dion himself, who, partly in the view of promoting his own future restoration, earnestly exhorted him to go. Dionysius besieged Plato with solicitations to come, promising that all which he might insist upon in favor of Dion should be granted, and putting in motion a second time Archytas and the Tarentines to prevail upon him. These men, through their companion and friend Archidemus, who came to Athens in a Syracusan trireme, assured Plato that Dionysius was now ardent in the study of philosophy, and had even made considerable progress in it. By their earnest entreaties, coupled with those of Dion, Plato was at length induced to go to Syracuse. He was received, as before, with signal tokens of honor. He was complimented with the privilege, enjoyed by no one else, of approaching the despot without having his person searched, and was affectionately welcomed by the female relatives of Dion. Yet this visit, prolonged much beyond what he himself wished, proved nothing but a second splendid captivity, as the companion of Dionysius in the acropolis at Ortigia.

Dionysius the philosopher obtained abundance of flatterers—as his father Dionysius the poet had obtained before him—and was even emboldened to proclaim himself as the son of Apollo. It is possible that even an impuissant embrace of philosophy, on the part of so great a potentate, may have tended to exalt the reputation of philosophers in the contemporary world. Otherwise the dabbings of Dionysius would have merited no attention; though he seems to have been really a man of some literary talent—retaining to the end a sincere admiration of Plato, and jealously pettish because he could not prevail upon Plato to admire *him*. But the second visit of Plato to him at Syracuse—very different from his first—presented no chance of benefit to the people of Syracuse, and only deserves notice as it bore upon the destiny of Dion. Here, unfortunately, Plato could accomplish nothing; though his zeal on behalf of his friend was unwearied. Dionysius broke all his promises of kind dealing, became more rancorous in his hatred, impatient of the respect which Dion enjoyed even as an exile, and fearful of the revenge which he might one day be able to exact.

When expelled from Syracuse, Dion had gone to Peloponnesus and Athens, where he had continued for some years to receive regular remittances of his property. But at length, even while Plato was residing at Syracuse, Dionysius thought fit to withhold one-half of the property, on pretense of reserving it for Dion's son. Presently he took steps yet more violent, threw off all disguise, sold the whole of Dion's property, and appropriated or distributed among his friends the large proceeds, not less than 100 talents. Plato, who had the mortification to hear this intelligence while in the palace of Dionysius, was full of grief and displeasure. He implored permission to depart. But though the mind of Dionysius had now been thoroughly set against him by the multiplied insinuations of the calumniators, it was not without difficulty and tiresome solicitations that he obtained permission; chiefly through the vehement remonstrances of Archytas and his companions, who represented to the despot that they had brought him to Syracuse, and that they were responsible for his safe return. The mercenaries of Dionysius were indeed so ill-disposed to Plato, that considerable precautions were required to bring him away in safety.

It was in the spring of 360 B.C. that the philosopher appears to have returned to Peloponnesus from this, his second visit to the younger Dionysius, and third visit to Syracuse. At the Olympic festival of that year, he met Dion, to whom he recounted the recent proceedings of Dionysius. Incensed at the seizure of the property, and hopeless of any permission to return, Dion was now meditating enforcement of his restoration at the point of the sword. But there occurred yet another insult on the part of Dionysius, which infused a more deadly exasperation into the quarrel. Arete, wife of Dion and half-sister of Dionysius, had continued to reside at Syracuse

ever since the exile of her husband. She formed a link between the two, the continuance of which Dionysius could no longer tolerate, in his present hatred toward Dion. Accordingly he took upon him to pronounce her divorced, and to remarry her, in spite of her own decided repugnance, with one of his friends named Timokrates. To this he added another cruel injury, by intentionally corrupting and brutalizing Dion's eldest son, a youth just reaching puberty.

Outraged thus in all the tenderest points, Dion took up with passionate resolution the design of avenging himself on Dionysius, and of emancipating Syracuse from despotism into liberty. During the greater part of his exile he had resided at Athens, in the house of his friend Kallippus, enjoying the society of Speusippus and other philosophers of the Academy, and the teaching of Plato himself when returned from Syracuse. Well supplied with money, and strict as to his own personal wants, he was able largely to indulge his liberal spirit toward many persons, and among the rest toward Plato, whom he assisted toward the expense of a choric exhibition at Athens. Dion also visited Sparta and various other cities; enjoying a high reputation, and doing himself credit everywhere; a fact not unknown to Dionysius, and aggravating his displeasure. Yet Dion was long not without hope that that displeasure would mitigate, so as to allow of his return to Syracuse on friendly terms. Nor did he cherish any purposes of hostility, until the last proceedings with respect to his property and his wife at once cut off all hope and awakened vindictive sentiments. He began therefore to lay a train for attacking Dionysius and enfranchising Syracuse by arms, invoking the countenance of Plato; who gave his approbation, yet not without mournful reserves; saying that he was now seventy years of age—that though he admitted the just wrongs of Dion and the bad conduct of Dionysius, armed conflict was nevertheless repugnant to his feelings, and he could anticipate little good from it—that he had labored long in vain to reconcile the two exasperated kinsmen, and could not now labor for an opposite end.

But though Plato was lukewarm, his friends and pupils at the Academy cordially sympathized with Dion. Speusippus especially, his intimate friend and relative, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse, had communicated much with the population in the city, and gave encouraging reports of their readiness to aid Dion, even if he came with ever so small a force against Dionysius. Kallippus, with Eudemus (the friend of Aristotle), Timonides, and Miltas—all three members of the society at the Academy, and the last a prophet also—lent him aid and embarked in his enterprise. There were a numerous body of exiles from Syracuse, not less than 1000 altogether; with most of whom Dion opened communication inviting their fellowship. He at the same time hired mercenary soldiers in small bands, keeping his measures as secret as he could. Alkimenes, one of the leading Achæans in Peloponnesus, was warm in the cause (probably from

sympathy with the Achæan colony Kroton, then under the dependence of Dionysius), conferring upon it additional dignity by his name and presence. A considerable quantity of spare arms, of every description, was got together, in order to supply new unarmed partisans on reaching Sicily. With all these aids Dion found himself in the island of Zakynthus, a little after Midsummer 357 B.C.; mustering 800 soldiers of tried experience and bravery, who had been directed to come thither silently and in small parties, without being informed whither they were going. A little squadron was prepared, of no more than five merchantmen, two of them vessels of thirty oars, with victuals adequate to the direct passage across the sea from Zakynthus to Syracuse; since the ordinary passage, across from Korkyra and along the Tarentine Gulf, was impracticable, in the face of the maritime power of Dionysius.

Such was the contemptible force with which Dion ventured to attack the greatest of all Grecian potentates in his own stronghold and island. Dionysius had now reigned as despot at Syracuse between ten and eleven years. Inferior as he personally was to his father, it does not seem that the Syracusan power had yet materially declined in his hands. We know little about the political facts of his reign; but the veteran Philistus, his chief adviser and officer, appears to have kept together the larger part of the great means bequeathed by the elder Dionysius. The disparity of force, therefore, between the assailant and the party assailed, was altogether extravagant. To Dion, personally, indeed, such disparity was a matter of indifference. To a man of his enthusiastic temperament, so great was the heroism and sublimity of the enterprise—combining liberation of his country from a despot, with revenge for gross outrages to himself—that he was satisfied if he could only land in Sicily with no matter how small a force, accounting it honor enough to perish in such a cause. Such was the emphatic language of Dion, reported to us by Aristotle; who (being then among the pupils of Plato) may probably have heard it with his own ears. To impartial contemporary spectators, like Demosthenes, the attempt seemed hopeless.

But the intelligent men of the Academy who accompanied Dion, would not have thrown their lives away in contemplation of a glorious martyrdom; nor were either they or he ignorant, that there existed circumstances, not striking the eye of the ordinary spectator, which materially weakened the great apparent security of Dionysius.

First, there was the pronounced and almost unanimous discontent of the people of Syracuse. Though prohibited from all public manifestations, they had been greatly agitated by the original project of Dion to grant liberty to the city—by the inclinations even of Dionysius himself toward the same end, so soon unhappily extinguished—by the dissembling language of Dionysius, the great posi-

tion of Dion's wife and sister, and the second visit of Plato, all of which favored the hope that Dion might be amicably recalled. At length such chance disappeared, when his property was confiscated and his wife re-married to another. But as his energetic character was well known, the Syracusans now both confidently expected, and ardently wished that he would return by force, and help them to put down one who was alike his enemy and theirs. Speusippus, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse and mingled much with the people, brought back decisive testimonies of their disaffection toward Dionysius, and of their eager longing for relief by the hands of Dion. It would be sufficient (they said) if he even came alone; they would flock around him, and arm him at once with an adequate force.

There were doubtless many other messages of similar tenor sent to Peloponnesus; and one Syracusan exile, Herakleides, was in himself a considerable force. Though a friend of Dion, he had continued high in the service of Dionysius, until the second visit of Plato. At that time he was disgraced, and obliged to save his life by flight, on account of a mutiny among the mercenary troops, or rather of the veteran soldiers among them, whose pay Dionysius had cut down. The men so curtailed rose in arms, demanding continuance of the old pay; and when Dionysius shut the gates of the acropolis, refusing attention to their requisitions, they raised the furious barbaric pæan or war shout, and rushed up to scale the walls. Terrible were the voices of these Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in the ears of Plato, who knew himself to be the object of their hatred, and who happened to be then in the garden of the acropolis. But Dionysius, no less terrified than Plato, appeased the mutiny, by conceding all that was asked, and even more. The blame of this misadventure was thrown upon Herakleides, toward whom Dionysius conducted himself with mingled injustice and treachery—according to the judgment both of Plato and of all around him. As an exile, Herakleides now brought word to Dion that Dionysius could not even rely upon the mercenary troops, whom he treated with a parsimony the more revolting as they contrasted it with the munificence of his father. Herakleides was eager to co-operate in putting down the despotism at Syracuse. But he waited to equip a squadron of triremes, and was not ready so soon as Dion; perhaps intentionally, as the jealousy between the two soon broke out.

The second source of weakness to Dionysius lay in his own character and habits. The commanding energy of the father, far from being of service to the son, had been combined with a jealousy which intentionally kept him down and cramped his growth. He had always been weak, petty, destitute of courage or foresight, and unfit for a position like that which his father had acquired and maintained. His personal incompetency was recognized by all, and would probably have manifested itself even more conspicuously, had

he not found a minister of so much ability, and so much devotion to the dynasty, as Philistus. But in addition to such known incompetency, he had contracted recently habits which inspired every one around him with contempt. He was perpetually intoxicated and plunged in dissipation. To put down such a chief, even though surrounded by walls, soldiers, and armed ships, appeared to Dion and his confidential companions an enterprise no way impracticable.

Nevertheless these causes of weakness were known only to close observers; while the great military force of Syracuse was obvious to the eyes of every one. When the soldiers mustered by Dion at Zakynthus, were first informed that they were destined to strike straight across the sea against Syracuse, they shrank from the proposition as an act of insanity. They complained of their leaders for not having before told them what was projected; just as the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of Cyrus, on reaching Tarsus, complained of Klearchus for having kept back the fact that they were marching against the Great King. It required all the eloquence of Dion, with his advanced age, his dignified presence, and the quantity of gold and silver plate in his possession, to remove their apprehensions. How widely these apprehensions were felt is shown by the circumstance, that out of 1000 Syracusan exiles, only twenty-five or thirty dared to join him.

After a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and an ample banquet to the soldiers in the stadium at Zakynthus, Dion gave orders for embarkation in the ensuing morning. On that very night the moon was eclipsed. We have already seen what disastrous consequences turned upon the occurrence of this same phenomenon fifty-six years before, when Nikias was about to conduct the defeated Athenian fleet away from the harbor of Syracuse. Under the existing apprehensions of Dion's band, the eclipse might well have induced them to renounce the enterprise; and so it probably would, under a general like Nikias. But Dion had learnt astronomy; and what was of not less consequence, Miltas, the prophet of the expedition, besides his gift of prophecy, had received instructions in the Academy also. When the affrighted soldiers inquired what new resolution was to be adopted in consequence of so grave a sign from the gods, Miltas rose and assured them that they had mistaken the import of the sign, which promised them good fortune and victory. By the eclipse of the moon, the gods intimated that something very brilliant was about to be darkened over: now there was nothing in Greece so brilliant as the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse; it was Dionysius who was about to suffer eclipse, to be brought on by the victory of Dion. Reassured by such consoling words, the soldiers got on board. They had good reason at first to believe that the favor of the gods waited upon them, for a gentle and steady Etesian breeze carried them across midsea without accident or suffering, in twelve days, from Zakynthus to Cape Pachynus, the south-eastern corner

of Sicily and nearest to Syracuse. The pilot Protus, who had steered the course so as exactly to hit the cape, urgently recommended immediate disembarkation, without going farther along the south-western coast of the island; since stormy weather was commencing, which might hinder the fleet from keeping near the shore. But Dion was afraid of landing so near to the main force of the enemy. Accordingly the squadron proceeded onward, but were driven by a violent wind away from Sicily toward the coast of Africa, narrowly escaping shipwreck. It was not without considerable hardship and danger that they got back to Sicily, after five days; touching the island at Herakleia Minoa westward of Agrigentum, within the Carthaginian supremacy. The Carthaginian governor of Minoa, Synalus (perhaps a Greek in the service of Carthage), was a personal acquaintance of Dion, and received him with all possible kindness; though knowing nothing beforehand of his approach, and at first resisting his landing through ignorance.

Thus was Dion, after ten years of exile, once more on Sicilian ground. The favorable predictions of Miltas had been completely realized. But even that prophet could hardly have been prepared for the wonderful tidings now heard, which insured the success of the expedition. Dionysius had recently sailed from Syracuse to Italy, with a fleet of 80 triremes. What induced him to commit so capital a mistake, we cannot make out; for Philistus was already with a fleet in the Gulf of Tarentum, waiting to intercept Dion, and supposing that the invading squadron would naturally sail along the coast of Italy to Syracuse, according to the practice almost universal in that day. Philistus did not commit the same mistake as Nikias had made in reference to Gylippus—that of despising Dion because of the smallness of his force. He watched in the usual waters, and was only disappointed because Dion, venturing on the bold and unusual straight course, was greatly favored by wind and weather. But while Philistus watched the coast of Italy, it was natural that Dionysius himself should keep guard with his main force at Syracuse. The despot was fully aware of the disaffection which reigned in the town, and of the hopes excited by Dion's project; which was generally well known, though no one could tell how or at what moment the deliverer might be expected. Suspicious now to a greater degree than ever, Dionysius had caused a fresh search to be made in the city for arms, and had taken away all that he could find. We may be sure too that his regiment of habitual spies were more on the alert than ever, and that unusual rigor was the order of the day. Yet at this critical juncture, he thought proper to quit Syracuse with a very large portion of his force, leaving the command to Timokrates, the husband of Dion's late wife; and at this same critical juncture Dion arrived at Minoa.

Nothing could exceed the joy of the Dionian soldiers on hearing of the departure of Dionysius, which left Syracuse open and easy of

access. Eager to avail themselves of the favorable instant, they called upon their leader to march thither without delay, repudiating even that measure of rest which he recommended after the fatigues of the voyage. Accordingly Dion, after a short refreshment provided by Synalus—with whom he deposited his spare arms, to be transmitted to him when required—set forward on his march toward Syracuse. On entering the Agrigentine territory, he was joined by 200 horsemen near Eknomon. Further on, while passing through Gela and Kamarina, many inhabitants of these towns, together with some neighboring Sikans and Sikels, swelled his band. Lastly, when he approached the Syracusan border, a considerable proportion of the rural population came to him also, though without arms; making the re-enforcements which joined him altogether about 5,000 men. Having armed these volunteers in the best manner he could, Dion continued his progress as far as Akraë, where he made a short evening halt. From thence, receiving good news from Syracuse, he recommenced his march during the latter half of the night, hastening forward to the passage over the river Anapus; which he had the good fortune to occupy without any opposition, before daybreak.

Dion was now within no more than a mile and a quarter of the walls of Syracuse. The rising sun disclosed his army to the view of the Syracusan population, who were doubtless impatiently watching for him. He was seen offering sacrifice to the river Anapus, and putting up a solemn prayer to the God Helios, then just showing himself above the horizon. He wore the wreath habitual with those who were thus employed; while his soldiers, animated by the confident encouragement of the prophets, had taken wreaths also. Elate and enthusiastic, they passed the Anapus (seemingly at the bridge which formed part of the Helorine way), advanced at a running pace across the low plain which divided the southern cliff of Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and approached the gates of the quarter of Syracuse called Neapolis—the Temenitid Gates, near the chapel of Apollo Temenites. Dion was at their head, in resplendent armor, with a body-guard near him composed of 100 of his Peloponnesians. His brother Megakles was on one side of him, his friend the Athenian Kallippus on the other; all three, and a large proportion of the soldiers also, still crowned with their sacrificial wreaths, as if marching in a joyous festival procession, with victory already assured.

As yet Dion had not met with the smallest resistance. Timokrates (left at Syracuse with the large mercenary force as viceregent), while he sent an express to apprise Dionysius, kept his chief hold on the two military positions or horns of the city; the island of Ortygia at one extremity, and Epipolæ with Euryalus on the other. It has already been mentioned that Epipolæ was a triangular slope, with walls bordering both the northern and southern cliffs, and forming an angle on the western apex, where stood the strong fort of Euryalus. Between Ortygia and Epipolæ lay the populous quarters of

Syracuse, wherein the great body of citizens resided. As the disaffection of the Syracusans was well known, Timokrates thought it unsafe to go out of the city, and meet Dion on the road, for fear of revolt within. But he perhaps might have occupied the important bridge over the Anapus, had not a report reached him that Dion was directing his attack first against Leontini. Many of the Campanian mercenaries under the command of Timokrates, having properties in Leontini, immediately quitted Epipolæ to go thither and defend them. This rumor—false, and perhaps intentionally spread by the invaders—not only carried off much of the garrison elsewhere, but also misled Timokrates; inasmuch that Dion was allowed to make his night march, to reach the Anapus, and to find it unoccupied.

It was too late for Timokrates to resist, when the rising sun had once exhibited the army of Dion crossing the Anapus. The effect produced upon the Syracusans in the populous quarters was electric. They rose like one man to welcome their deliverer, and to put down the dynasty which had hung about their necks for forty-eight years. Such of the mercenaries of Dionysius as were in these central portions of the city were forced to seek shelter in Epipolæ, while his police and spies were pursued and seized, to undergo the full terrors of a popular vengeance. Far from being able to go forth against Dion, Timokrates could not even curb the internal insurrection. So thoroughly was he intimidated by the reports of his terrified police, and by the violent and unanimous burst of wrath among a people whom every Dionysian partisan had long been accustomed to treat as disarmed slaves—that he did not think himself safe even in Epipolæ. But he could not find means of getting to Ortygia, since the intermediate city was in the hands of his enemies, while Dion and his troops were crossing the low plain between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. It only remained for him therefore to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to escape from Epipolæ either by the northern or the western side. To justify his hasty flight, he spread the most terrific reports respecting the army of Dion, and thus contributed still farther to paralyze the discouraged partisans of Dionysius.

Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him. Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother Megakles were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight, as was rare in a Grecian city) was decorated as on a day of jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables, and bowls of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of his

soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and grateful prayers addressed to him as it were to a god. Every house was a scene of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police and garrison.

It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That stronghold was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokrates had left them without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising of the people in Achradina—which they must partly have witnessed from their walls, and partly learned through fugitive spies and partisans—struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications. Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sun-dial, erected by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with the muniments of the despot on one side and the now liberated Achradina on the other, Dion addressed an animated harangue to the Syracusans around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in defense of their newly-acquired rights and liberties, and inviting them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megakles generals with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.

Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which, forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison left in it by the fugitive Timokrates, that they allowed him to acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus, which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side and discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far to determine

the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to set free many state prisoners, who became ardent partisans of the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side, he commenced the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the Great Harbor at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the Portus Lakkius, at the other. He at the same time provided arms as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus, but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading cross-wall.

At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius returned with his fleet to Ortygia. Fatally indeed was his position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably many of his other dependencies out of Syracuse, had taken the opportunity of revolting. Even with the large fleet which he had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to receive any separate propositions, and desired him to address them publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and moderate fulfillments of military service, subject to their own vote of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion returned in their name the peremptory reply—that no proposition from Dionysius could be received, short of total abdication; adding in his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details. Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent Syracusans, approved by Dion, were dispatched as envoys to Dionysius. A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their houses in the city.

This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the dis-

cussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he ordered at daybreak a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case of victory. The sally was well-timed and at first completely successful. One half of Dion's soldiers were encamped to guard the cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels, and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no resistance. Their flight partially disordered the stouter Dionian soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the clamor, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage, the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going against him. Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray. The struggle was the more violent as it took place in a narrow space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armor and the person of Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends, and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian history. Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet, while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which were kept from his body only by the breast-plate. At length he was wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the ground, and in imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having named Timonides commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius 800 men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field (under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularizing himself with the survivors.

When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved, it seems evident that had Timokrates maintained himself in Epipolæ, so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of

Ortygia, the success of Dion's whole enterprise in Syracuse would have been seriously endangered.

Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan people testified their gratitude to the Dionian soldiers by voting a golden wreath to the value of 100 minæ; while these soldiers, charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective guard for the future. Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported parties across the harbor to ravage the country for provisions, and dispatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleides from Peloponnesus, with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and 1500 soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show themselves actively on shipboard, got together a tolerable naval force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and round Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans, with an intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments), must have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty triremes, which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.

Dionysius was shortly afterward re-enforced by Philistus, who brought to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into the town by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by reinforcements from Syracuse.

To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleides. After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward, appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself, with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound, however, was not mortal; so that he fell alive, being now about 78 years of age, into the hands of his enemies—who stripped him naked, insulted him brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse. Revolting as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine general Phytton.

The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus,

the ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its first day of usurpation—its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile—its St. Helena.

Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now further lost, through the victory of Herakleides, his superiority at sea, and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obligated to forego empire himself, yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be ruined along with him—he set on foot a tissue of base maneuvers; availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans, the rivalry of Herakleides, the defects of Dion, and what was more important than all—the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.

Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism of which his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis. The circumstances, therefore, were such as to suggest to the Syracusans apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those from Timonides to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained much complaint of the repulsive demeanor of Dion; which defect the philosopher exhorted his friend to amend. All those whom Dion's arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleides. This latter—formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose displeasure he had only saved his life by flight—had been unable or unwilling to co-operate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthus, but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already been placed under blockade, Herakleides was esteemed the equal of Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to ulterior designs, he had the prodigious advantage of being free from connection with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover, his manners were not only popular, but

according to Plutarch, more than popular—smooth, insidious, and, dexterous in crimiatory speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.

As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that Herakleides, who had brought the greatest number of triremes, naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion, who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed, protested against it as derogating from the full powers which the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself. Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote, and deposed Herakleides. Having then gently rebuked Herakleides for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed, from himself, the appointment of Herakleides as admiral, with a guard equal to his own. The right of nomination thus assumed displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleides, and exasperated his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him power—together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from some, and to intentional calumny from others.

It is necessary to understand this situation in order to appreciate the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were hostile to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not, unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion's sympathies. One letter there was, bearing on its superscription the words "Hipparinus (the son of Dion) to his father." At first many persons present refused to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin, for the sake of a people who would turn round and

sting him, so soon as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion would consent to take his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures against his female relatives and his son.

This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion. Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison into their minds. Plutarch displays (in my judgment) no great knowledge of human nature when he complains of the Syracusans for suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It was precisely the magnanimity required for the situation which made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling, to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or who could foretell which, among painfully conflicting sentiments, would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover, his enemies, not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries under his command. A Syracusan named Sosis, brother to one of the guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly, warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sosis appeared in the assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech. Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause; while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry, it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted by Sosis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate. In this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile interests, and tending toward the same end. Every day the suspicion and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans toward Dion and his soldiers became more imbibtered.

The naval victory gained by Herakleides and the Syracusan fleet over Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory of the admiral, still further lowered the influence of Dion. The belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia. It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months' full pay—on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy the

revenues of a large and productive portion (called Gyarta) of the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him to address the Syracusan public, yet advising them to accept the terms. Under the existing mistrust toward Dion, this advice was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and Dionysius. Herakleides promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his eldest son Apollokrates.

Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable discredit on Herakleides. Probably the Dionian partisans were not sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity, Herakleides warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition, which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been recommended upon specious grounds of retributive justice, as well as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also, yet more repugnant to him, and even pointedly directed against him, were adopted. Lastly Herakleides, enlarging upon his insupportable arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers, now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the public purse.

It was toward midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command, about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse. Twenty-five new generals were named, of whom Herakleides was one.

The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy against Dion: for it does not seem to have been applied to those soldiers who had come with Herakleides; moreover the new generals sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant of citizenship was promised to them. Had the soldiers complied, it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose of Herakleides was to expel him alone. This, however, was prevented by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate revenge upon them, and demanded only to be led to the assault. Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse upon their pro-

ceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless the new generals, chosen as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to his appeal, but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by the soldiers—excellent troops, 3,000 in number; while Dion, anxious only to insure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides, confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit, giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the slain for burial.

In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest sympathy toward himself, with indignant disgust at the behavior of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly enfranchised Syracuse against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not enable us to say. Their sentence went in favor of Dion and against the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all justice or reparation, and fancying themselves competent to reduce Ortygia without Dion's assistance—since the provisions therein were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine. Despairing of re-enforcement, Apollokrates had already resolved to send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nysius, a Neapolitan officer, dispatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to reach Ortygia at the head of a re-enforcing fleet conveying numerous transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was re-enforced to 10,000 mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well provisioned for some time.

The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune, had not been able to prevent the entry of Nysius. But they made a sudden attack upon him while his ships were in the harbor, and while the crews, thinking themselves save from an enemy, were interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of Nysius were ruined—others were towed off as prizes, while the victory, gained by Herakleides without Dion, provoked extravagant joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals gave loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing night. Nysius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order, planted their scaling ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew the sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of this

important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia; next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed—the houses, of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own rapacity. The soldiers of Nypsius stripped the private dwellings in the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also into Achradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse. Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed was continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without restraining their progress.

It soon became evident to Herakleides and his colleagues, as well as to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety except in invoking the aid of Dion and his soldiers from Leontini. Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a long time no one would speak out to propose what every one had in his mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition, which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and five Syracusan horsemen, set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place toward evening, they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly expiated.

Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears checked his utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging sympathy. At length he found voice to say: "I have convened you, Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct. For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse

is in the hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in spite of what has happened, you still chose to assist us, misguided and unhappy Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city. But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to our fate, I here thank you for all your past valor and attachment to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion, as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own fellow-citizens when they were in misery."

This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith, and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to Syracuse.

By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him, inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution. Herakleides and the other generals had sent a message forbidding his near approach, with notice that the gates would be closed against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising him both admittance and support. Nysius, having permitted his troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleides and his colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion. Under this impression they dispatched to him the second message of exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make their threat good. But the events of the next morning speedily undeceived them. Nysius renewed his attack with greater ferocity than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage, but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To accelerate the process, and to forestall Dion's arrival, which they fully expected—they set fire to the city in several places, with torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword without. The streets were strewn with corpses, while the fire gained ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleides, himself wounded, nor

the other generals, could hold out any longer against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of Herakleides were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.

Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers, whose ardor was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area called the Hekatompedon. His light-armed were sent forward at once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains, along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations of grateful reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nysius, on several points at once. Being now within the exterior fortification formed by the wall of Epipolæ, there lay before him the tripartite interior city—Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its separate fortification; between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and formed the principal defense against a foreign enemy. Moreover, the troops of Nysius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving as destroyers around them, for several hours, had doubtless broken down the gates and in other ways weakened the defenses. The scene was frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred around. It was amid such horrors that Dion and his soldiers had found themselves—while penetrating in different divisions at once into Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradina.

His task would probably have been difficult, had Nysius been able to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain. Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder, Nysius marshaled them along the interior fortification, occupying the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate into the city. The battle was thus not continuous, but fought between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amid the conflagration blazing everywhere around. Disorganized by pillage, the troops of Nysius could oppose no long resistance to the forward advance of Dion, with soldiers full of ardor and with the Syracusans around him stimulated by despair. Nysius was overpowered, compelled to abandon his line of defense, and to

retreat with his troops into Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the city, did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number of the soldiers of Nypsius were found dispersed through the streets and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however, all hands within it were employed in stopping the conflagration; a task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts throughout the day and the following night.

On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit, and a deep sense of repentant gratitude toward Dion. All those generals who had been chosen at the last election from their intense opposition to him, fled forthwith, except Herakleides and Theodotes. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies; yet it appears that they knew his character better than their colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new luster, if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals, who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition, entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.

If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay, were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleides, exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms to purposes hardly less mischievous than despotism itself. The life of Herakleides now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one astonished when he took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning Herakleides; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction to his disappointed friends:

“Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do my duty toward my friends and toward honest men. The true test is, if, after being wronged, I show myself pla-

cable and gentle toward the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleides more in goodness and justice than in power and intelligence. Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing to fortune. If Herakleides has been treacherous and wicked through envy, it is not for Dion to dishonor a virtuous life in obedience to angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality as not to be amended by gentle and gracious treatment from steady benefactors."

We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech of Dion, reported by his companion Timonides, and thus passing into the biography of Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of the case counseled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of Kallikratidas on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in realizing by a conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed from the Academy, the rather, as the case presented every temptation to depart from it. Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in Grecian party warfare, and regarding the amnesty toward Herakleides as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march from Leontini to Syracuse—he probably gloried in both, more than in the victory itself. We shall presently have the pain of discovering that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure that at the time, the judgment passed on his proceeding toward Herakleides was very different from what it now receives. Among his friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into friends. In the bosom of Herakleides himself, the mere fact of owing his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which the Erinnys within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned, by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleides continuing at Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them than he had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.

It was Dion's next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of Nysius. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the

soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nypsius and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than 2,000 in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia. A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not forgotten.

A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleides himself, that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land and sea. The motion was received with great favor by the principal citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleides, especially the seamen; who preferred serving under his command and loudly required that he should be named admiral, along with Dion as general on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented himself with insisting and obtaining that the resolution, which had been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should be rescinded. The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority; at sea, Herakleides, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleides, often on just grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just pretenses. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messene in order to carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy Dionysius, through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse. Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing with Herakleides, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even from irregular supply of provisions. Among the mortifications of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings and predictions when he consented to spare Herakleides. Meanwhile Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make out; for Plutarch tells us nothing except what bears immediately on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleides. To attack Pha-

rax, the forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleides, the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the insinuation of Herakleides and the clamor of the seamen; who accused him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Pharak, but was repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleides with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed to Syracuse, with the intention of seizing the city, and barring out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing a distance of 700 stadia (about 82 miles) in a very short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleides.

Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleides found means to direct another maneuver against Dion through the medium of a Spartan named Gæsylos, who had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the command. Herakleides eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this officer, pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was required he was himself a Spartan by public grant. Gæsylos, having ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleides. Sensible that the wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsylos constrained him to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future. He engaged his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant; but the better to insure such observance the greater part of the Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument of Herakleides) was disbanded, leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.

The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharak, or why he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the Syracusans and succor Ortygia, we know not. But no succor arrived; provisions grew scarce, and the garrison became so discontented that Apollokrates, the son of Dionysius, could not hold out any longer. Accordingly he capitulated with Dion, handing over to him Ortygia, with its fort, arms, magazines, and everything contained in it, except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these vessels he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends, and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy and mutual self-congratulation, promising to commence a new era of freedom.

On entering Ortygia, Dion saw, for the first time after a separation of about twelve years, his sister Aristomache, his wife Arete, and his family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of delight to all. Arete having been made against her own consent the wife of Timokrates, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he received and embraced her with unabated affection. He conducted both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they had been living since his absence, into his own house, having himself resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However, this renewal of his domestic happiness was shortly afterward imbibed by the death of his son, who, having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute habits, fell from the roof of the house in a fit of intoxication or frenzy and perished.

Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With means altogether disproportionate he had achieved the expulsion of the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold. He had combated danger and difficulty with conspicuous resolution, and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he "breathed out his soul" at the instant of triumphant entry into Ortygia, the Academy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity which poisoned so many other eminent Greeks had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all the worst of Dion's qualities and damping all the best.

Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits of life completely unchanged, now that he had become master of Syracuse and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil. But the public mistakes now to be recounted were not the less mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.

From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus, Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of Dionysius only in order to transfer the despotism to himself. His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal antipathies everywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even at moments when Dion was laboring for the genuine good of the Syracusans this suspicion had always more or less crossed his path, robbing him of well-merited gratitude, and at the same time discrediting his opponents and the people of Syracuse as guilty of mean jealousy toward a benefactor.

The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner as either to confirm or to belie such unfavorable auguries. Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanor for which he had always been notorious was rather aggravated than

softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he despised everything which looked like courting popularity.

If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what he did and what he left undone was more significant still. Of that great boon of freedom which he had so loudly promised to the Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly without reduction, if not actually re-enforced; for as Apollokrates did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers, but to the people of Syracuse it produced nothing better than a change of masters.

It was not, indeed, the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution. Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy, as well as from his own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government, combining king, aristocracy, and people under certain provisions and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations addressed both to him and to the Syracusans after his death by Plato, who, however, seems to contemplate, along with the political scheme, a Lykurgæan reform of manners and practice. To aid in framing and realizing his scheme, Dion had sent to Corinth to invite counselors and auxiliaries, for Corinth was suitable to his views, not simply as mother-city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly oligarchical.

That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere we need not question. They had been originally conceived without any views of acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had exhorted the younger Dionysius to realize, immediately after the death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further by calling in Plato—with what success has been already recounted. But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered during the interval between 367 B.C. and 354 B.C. If at the former period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even

dictated by himself—it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession, would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B.C., when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokrates, had become master in Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot, who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every one knows that he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement action by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust, should constitute himself king—even limited king—and determine how much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had appointed him—this was a proceeding which they could not but resent as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by force.

The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He manifested no evidence of realizing even that fraction of popular liberty which had entered into his original scheme. What exact promise he made we do not know. But he maintained his own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications, provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended to maintain them? That he really had in his mind purposes such as Plato gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no practical step toward them. He had resolved to accomplish them, not through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterward no escape.

It was not likely that Dion's conduct would pass without a protest. That protest came loudest from Herakleides; who, so long as Dion had been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a culpable and traitorous manner—and who now again found himself in opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen, and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down. The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and expected, moreover, to see the

destruction of that splendid funeral monument which his son had built in his honor, and the urn with its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have consummated without a moment's delay; the second was compliance with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet Dion did neither. It was Herakleides who censured him, and moved for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory of attaching his name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon eleven years afterward, the moment that he found himself master of Syracuse. Not only Dion did not originate the overthrow of this dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleides proposed it, he resisted him and prevented it from being done. We shall find the same den serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.

Herakleides gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon Herakleides as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it time to remove. Accordingly, with his privy, they made their way into the house of Herakleides and slew him.

This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the obsequies of Herakleides with his full military force, excusing his well-known crime to the people, on the plea that Syracuse could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleides away at the moment when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the melancholy honor of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded to lend himself more and more to their exigencies. He provided for them pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length discontent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in great part disaffected to him.

The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been

yet re-established, there was ample liberty at least of speech and censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the sentiment entertained toward him. He became disquieted and irritable at this change of public feeling; angry with the people, yet at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleides sat heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution, indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence toward friends as well as enemies.

One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion. His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion, had been his companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily, and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious friendship arose, not out of fellowship in philosophy, but out of common hospitalities, and especially common initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries. Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even insured the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learned that plots were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus, who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under this confidence, Kallippus had full license for carrying out his intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which reached him. Among the rumors raised out of Dion's new position, and industriously circulated by Kallippus—one was, that he was about to call back Apollokrates, son of Dionysius, as his partner and successor in the despotism—as a substitute for the youthful son who had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organized a wider circle of adherents. His plot, however, did not escape the penetration of Aristomache and Arete; who having first addressed unavailing hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself. The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific oaths recognized in Grecian religion; going into the sacred

grove of Demeter and Persephone, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and taking in his hand a lighted torch.

Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the Koreia:—the festival of these very two goddesses in whose name and presence Kallippus had foresworn. This was the day which he had fixed for execution. The strong points of defense in Syracuse were confided beforehand to his principal adherents, while his brother Philostrates kept a trireme manned in the harbor ready for flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They then made their way up to Dion's apartment, and attempted to throw him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however, that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracasan without, named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death. They then seized Aristomache and Arete, the sister and wife of Dion. These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.

Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse—but a year too long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing from the class of Grecian despots; a man, not of aspirations purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive subjects and a victorious army—but with large public-minded purposes attached as co-ordinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did not shock Hellenic instincts, should reach further than political institutions generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato. Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech, and habit of active citizenship, from whence a large portion of Hellenic virtue flowed—the wonder is, how he acquired so much public conviction and true magnanimity of soul—not how he missed acquiring more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a rare predispo-

sition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in which his youth was passed, was that of an energetic despotism; while the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them from acquiring more.

How this project—the natural growth of Dion's mind, for which his tastes and capacities were suited—was violently thrust aside through the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius—has been already recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could not overthrow Dionysius without "taking the Syracusan people into partnership" (to use the phrase of Herodotus respecting the Athenian Kleisthenes)—without promising them full freedom, as an inducement for their hearty co-operation—without giving them arms, and awakening in them the stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all the more violent because they had been so long trodden down. With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had no experience of a free and jealous popular mind: in persuasion he was utterly unpracticed: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (*Egalité*) at the end of 1792, in the first French Revolution—he was hated both by the royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had taken an active part against it—and by sincere democrats, because they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion, such coalition of antipathies was a serious hindrance; presenting a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the unscrupulous Herakleides. The bad treatment which he underwent both from the Syracusans and from Herakleides, during the time when the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy, that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendancy unshaken, until the surrender of Ortygia.

That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the turning point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed in after days by Timoleon—the razing of the Dionysian stronghold, and the erection of courts of justice on its site. He might have taken

the lead in organizing, under the discussion and consent of the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact. Dion might have done all that Timoleon did—and might have done it more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought himself strong enough to resume his original project. In spite of the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans—in spite of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere suspicion of his despotic designs—he fancied himself competent to treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for them just as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any liberty at all, on the plea, or pretense, of full consultation with advisers of his own choice.

Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made a martyr of Herakleides, and he would have been compelled to make other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion's failure on every one but Dion himself.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF
TIMOLEON. B.C. 353–336.

THE assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears to have been skillfully planned and executed for the purpose of its contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular—and to the mastery of Ortygia—he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We read in Cornelius Nepos, that after the assassination of Dion there was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favor, testified by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population. But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw into prison the female relatives of Dion—his sister

Aristomache and his pregnant wife Arete, avenging by such act of malignity the false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order to satisfy their suspicions. Arete was delivered of a son in the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus, but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly how implacable those enemies were.

How Killippus maintained himself in Syracuse—by what support, or violences, or promises—and against what difficulties he had to contend—we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens; wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honors of tyrannicide; representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion's death occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the philosopher's letters.

Killippus maintained himself for a year in full splendor and dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion—or perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name—showed themselves with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced them to take refuge in Leontini; of which town we presently find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus committed many enormities, and made himself so odious, that the expelled Dionysian family began to conceive hopes of recovering their dominion. He had gone forth from Syracuse on an expedition against Katana; of which absence Hipparnius took advantage to effect his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Killippus speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of Syracuse.

Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by Aristomache, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse, yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse, there were opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans of Dionysius the younger, and of his family—next the mass who desired to get rid of both the families, and to establish a free popular constitution. Such is the state of facts which we gather from the letters of Plato. But we are too destitute of memorials to

make out anything distinct respecting the condition of Syracuse or of Sicily between 353 B.C. and 344 B.C.—from the death of Dion to the invitation sent to Corinth, which brought about the mission of Timoleon. We are assured generally that it was a period of intolerable conflicts, disorders, and suffering; that even the temples and tombs were neglected; that the people were everywhere trampled down by despots and foreign mercenaries; that the despots were frequently overthrown by violence or treachery, yet only to be succeeded by others as bad or worse; that the multiplication of foreign soldiers, seldom regularly paid, spread pillage and violence everywhere. The philosopher Plato—in a letter written about a year or more after the death of Dion (seemingly after the expulsion of Kallippus), and addressed to the surviving relatives and friends of the latter—draws a lamentable picture of the state both of Syracuse and Sicily. He goes so far as to say, that under the distraction and desolation which prevailed, the Hellenic race and language were likely to perish in the island, and give place to the Punic and Oscan. He adjures the contending parties at Syracuse to avert this miserable issue by coming to a compromise, and by constituting a moderate and popular government—yet with some rights reserved to the ruling families, among whom he desires to see a fraternal partnership established, tripartite in its character; including Dionysius the younger (now at Lokri)—Hipparinus son of the elder Dionysius—and the son of Dion. On the absolute necessity of such compromise and concord, to preserve both people and despots from one common ruin, Plato delivers the most pathetic admonitions. He recommends a triple co-ordinate kingship, passing by the hereditary transmission in the families of the three persons just named; and including the presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.

To Plato—who saw before him the double line of Spartan kings, the only hereditary kings in Greece—the proposition of three co-ordinate kingly families did not appear at all impracticable; nor indeed was it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted to to them. But amid the angry passions which then raged, and the mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantineian Demonax at Kyrene—between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of of the Battiad princes. Plato's recommendation passed unheeded. He died in 348-347 B.C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian calamities which saddened the last years of his long life. On the contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better,

The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient proverb recognized as belonging to kings restored from exile.

Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken and dissolute habits—Dionysius the younger, and his son Apollokrates, as well as Hipparinus and Nysæus. Hipparinus was assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia by the return of the younger Dionysius.

That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium), once belonging to Rhegium Kauloina, and Hipponium. But though the power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city, being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family. As such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia. Rhegium itself reappears shortly afterward as a community under its own name, and was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second Dionysius.

The season between 356-346 B.C. was one of great pressure and suffering for all the Italic Greeks, arising from the increased power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities, who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters and formed an independent aggregate for themselves. These men especially in the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to the Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.

It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri, after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself, seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan

Pharax, a man of profligacy and violence. The conduct of Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he was in the habit of practicing the most licentious outrage toward the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not, we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against individual persons who stood on their defense—until the moment arrived when he and his son Apollokrates effected their second return to Ortygia. To insure so important an acquisition, Dionysius diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced garrison, and took captive these unfortunate members of his family. Upon their guiltless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius himself, and the Tarentines supplicated permission to redeem the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the wife and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from further suffering by being strangled. With this revolting tragedy terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.

By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of the slain Dion's widow and sister) had now established himself as despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover, a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage. What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years, while Sicily was so weak and disunited—we do not know; but she had become once more aggressive, extending her alliance among the despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy. The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair, and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth. To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth both the actual suffering and approaching peril from without. And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was

on the point of receiving fulfillment—Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on the island.

To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an unwilling party. He had made up his mind, that for his purpose, it was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already opened negotiations—and to employ their forces, first in expelling Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the Syracusans to Corinth, intending from the beginning to frustrate its success. He expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect; while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.

The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favorable moment. But it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself, were all in exuberant vigor as well as unimpaired freedom. However, the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies, was heard with favor and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.

The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were successively put up by the archons; but all with one accord declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon, an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son of Timodemus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration, so little obvious was the choice, and so pre-eminently excellent did it prove. Timoleon was named—without difficulty, and without much intention of doing him honor—to a post which all the other leading men declined.

Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth, and was now of mature age—perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition. Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of des

pots as well as of traitors. The government of Corinth was, and always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional, oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old standing—hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens. As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.

These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from contrast with his elder brother Timophanes; who possessed the soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities of Timophanes, however, gained for him so much popularity that he was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon, animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a battle against the Argeians and Kleonaans, Timophanes was commanding the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground, very near to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with his utmost speed, and covered Timophanes with his shield, when the enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head single-handed against them warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully protected his fallen brother until succor arrived; though at the cost of several wounds to himself.

This act of generous devotion raised great admiration toward Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanes, who less deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely notice given at Corinth. To arm the people being regarded as dangerous to the existing oligarchy, it was judged expedient to equip a standing force of 400 paid foreign soldiers, and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort, was intrusted to Timophanes. A worse choice could not have been made. The new commander—seconded not only by his regiment and his strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens—speedily stood forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to death without even form of trial. Now, when it was too late, the Corinthians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the acropolis to

remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically, by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce his disastrous projects. Timophanes repudiated the appeal with contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his country. Again he went to the acropolis, accompanied by Æschylus, brother of the wife of Timophanes—by the prophet Orthagoras, his intimate friend—perhaps also by another friend named Telekleides. Admitted into the presence of Timophanes, they renewed their prayers and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanes first laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.

With the life of Timophanes passed away the despotism which had already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands; the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied, we are left in ignorance; for Plutarch tells us hardly anything except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn, however, that the expression of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanes and the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal. So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed, these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanes should be killed (they said), yet that he should be killed by his brother, and his brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with inextinguishable guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of Timophanes. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen, became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.

Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority—a majority as well in value as in number—respecting the behavior of Timoleon. In his mind, however, the general strain of encomium

was not sufficient to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that minority, too, was found one person whose single voice told with profound impression—his mother Demariste, mother also of the slain Timophanes. Demariste not only thought of her murdered son with the keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration for the authors of the deed. She imprecated curses on the head of Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.

There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly miserable, amid the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong fraternal affection for Timophanes, his previous conduct leaves no doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But when to this internal source of distress was added the sight of persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together with the sting of the maternal Erinnyes—he became agonized even to distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men, buried himself in solitude amid his fields in the country, and refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years had now elapsed from the death of Timophanes, to the arrival of the Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens, had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office. At length the *vox Dei* is heard, unexpectedly, amid the crowd; dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his soul, and restoring him to healthy and honorable action.

There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in killing Timophanes was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen, and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And even Timoleon and Æschylus could not make the attempt

without the greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that the death of Timophanes would be avenged on the spot; nor are we told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment toward Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance on the side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The sentiment of duty toward family covers a larger proportion of the field of morality, as compared with obligations toward country, than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy against a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the worst of criminals—which stood in the foreground of the ancient virtuous feeling—has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime, only where it displaces an established king already in possession; where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather than censure; and few readers would have been displeased with Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother's attempt. But in the view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but he could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which he endured afterward, argued an unworthy weakness of character; that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples, and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I think his criticisms unwarranted. There is no reason to presume that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the most sacred obligation, he of necessity suffered from the violation of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the life of Timophanes, only that the latter might destroy the liberties of his country—contributed materially to his ultimate resolution, a resolution in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a larger share than he.

It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called upon to take the command of the auxiliaries for Syracuse. As soon as the vote had passed, Telekleides addressed to him a few words, emphatically exhorting him to strain every nerve, and to show what he was worth—with this remarkable point in conclusion—"If you now come off

with success and glory, we shall pass for having slain a despot; if you fail, we shall be held as fratricides."

He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in large number as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to which the Korkyræans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as of old in the time of the despot Hippokrates) added two more, and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than 1000 soldiers, re-enforced afterward on the voyage to 1200. A few of the principal Corinthians—Eukleides, Telemachus, and Neon, among them—accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries—some of whom had served under the Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had incurred so much odium as partners in the spoliation of the Delphian temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.

Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he had said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas, rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal for active service, far from being increased, was probably even abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a single friend of importance:—for without Hiketas, the Syracusan people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.

While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to Timoleon the most favorable signs and omens. Not only did he receive an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephone learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with Timoleon for Sicily, her own favorite island. Accordingly he caused a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses (Demeter and Persephone) who were to accompany him. And when, after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illum-

ined by a blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similiar to that which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries, ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper landing place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets, rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.

These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when, after disregarding a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes, double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his arrival—with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with what they pretended to be good news. “Hiketas had recently gained a capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part of Syracuse, and was now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel it with their superior naval force now in the strait.”

The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament. Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all the ardor of the armament, it was impossible to cross the strait in opposition to an enemy's fleet of double force. Accordingly Timoleon resorted to a stratagem in which the leaders and people of Rhegium, eagerly sympathising with his projects of Sicilian emancipation, coöperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them that he had been intrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian purposes—and that he should be a disgraced man if he now conducted it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear,

along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would testify on his (Timoleon's) behalf, when he came to defend himself at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the way of guarantee for Syracuse; they would testify also on behalf of the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter evaded.

Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly); the Carthaginian men-of-war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore; since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians was now repeated in formal deposition before the assembly; the envoys of Hiketas probably going into the case more at length, with certain flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various Rhégine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted, Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhégine. During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbor were not idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course toward Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding, neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress; that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbor. Intimation being secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape—and got aboard immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged by the Rhégine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated, his enemies left the assembly in

vehement wrath against the Rhegines, who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain of deception in others.

The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily, at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient Naxos, receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen of the place—whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the reform of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting Timoleon to come, now prepared to co-operate with him, and returned a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron to Tauromenium.

But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries, compared with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the stratagem practiced at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse; the harbor of which place was presently completely beset. A large Carthaginian land-force was also acting under Hanno in the western regions of the island, with considerable success against the Campanians of Entella, and others. The Sicilian towns had their native despots, Mamerkus at Katana—Leptines at Apollonia—Nikodemus at Kentoripa—Apolloniades at Agyrium—from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium, scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover what guaranty had they that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men's hearts, and thought only of appropriating to themselves the scepter of the previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of Syracuse, amid that despair and sickness of heart which made the name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new scourge.

It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he sent round were so coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the walls of Tauromenium.

At length one invitation of great importance, reached him—from the town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenized, inconsiderable in size, but venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the other dispatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium; and lost no time in marching thither, with 5,000 troops, to occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise. Accordingly on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great progress on the first day, in order that no report of his approach might reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times their superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them, he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying it on his arm (the shield of a general was habitually carried for him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had himself performed on foot as well as they. The soldiers obeyed, and the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas, unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise, that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, 300 of them only were slain. But 600 were made prisoners, and the whole camp, including its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.

This victory, so rapidly and skillfully won—and the acquisition of Adranum which followed it—produced the strongest sensation throughout Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration of the gods in favor of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus in his favor. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his face. Such facts—verified and attested in a place of peculiar sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighbor-

ing communities—contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana, one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island. So numerous were the re-enforcements thus acquired, and so much was his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of Adranum.

Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse—except Ortygia, against which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of his own position of Ortygia; where indeed he might perhaps hold out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever. Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and personal ascendancy of his father, which might have made head against such difficulties—but indolent and drunken in his habits, not relishing a scepter when it could only be maintained by hard fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a cause of war. Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian despot, with the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal security. But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shelter and protection at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him; since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender of Ortygia—a treasure of incalculable worth. Accordingly he resolved to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the purpose.

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms, and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three

Corinthian officers—Telemachus, Eukleides, and Neon—were sent in with 400 men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of his garrison, Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions, into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same time the neighborhood of Syracuse.

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one—except so far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph accomplished. Although not fifty days had yet elapsed since Timoleon's landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison equal in number to his own army; the dispatches being accompanied by the presence of that very despot, bearing the terrific name of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed! Timoleon sent a special trireme to Corinth, carrying Dionysius and communicating these important events, together with the convention which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in that city.

The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had started as a desperate venture, in which scarcely one among the leading Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A re-enforcement of 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry was immediately voted and equipped.

If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance to retire to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of circumstances, the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious despotism which had ever overridden the Grecian world. For nearly half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse, every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius with a mixture of fear and hatred—the sentiment of prostration before irresistible force.

How much difficulty Dion himself found in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen. The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered largely into every man's views of human affairs, and were reproduced in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of visitors—who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece—was immense; some in simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey a degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even the common offices of life—the purchase of unguents and condiments at the tavern—the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes and furniture—looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was not likely to become amended in these days of mortification; yet on the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art of singing or reciting poetry. His name served to subsequent writers, both Greek and Roman—as those of Cræsus, Polykrates, and Xerxes, serve to Herodotus—for an instance to point a moral on the mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was sure to bring forth.

Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum; for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavored to preserve his unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy Polyarchus, had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into conversation with the chief magistrate Archytas. This conversation Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments as the sole objects worth living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses as the only beings deserving admiration. At the sum-

mit of all stood the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and admirable of mortals. "Next to the Persian King (said he), though with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse." What had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also. On being asked what had been the cause of his displeasure against Plato, Dionysius replied in language widely different from that of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amid the many evils which surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato. This anecdote bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more witty and pungent. The cynic philosopher, Diogenes, treated Dionysius with haughty scorn for submitting to live in private station after having enjoyed so overruling an ascendancy. Such was more or less the sentiment of every visitor who saw him; but the matter to be lamented is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning. He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.

The re-enforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented from proceeding farther on ship-board by the Carthaginian squadron at the strait, and were condemned to wait for a favorable opportunity. But the greatest of all re-enforcements to Timoleon was the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison of 2,000 soldiers—who passed (probably much to their own satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious banner of Timoleon—but also every species of military stores. There were horses, engines for siege and battery, missiles of every sort, and above all shields and spears to the amazing number of 70,000—if Plutarch's statement is exact. Having dismissed Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success, availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbor. Meanwhile he himself returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and Syracuse. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only prevented by an incident so remarkable, that every one recognized the visible intervention of the gods to protect him.

Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia, invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The great harbor of Syracuse was presently occupied by an overwhelming fleet of 150 Carthaginian ships of war, while a land force, said to consist of 60,000 men, came also to join Hiketas, and were quartered by him

within the walls of Syracuse. Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed, some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a fact which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia. Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbor, and marched from the city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw from the walls of Ortygia, the opportunity of attacking them with advantage. Making a sudden and vigorous sally, he fell upon the blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city. The provisions and money acquired herein at a critical moment, rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value was, the possession of Achradina, which Neon immediately caused to be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus held the two in combination. Ortygia had been before (as I have already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defense of their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines toward Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would supply materials.

This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city—Tychea, Neapolis, and Épipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides that, Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.

Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, re-enforced by the new Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii, and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find the strait unguarded: for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno—having seen their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance by land—had first returned with his squadron to the Strait of Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbor of Syracuse with his

triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen, with wreaths round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbor under the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the strait had been all captured, and exhibited as proofs of the victory certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication, Hanno produced a serious dismay among the garrison of Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium, these Corinthians not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking immediately on such ferry-boats and fishing craft as they could find, and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.

Thus did the gods again show their favor toward Timoleon by an unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that the important town of Messene declared itself among his allies, admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing. With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon; who thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this re-enforcement he could only command 4,000 men, to march up to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably superior force of his enemies. He appears to have encamped near the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.

Though Timoleon was sure of the co-operation of Neon and the Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tychea, together with the low ground between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; while the large Carthaginian fleet filled the Harbor itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already begun in the mind of Magon, sowing the seeds of disunion between him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other. The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted on the river Anapus—and when he felt that he was in a Greek city generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful co-operation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide. And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated

by the friendly communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on the field of battle, like enemies; but conversed in a pacific and amicable way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus. Interchanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendor and magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience—when one of Timoleon's soldiers observed to the opposite party—"And this magnificent city, you, Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarize, planting these Carthaginian cut-throats nearer to us than they now are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought up this host from the Atlantic and the Pillars of Herakles, all for the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why if Hiketas took measure of affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren, and bring in an enemy to his country; he would insure to himself an honorable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians and Timoleon." Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to whom it was addressed, it justified alarm in Magon; who was led to believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas, sailed away to Africa.

On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the cowardice of Magon. Still, however, Hiketas determined to defend Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted by Magon's desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbor, and the lower ground near the Harbor; so that Timoleon was enabled to come into direct communication with his own garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ toward the river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted the recent re-enforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon; they were probably sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas, holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tycha, and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous

than those of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas and his followers fled to Leontini.

The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must have been something more than discouragement. The soldiers on defense were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd and cowardly as Plutarch represents.

The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinizing preliminary events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same; astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learned the disappearance of the large Carthaginian host and the total capture of Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were even assured that their second re-enforcement, which they knew to have been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.

Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more in Sicily itself, a sentiment toward Timoleon such as hardly any Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skillful plans, his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in this respect, others had equaled him before; and we may remark that even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivaled anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood without like or second in Timoleon—that which set a peculiar stamp upon all his meritorious qualities—was, his superhuman good fortune; or—what in the eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other words—the unbounded favor with which the gods had cherished both his person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable man. “Never had the gods been seen so manifest in their dispensations of kindness toward any mortal.” The issue, which Telekleides had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide—every one extolled him as a

tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at the cost of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned, etc., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats—overthrew what seemed insuperable obstacles—by a mere first appearance, and without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result, executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege to the inspirations of first-rate genius. Such a spectacle of virtue and good fortune combined—glorious consummation with graceful facility—was new to the Grecian world.

For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself. In the dispatch which announced to the Corinthians his *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the whole achievement to fortune or to the gods, whom he thanked for having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for liberating Sicily. We need not doubt that he firmly believed himself to be a favored instrument of the divine will, and that he was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself, there was great prudence in putting this coloring on the facts; not simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because, under the pretense of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher. He purchased for himself a greater hold on men's minds toward his future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone; new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude, to be combated.

It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial, fatal to so many eminent Greeks before him. Proof was to be shown, whether he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup of success administered to him in such overflowing fullness. He was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the fortifications of Ortygia yet standing—with all the gloomy means of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading Greek poli-

tician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled position to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time) for not taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be wanting other advisers, to insinuate the like recommendation under the pretense of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended), unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests required that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies, and insure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their own free determination.

Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere naked ambition, so as to plunge him into that fatal misjudgment and misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible from the last sad months of Dion's career was not lost upon Timoleon. He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without. Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes, would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and rectitude of judgment, united in his character, first shone forth with its full brightness.

Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its five-fold aggregate, Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ—he determined to strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow-citizens. Without a moment's delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and co-operate with him in demolishing the separate stronghold, fortification, and residence constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as the splendid funereal monument erected to the memory of that despot by his son and successor. This was the first public act executed in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half a century of servitude; the first fraternizing co-operation of Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away

all mistake, all possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was bent on rendering it impossible for any one else, when he began by overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to further measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the former proceedings.

This important act of demolition was further made subservient to a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared away the obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a local substitute for that of the past despotism.

Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings—the first fruits of Timoleon's established ascendancy. And if we regard the intrinsic importance of the act itself—the manner in which an emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as upon the Syracusan mind—the proof evinced not merely of disinterested patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the actual situation—lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing further good—if we take all these matters together, we shall feel that Timoleon's demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.

The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the best spirit, energy, and discretion, both on his part and on that of the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was so impoverished and desolate, that the market-place (if we were to believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay, desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His next step

was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of these who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy, obeyed his summons with glad readiness. But there were others, who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly, to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honorable task of founders of Syracuse.

Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth to co-operate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an amended legislation. These commissioners adopted, for their main text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established by Diokles about seventy years before, which the usurpation of Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of Diokles, with such comments, modifications, and adaptations as the change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary. In the laws respecting inheritance and property he is said to have made no change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information what were the laws of Diokles, or how they were now modified. It is certain, however, that the political constitution of Diokles was a democracy, and that the constitution as now re-established was democratical also. Beyond this general fact we can assert nothing.

Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon—it was not the only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses. Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the same time the public exigences were considerable, since it was essential, among other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples; a cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera over the Carthaginians.

For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a certified assurance that the Corinthians had already overthrown both the despotism and the despot—a fact which the notorious presence of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to promulgate more widely than any formal announcement. They further engaged, if the exiles would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders, to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable, was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement, if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the positive management of a powerful presiding city. There were many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted numerous applicants, and a large force of colonists was presently assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of 10,000 persons, including the Syracusan exiles.

When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction of the Corinthian government, these colonists found a still larger number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more than that of the Corinthians as an allurements to newcomers—from the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the total of immigrants from all quarters (restored exiles as well as others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom, was not less than 60,000.

Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalus dealt with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a degree of resource and original judgment which furnishes good measure of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not per-

mitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for 1000 talents—the large sum of £230,000. A right of pre-emption was allowed to the Syracusan exiles for repurchasing the houses formerly their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable price—so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been brought in.

Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time, though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the mean time Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans. He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas, his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptines, despot of Apollonia and of several other neighboring townships, was also constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to Corinth.

It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to try another invasion of Sicily. They were the more disposed to this step, as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been violent when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbor of Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defense satisfactory, Magon only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body was crucified by public order. And the Carthaginians now resolved on a fresh effort, to repair their honor as well as to defend their territory.

The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous preparations. An army said to consist of 70,000 men, under Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at Lilybæum, on the western corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of 200 triremes and 1000 attendant vessels carrying provisions, warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses, etc. But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less than 10,000 native

infantry from Carthage; men clothed with panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary—carrying white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These men brought to the campaign ample private baggage, splendid goblets and other articles of gold and silver, such as becomed the rich families of that rich city. The élite of the division—2,500 in number, or one-fourth part—formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage. It has been already stated that in general the Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily, not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to Timoleon for reinforcement.

The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement, had not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing, that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could assemble no greater total than 12,000 men, including about 3,000 Syracusan citizens—the paid force which he had round him at Syracuse—that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian province—and finally such allies as would join. His cavalry was about 1000 in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum, the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his further progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took advantage of the prevalent feeling to raise a mutiny against him, persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on to certain ruin against an enemy six times superior in number, and in a hostile country eight days' march from Syracuse; so that there would be neither salvation for them in a case of reverse, nor interment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in arrear, Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not or would not requite them upon such desperate service. Such was the success and plausibility of these recommendations under the actual discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjecture in which his influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from belief in his favor with the gods, was so near failing. As it was, though he succeeded in heart-

ening up and retaining the large body of his army, yet Thrasius, with 1000 of the mercenaries, insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse. Moreover, Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is that he succeeded in his efforts to retain the rest, after insuring to the mutineers a lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave man, having engaged in the service of the Phokians Philomelus and Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world. How many of the 1000 seceding soldiers who now followed him to Syracuse had been partners in the same sacrilegious act we cannot tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled inhabitants would not permit.

Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian province, until he approached within a short distance of the river Krimesus, a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea near Selinus. Some mules carrying loads of parsley met him on the road, a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of the soldiers, since parsley was habitually employed for the wreaths deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, "This is our Corinthian symbol of victory; it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously, as an earnest of our approaching success." Insisting emphatically on this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of the Krimesus.

It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of a May morning, overhanging the valley, still concealed from the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four, which formed their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native Carthaginians, 10,000 chosen hoplites with white shields, who had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in a disorderly mass to

get to the bank, which appears to have been in part rugged. Seeing how favorable was the moment for attacking them, while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after a short exhortation, gave orders immediately to charge down the hill. His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled, were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the best of the mercenaries, occupied the center. Demaretus with his cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring; the effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him. Re-echoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of trumpets.

The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry, though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen Carthaginian infantry, who resisted with a courage worthy of their reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets (forming altogether armor heavier than was worn usually even by Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we rarely read of in a Grecian battle. Though the contest was bravely maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with armor to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage—when the gods, yet farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture by an intervention manifest and terrific. A storm of the most violent character began. The hill tops were shrouded in complete darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly, with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came on their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it *did* directly in their faces, it occasioned both great suffering and soul-subduing alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed in their faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants: the noise of the wind,

and of hail rattling against their armor, prevented the orders of their officers from being heard: the folds of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain water, so as to embarrass their movements; the ground presently became so muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the rest of the Whiteshields turned their backs and sought relief in flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered their own troops in the rear advancing up and trying to cross the Krimesus, which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one of such unspeakable confusion that numbers perished in the torrent. Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side, inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armor, into mud and water, from whence they could not get clear.

No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of Timoleon at the Krimesus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken during the action, and all that remained, 200 in number, fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was that it fell chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of Carthage, comprising 2,500 soldiers belonging to the most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man; a statement doubtless exaggerated, yet implying a fearful real destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing away their ornamented shields and costly breastplates, which the victors picked up in great numbers—1000 breastplates, and not less than 10,000 shields. Altogether, the spoil collected was immense—in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit and capture that they did not find time to erect their trophy until the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the plunder, as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day's work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan

chest; 5,000 prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armor and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the general's tent.

The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum. And even there, such was their discouragement—so profound their conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them—that they could scarcely be induced to go on shipboard for the purpose of returning to Carthage; persuaded as they were that, if once caught out at sea, the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach land. At Carthage itself also, the sorrow and depression were unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage on her own soil. Immediate efforts were, however, made to furnish a fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their most energetic citizen, was recalled from exile, and directed to get together this new armament.

The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the Carthaginians labored, arose from the fact that their defeat had been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of Timoleon—the victory of the Krimesus must have convinced them. The storm, alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation of divine favor scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to Diomedes or Æneas in the *Iliad*. And the sentiment thus raised toward Timoleon—or rather previously raised, and now yet farther confirmed—became blended with that genuine admiration which he had richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory at the Krimesus, like his victory at Adranum, was gained mainly by that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched at once to Corinth—accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian shields to decorate the Corinthian temples—diffused throughout Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honor to his name, commemorated by the inscription attached—“The Corinthians and the general Timoleon, after liberating the Sicilian Greeks from the Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude to the gods.”

Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian

province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the 1000 paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of simulated friendship, and slew them all.

Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies—Hiketas and Mamerkus—the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host of Carthage, before it came into co-operation with these two allies. Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as indispensable for their security not less than for the Carthaginian interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both. Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force—seventy triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of the Krimesus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle of the island—partly in the neighborhood of Mylæ and Messene on the north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana. Messene appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in command; on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats; two divisions of them, one comprising four hundred men, being cut to pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favor shown by the gods toward Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the least possible inconvenience to him.

Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph: the latter—taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria—undertook an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not content with inflicting

great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along with him by passing immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by, Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action, while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their shields.

It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers in garrison—either discontented with the behavior of Hiketas at the battle of the Damurias, or awestruck with that divine favor which waited on Timoleon—mutinied and surrendered the place into his hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains, with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas, in putting to death the widow, sister, and son of Dion. Though Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling of the people accounted this cruel, but special retaliation, right under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to put their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his. The women were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.

Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the river Abolus, with a loss of 2,000 men, many of them belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterward sent earnest propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was accordingly concluded; on terms, however, which left the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the reign of the

elder Dionysius, as well as at the landing of Dion in Sicily. The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus, or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa, and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigentum. All westward of the Halykus was recognized as Carthaginian; but it was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed freely to come with their families and their property. It was further covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally, any Grecian despot in Sicily. In the first treaty concluded by the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him. Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.

Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus, in fact, despaired of further defense without foreign aid. He crossed over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a Lucanian army into Sicily; which he might perhaps have obtained, since that warlike nation were now very powerful—had not his own seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana, surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendancy exercised by the name of Timoleon, with the prestige of his perpetual success. Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messene, where he was welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither with a force ample enough to besiege Messene by land and by sea. After a certain length of resistance, the town was surrendered to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard. But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Messenian population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance, planted him in the midst of the crowded theater and there put him to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the theater to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus, without attempting escape, surrendered himself prisoner to Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself should say nothing to his disfavor. He was accordingly brought to Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people, whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skillfully composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as a poet. But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion entertained by the Syracusans for his person and

character. Being heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a favorable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment, and rushed with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost, in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this attempted suicide, he was led out of the theater and executed like a robber.

Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodemus as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniades at Agyrium. Both of these he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder Dionysius. In this way did he proceed until there remained only free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of Sicily.

Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information permits us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the other despotisms in Sicily, there remained for him but one further triumph—the noblest and rarest of all—to lay down his own. This he performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to dispense with his further services as sole commander; the rather as his eyesight was now failing. It is probable enough that his demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested to retain his functions; but if such was the fact, he did not the less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought further to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from foreign enemies as well as from despot-enemies; just as, on first acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative career, without a moment's delay, by ordering the demolition of the Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in its place. By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised, and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be derived from men worse than he—and therefore unfavorable. Hence it was necessary for him to be prompt and forward, even to a sort of ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.

He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having neither paid

soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the neighborhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and family to Corinth.

Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species of official authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser over the judgment, feelings, and actions, not only of Syracusans, but of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater—because the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title more to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little of alloy or abatement. To possess a counselor whom every one revered, without suspicions or fears of any kind—who had not only given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skillful management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favor of the gods—was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this juncture. For it was now the time when not merely Syracuse, but other cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the disturbed reign of the second—all contributed to the same result. About the year 352–351 B.C., Plato (as has been already mentioned) expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily, giving place before Phenician or Campanian force. And what was a sad possibility, even in 352–351 B.C.—had become nearer to a probability in 344 B.C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition of the island.

His unparalleled success and matchless personal behavior, combined with the active countenance of Corinth without—had completely turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily was now a land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse. They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire accessions from without. At the same time all three (especially Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power, as it had stood

prior to 407 B.C. It was with eagerness therefore that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted to Sicily by the career of Timoleon, to replenish their exhausted numbers ; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away, and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus, citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was probably at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agyrium received large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said to have removed their habitations to Syracuse ; a statement difficult to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its name still continued to exist.

Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular facts. But about the general circumstances, with their character and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or doubt. That which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their panegyrical harangues—that for which Plato sighed, in the epistles of his old age—commending it, after Dion's death, to the surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of their departed leader—the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout the island—was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon. The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal reputation and achievements which constituted the main allure-ment to new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort of general *Ækist* or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the new political constitutions, etc., were all submitted to his review. No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or approved ; none which he had approved, was contested.

In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise ; that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting ; that the rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole, might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony ; that the settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies, might bring with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political constitution ; that the apportionment or sale of lands, and the adjustment of all debts, presented but too many chances of angry dispute ; that

there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister bias, but recognized by every one as being so; a man whom every one loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee. There is no situation in human society so valuable to study, as that in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more extensive than that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of both these great men.

But though the sphere of Timoleon's activity was coextensive with Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of the Syracusans, had re-established the democratical constitution of Diokles, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of Amphilopolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some conditions of qualification which are not made known to us), and intended, like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognized name to distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional reform, as well as in all the labors and adjustments connected with the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it. Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure

of eyesight, which presently became total blindness. He dwelt in the house assigned to him by public vote of the people, which he had consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a chapel to the goddess Automatia—the goddess under whose auspices blessings and glory came as it were of themselves. To this goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness who had accompanied him from Corinth all through his proceedings in Sicily.

By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead of diminishing his real ascendancy. Here as elsewhere, the goddess Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become blind, his arrival in the assembly was a solemn scene. Having been brought in his car drawn by mules across the marketplace to the door of the theater wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led or drew the car into the theater amid the assembled people, who testified their affection by the warmest shouts and congratulations. As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored, the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out of the theater, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more ordinary business.

Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless by Athanis or some other eye-witness) of the relations between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing except his character and moral ascendancy. It is easy to see that the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonor to yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme, to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Perikles, at Athens) for occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap occasionally

dangerous to all free societies, but which even at Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment in his favor tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.

Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment. The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns. The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say. However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure, only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson. Protesting against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which he had so long labored, and combated—in order that every Syracusan citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full liberty of speech.

We obtain little from the biographers of Timoleon, except a few incidents, striking, impressive, and somewhat theatrical, like those just recounted. But what is really important is, the tone and temper which these incidents reveal, both in Timoleon and in the Syracusan people. To see him unperturbed by a career of superhuman success, retaining the same hearty convictions with which he had started from Corinth; renouncing power, the most ardent of all aspirations with a Greek politician, and descending to a private station, in spite of every external inducement to the contrary; resisting the temptation to impose his own will upon the people, and respecting their free speech and public vote in a manner which made it imperatively necessary for every one else to follow his example: foregoing command, and contenting himself with advice when his opinion was asked—all this presents a model of genuine and intelligent public spirit, such as is associated with few other names except that of Timoleon. That the Syracusan people should have yielded to such conduct an obedience not merely voluntary, but heartfelt and almost reverential, is no matter of wonder. And we may be quite sure that the opinion of Timoleon, tranquilly and unostentatiously consulted, was the guiding star which they followed on most points of moment or difficulty; over and above those of exceptional cases

of aggravated dissent where he was called in with such imposing ceremony as an umpire. On the value of such an oracle close at hand it is needless to insist; especially in a city which for the last half century had known nothing but the dominion of force, and amid a new miscellaneous aggregate composed of Greek settlers from many different quarters.

Timoleon now enjoyed, as he had amply earned, what Xenophon calls "that good, not human, but divine—command over willing men—given manifestly to persons of genuine and highly trained temperance of character." In him the condition indicated by Xenophon was found completely realized—temperance in the largest and most comprehensive sense of the word—not simply sobriety and continence (which had belonged to the elder Dionysius also), but an absence of that fatal thirst for coercive power at all price, which in Greece was the fruitful parent of the greater crimes and enormities.

Timoleon lived to see his great work of Sicilian enfranchisement consummated, to carry it through all its incipient difficulties, and to see it prosperously moving on. Not Syracuse alone, but the other Grecian cities in the island also, enjoyed under their revived free institutions a state of security, comfort, and affluence, to which they had been long strangers. The lands became again industriously tilled; the fertile soil yielded anew abundant exports; the temples were restored from their previous decay, and adorned with the votive offerings of pious munificence. The same state of prosperous and active freedom, which had followed on the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty a hundred and twenty years before, and lasted about fifty years, without either despots within or invaders from without—was now again made prevalent throughout Sicily under the auspices of Timoleon. It did not indeed last so long. It was broken up in the year 316 B.C., twenty-four years after the battle of the Krimesus, by the despot Agathokles, whose father was among the immigrants to Syracuse under the settlement of Timoleon. But the interval of security and freedom with which Sicily was blessed between these two epochs, she owed to the generous patriotism and intelligent counsel of Timoleon. There are few other names among the Grecian annals, with which we can connect so large an amount of predetermined and beneficent result.

Endeared to the Syracusans as a common father and benefactor, and exhibited as their hero to all visitors from Greece, he passed the remainder of his life amid the fullness of affectionate honor. Unfortunately for the Syracusans, that remainder was but too short; for he died of an illness apparently slight, in the year 337-336 B.C.—three or four years after the battle of the Krimesus. Profound and unfeigned was the sorrow which his death excited, universally throughout Sicily. Not merely the Syracusans, but crowds from all other parts of the island, attended to do honor to his funeral, which was splendidly celebrated at the public cost. Some of the chosen

youths of the city carried the bier whereon his body was deposited: a countless procession of men and women followed in their festival attire, crowned with wreaths and mingling with their tears admiration and envy for their departed liberator. The procession was made to pass over that ground which presented the most honorable memento of Timoleon; where the demolished Dionysian stronghold had once reared its head, and where the court of justice was now placed, at the entrance of Ortygia. At length it reached the Nekropolis, between Ortygia and Achradina, where a massive funeral pile had been prepared. As soon as the bier had been placed on this pile, and fire was about to be applied, the herald Demetrius, distinguished for the powers of his voice, proclaimed with loud announcement as follows:

"The Syracusan people solemnize, at the cost of 200 minæ, the funeral of this man, the Corinthian Timoleon son of Timodemus. They have passed a vote to honor him for all future time with festival matches in music, horse and chariot race, and gymnastics—because, after having put down the despots, subdued the foreign enemy, and recolonized the greatest among the ruined cities, he restored to the Sicilian Greeks their constitution and laws."

A sepulchral monument, seemingly with this inscription recorded on it, was erected to the memory of Timoleon in the agora of Syracuse. To this monument other buildings were presently annexed; porticoes for the assembling of persons in business or conversation—and palæstræ, for the exercises of youths. The aggregate of buildings all taken together was called the Timoleontion.

When we reflect that the fatal battle of Charoneia had taken place the year before Timoleon's decease, and that his native city Corinth as well as all her neighbors were sinking deeper and deeper into the degradation of subject-towns of Macedonia, we shall not regret, for his sake, that a timely death relieved him from so mournful a spectacle. It was owing to him that the Sicilian Greeks were rescued, for nearly one generation, from the like fate. He had the rare glory of maintaining to the end, and executing to the full, the promise of liberation with which he had gone forth from Corinth. His early years had been years of acute suffering—and that, too, incurred in the cause of freedom—arising out of the death of his brother; his later period, manifesting the like sense of duty under happier auspices, had richly repaid him, by successes overpassing all reasonable expectation, and by the ample flow of gratitude and attachment poured forth to him amid the liberated Sicilians. His character appears most noble, and most instructive, if we contrast him with Dion. Timoleon had been brought up as the citizen of a free, though oligarchical community in Greece, surrounded by other free communities, and amid universal hatred of despots. The politicians whom he had learnt to esteem were men trained in this school, maintaining a qualified ascendancy against more or less of open competition from rivals,

and obliged to look for the means of carrying their views apart from simple dictation. Moreover, the person whom Timoleon had selected for his peculiar model, was Epaminondas, the noblest model that Greece afforded. It was to this example that Timoleon owed in part his energetic patriotism combined with freedom from personal ambition—his gentleness of political antipathy—and the perfect habits of conciliatory and popular dealing—which he manifested amid so many new and trying scenes to the end of his career.

Now the education of Dion (as I have recounted in the preceding chapter) had been something totally different. He was the member of a despotic family, and had learnt his experience under the energetic, but perfectly self-willed, march of the elder Dionysius. Of the temper or exigencies of a community of freemen, he had never learnt to take account. Plunged in this corrupting atmosphere, he had nevertheless imbibed generous and public-spirited aspirations: he had come to hold in abhorrence a government of will, and to look for glory in contributing to replace it by a qualified freedom and a government of laws. But the source from which he drank was, the Academy and its illustrious teacher Plato; not from practical life, nor from the best practical politicians like Epaminondas. Accordingly, he had imbibed at the same time the idea, that though despotism was a bad thing, government thoroughly popular was a bad thing also; that, in other words, as soon as he had put down the despotism, it lay with him to determine how much liberty he would allow, or what laws he would sanction, for the community; that instead of a despot, he was to become a despotic lawgiver.

Here then lay the main difference between the two conquerors of Dionysius. The mournful letters written by Plato after the death of Dion contrast strikingly with the enviable end of Timoleon, and with the grateful inscription of the Syracusans on his tomb.

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER, 359-356 B.C.

My last preceding chapters have followed the history of the Sicilian Greeks through long years of despotism, suffering, and impoverishment, into a period of renovated freedom and comparative happiness, accomplished under the beneficent auspices of Timoleon, between 344-336 B.C. It will now be proper to resume the thread of events in Central Greece, at the point where they were left at the close of the eightieth chapter—the accession of Philip of Macedon in 360-359 B.C. The death of Philip took place in 336 B.C.; and the closing years of his life will bring before us the last struggles of full

Hellenic freedom; a result standing in melancholy contrast with the achievements of the contemporary liberator Timoleon in Sicily.

No such struggles could have appeared within the limits of possibility, even to the most far-sighted politician either of Greece or of Macedon—at the time when Philip mounted the throne. Among the hopes and fears of most Grecian cities, Macedonia then passed wholly unnoticed; in Athens, Olynthus, Thasus, Thessaly, and a few others, it formed an item not without moment, yet by no means of first-rate magnitude.

The Hellenic world was now in a state different from anything which had been seen since the repulse of Xerxes in 480–479 B.C. The defeat and degradation of Sparta had set free the inland states from the only presiding city whom they had ever learned to look up to. Her imperial ascendancy, long possessed and grievously abused, had been put down by the successes of Epaminondas and the Thebans. She was no longer the head of a numerous body of subordinate allies, sending deputies to her periodical synods—submitting their external politics to her influence—placing their military contingents under command of her officers (*xenagi*)—and even administering their internal government through oligarchies devoted to her purposes, with the re-enforcement, wherever needed, of a Spartan *harmost* and garrison. She no longer found on her northern frontier a number of detached Arcadian villages, each separately manageable under leaders devoted to her, and furnishing her with hardy soldiers; nor had she the friendly city of Tegea, tied to her by a long-standing philo-Laconian oligarchy and tradition. Under the strong revolution of feeling which followed on the defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra, the small Arcadian communities, encouraged and guided by Epaminondas, had consolidated themselves into the great fortified city of Megalopolis, now the center of a Pan-Arcadian confederacy, with a synod (called the Ten Thousand) frequently assembled there to decide upon matters of interest and policy common to the various sections of the Arcadian name. Tegea too had undergone a political revolution; so that these two cities, conterminous with each other and forming together the northern frontier of Sparta, converted her Arcadian neighbors from valuable instruments into formidable enemies.

But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier (conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city of Messene, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messene and various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who had once been *Periœki* and *Helots* of Sparta.

In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to enter—when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since the

invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defense against a foreign enemy from Macedonia—this altered position of Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but Megalopolis and Messene, knowing the intense hostility of Sparta against them—and her great superiority of force, even reduced as she was, to all that they could muster—lived in perpetual dread of her attack. Their neighbors the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta, were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient for their defense, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexorable hostility of Sparta. Elis—placed in the same situation with reference to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messene—complained that the Triphylians, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta endeavoring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended to insure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion. Of these combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with her perpetually menaced aggression against Messene and Arcadia, disorganized Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-Hellenic defense against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.

The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as secondary states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself, of all share in collision between Sparta and Thebes. It would appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by the temporary despotism of Timophanes, described in my last chapter; though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.

But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for the first time in our history, without, and not within, Peloponnesus; at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigor and efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourishing commerce, a considerable body of maritime and insular allies, sending deputies to her synod and contributing to a common fund for the maintenance of the joint security. She was by far the greatest maritime power in Greece. I have recounted in preceding chapters, how her general Timotheus had acquired for her the important island of Samos, together with Pydna, Methone, and Potidæa, in the Thermaic Gulf; how he failed (as Iphikrates had failed before him) in more than one attempt upon Amphipolis; how he planted Athenian conquest and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese; which territory, after having been attacked and endangered by the Thracian prince Kotys, was regained by the continued efforts of Athens in the year 358 B.C.

Athens had sustained no considerable loss, during the struggles which ended in the pacification after the battle of Mantinea; and her condition appears on the whole to have been better than it had ever been since her disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The power of Thebes also was imposing and formidable. She had indeed lost many of those Peloponnesian allies who formed the overwhelming array of Epaminondas, when he first invaded Laconia, under the fresh anti-Spartan impulse immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra. She retained only Argos, together with Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messene. The three last added little to her strength, and needed her watchful support; a price which Epaminondas had been perfectly willing to pay for the establishment of a strong frontier against Sparta. But the body of extra-Peloponnesian allies grouped round Thebes was still considerable; the Phokians and Lokrians, the Malians, the Herakleots, most of the Thessalians, and most (if not all) of the inhabitants of Eubœa; perhaps also the Akarnanians. The Phokians were indeed reluctant allies, disposed to circumscribe their obligations within the narrowest limits of mutual defense in case of invasion; and we shall presently find the relations between the two becoming positively hostile. Besides these allies, the Thebans possessed the valuable position of Oropus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica; a town which had been wrested from Athens six years before, to the profound mortification of the Athenians.

But over and above allies without Bœotia, Thebes had prodigiously increased the power of her city within Bœotia. She had appropriated to herself the territories of Platea and Thespiæ on her southern frontier, and of Koroneia and Orchomenus near upon her northern; by conquest and partial expulsion of their prior inhabitants. How and when these acquisitions had been brought about, has been already explained: here I merely recall the fact, to appreciate the position of Thebes in 359 B.C.—That these four towns, having been in 372 B.C. autonomous—joined with her only by the definite obligations of the Bœotian confederacy—and partly even in actual hostility against her—had now lost their autonomy with their free citizens, and had become absorbed into her property and sovereignty. The domain of Thebes thus extended across Bœotia from the frontiers of Phokis on the north-west to the frontiers of Attica on the south.

The new position thus acquired by Thebes in Bœotia, purchased at the cost of extinguishing three or four autonomous cities, is a fact of much moment in reference to the period now before us; not simply because it swelled the power and pride of the Thebans themselves; but also because it raised a strong body of unfavorable sentiment against them in the Hellenic mind. Just at the time when the Spartans had lost nearly one-half of Laconia, the Thebans had annexed to their own city one-third of the free Bœotian territory. The revival of free Messenian citizenship, after a suspended existence of more than two centuries, had recently been welcomed with uni-

versal satisfaction. How much would that same feeling be shocked when Thebes extinguished, for her own aggrandizement, four autonomous communities, all of her own Boeotian kindred—one of these communities too being Orchomenus, respected both for its antiquity and its traditionary legends! Little pains were taken to canvass the circumstances of the case, and to inquire whether Thebes had exceeded the measure of rigor warranted by the war-code of the time. In the patriotic and national conceptions of every Greek, Hellas consisted of an aggregate of autonomous, fraternal, city-communities. The extinction of any one of these was like the amputation of a limb from the organized body. Repugnance toward Thebes, arising out of these proceedings, affected strongly the public opinion of the time, and manifests itself especially in the language of Athenian orators, exaggerated by mortification on account of the loss of Oropus.

The great body of Thessalians, as well as the Magnetes and the Phthiot Achæans, were among those subject to the ascendancy of Thebes. Even the powerful and cruel despot, Alexander of Phæræ, was numbered in this catalogue. The cities of fertile Thessaly, possessed by powerful oligarchies with numerous dependent serfs, were generally a prey to intestine conflict and municipal rivalry with each other; disorderly as well as faithless. The Aleuadae, chiefs at Larissa—and the Skopadae, at Krannon—had been once the ascendant families in the country. But in the hands of Lykophron and the energetic Jason, Phæræ had been exalted to the first rank. Under Jason as tagus (federal general), the whole force of Thessaly was united, together with a large number of circumjacent tributaries, Macedonian, Epirotic, Dolopian, etc., and a well-organized standing army of mercenaries besides. He could muster 8,000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites, and peltasts or light infantry in numbers far more considerable. A military power of such magnitude, in the hands of one alike able and aspiring, raised universal alarm, and would doubtless have been employed in some great scheme of conquest, either within or without Greece, had not Jason been suddenly cut off by assassination in 370 B.C., in the year succeeding the battle of Leuktra. His brothers Polyphron and Polydorus succeeded to his position as tagus, but not to his abilities or influence. The latter, a brutal tyrant, put to death the former, and was in his turn slain, after a short interval, by a successor yet worse, his nephew Alexander, who lived and retained power at Phæræ, for about ten years (368–358 B.C.).

During a portion of that time Alexander contended with success against the Thebans, and maintained his ascendancy in Thessaly. But before the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C., he had been reduced into the condition of a dependent ally of Thebes, and had furnished a contingent to the army which marched under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. During the year 362–361 B.C., he even turned his hostilities against Athens, the enemy of Thebes; carrying on a naval war against her, not without partial success, and damage to her com-

merce. And as the foreign ascendancy of Thebes everywhere was probably impaired by the death of her great leader Epaminondas, Alexander of Pheræ recovered strength; continuing to be the greatest potentate in Thessaly, as well as the most sanguinary tyrant, until the time of his death in the beginning of 359 B.C. He then perished, in the vigor of age and in the fullness of power. Against oppressed subjects or neighbors he could take security by means of mercenary guards; but he was slain by the contrivance of his wife Thebe and the act of her brothers:—a memorable illustration of the general position laid down by Xenophon, that the Grecian despot could calculate neither on security nor on affection anywhere, and that his most dangerous enemies were to be found among his own household or kindred. The brutal life of Alexander, and the cruelty of his proceedings, had inspired his wife with mingled hatred and fear. Moreover she had learned from words dropped in a fit of intoxication, that he was intending to put to death her brothers Tisiphonus, Pytholaus, and Lykophon—and along with them herself; partly because she was childless, and he had formed the design of remarrying with the widow of the late despot Jason, who resided at Thebes. Accordingly Thebe, apprising her brothers of their peril, concerted with them the means of assassinating Alexander. The bed-chamber which she shared with him was in an upper story, accessible only by a removable staircase or ladder; at the foot of which there lay every night a fierce mastiff in chains, and a Thracian soldier tattooed after the fashion of his country. The whole house moreover was regularly occupied by a company of guards; and it is even said that the wardrobe and closets of Thebe were searched every evening for concealed weapons. These numerous precautions of mistrust, however, were baffled by her artifice. She concealed her brothers during all the day in a safe adjacent hiding-place. At night, Alexander, coming to bed intoxicated, soon fell fast asleep: upon which Thebe stole out of the room—directed the dog to be removed from the foot of the stairs, under pretense that the despot wished to enjoy undisturbed repose—and then called her armed brothers. After spreading wool upon the stairs, in order that their tread might be noiseless, she went again up into the bedroom, and brought away the sword of Alexander, which always hung near him. Notwithstanding this encouragement, however, the three young men still trembling at the magnitude of the risk, hesitated to mount the stair; nor could they be prevailed upon to do so, except by her distinct threat, that if they flinched, she would awaken Alexander and expose them. At length they mounted, and entered the bed-chamber, wherein a lamp was burning; while Thebe, having opened the door for them, again closed it, and posted herself to hold the bar. The brothers then approached the bed; one seized the sleeping despot by the feet, another by the hair of his head, and the third with a sword thrust him through.

After successfully and securely consummating this deed, popular om

account of the odious character of the slain despot, Thebe contrived to win over the mercenary troops, and to insure the scepter to herself and her eldest brother Tisiphonus. After this change, it would appear that the power of the new princes was not so great as that of Alexander had been, so that additional elements of weakness and discord were introduced into Thessaly. This is to be noted as one of the material circumstances paving the way for Philip of Macedon to acquire ascendancy in Greece—as will hereafter appear.

It was in the year 360–359 B.C., that Perdikkas, elder brother and predecessor of Philip on the throne of Macedonia, was slain, in the flower of his age. He perished, according to one account, in a bloody battle with the Illyrians, wherein 4,000 Macedonians fell also; according to another statement, by the hands of assassins and the treacherous subornation of his mother Eurydike.

Of the exploits of Perdikkas during the five years of his reign we know little. He had assisted the Athenian general Timotheus in war against the Olynthian confederacy, and in the capture of Pydna, Potidaea, Torone, and other neighboring places; while on the other hand he had opposed the Athenians in their attempt against Amphipolis, securing that important place by a Macedonian garrison, both against them and for himself. He was engaged in serious conflict with the Illyrians. It appears too that he was not without some literary inclinations—was an admirer of intellectual men, and in correspondence with Plato at Athens. Distinguished philosophers or sophists, like Plato and Isokrates, enjoyed renown, combined with a certain measure of influence, throughout the whole range of the Grecian world. Forty years before, Archelaus king of Macedonia had shown favor to Plato, then a young man, as well as to his master Sokrates. Amyntas, the father both of Perdikkas and of Philip, had throughout his reign cultivated the friendship of leading Athenians, especially Iphikrates and Timotheus; the former of whom he had even adopted as his son; Aristotle, afterward so eminent as a philosopher (son of Nikomachus the confidential physician of Amyntas), had been for some time studying at Athens as a pupil of Plato; moreover Perdikkas during his reign had resident with him a friend of the philosopher—Euphræus of Oërus. Perdikkas lent himself much to the guidance of Euphræus, who directed him in the choice of his associates, and permitted none to be his guests except persons of studious habits; thus exciting much disgust among the military Macedonians. It is a signal testimony to the reputation of Plato, that we find his advice courted, at one and the same time, by Dionysius the younger at Syracuse, and by Perdikkas in Macedonia.

On the suggestion of Plato, conveyed through Euphræus, Perdikkas was induced to bestow upon his own brother Philip a portion of territory or an appanage in Macedonia. In 368 B.C. (during the reign of Alexander, elder brother of Perdikkas and Philip), Pelopidas had reduced Macedonia to partial submission, and had taken hostages for

its fidelity; among which hostages was the youthful Philip, then about fifteen years of age. In this character Philip remained about two or three years at Thebes. How or when he left that city, we cannot clearly make out. He seems to have returned to Macedonia after the murder of Alexander by Ptolemy Alorites; probably without opposition from the Thebans, since his value as a hostage was then diminished. The fact that he was confided (together with his brother Perdikkas) by his mother Eurydike to the protection of the Athenian general Iphikrates, then on the coast of Macedonia—has been recounted in a previous chapter. How Philip fared during the regency of Ptolemy Alorites in Macedonia, we do not know; we might even suspect that he would return back to Thebes as a safer residence. But when his brother Perdikkas, having slain Ptolemy Alorites, became king, Philip resided in Macedonia, and even obtained from Perdikkas (as already stated), through the persuasion of Plato, a separate district to govern as subordinate. Here he remained until the death of Perdikkas in 360–359 B.C.; organizing a separate military force of his own (like Derdas in 382 B.C., when the Lacedæmonians made war upon Olynthus); and probably serving at its head in the wars carried on by his brother.

The time passed by Philip at Thebes, however, from fifteen to eighteen years of age, was an event of much importance in determining his future character. Though detained at Thebes, Philip was treated with courtesy and respect. He resided with Pammenes, one of the principal citizens; he probably enjoyed good literary and rhetorical teaching, since as a speaker, in after life, he possessed considerable talent; and he may also have received some instruction in philosophy, though he never subsequently manifested any taste for it, and though the assertion of his having been taught by Pythagoreans merits little credence. But the lesson, most indelible of all, which he imbibed at Thebes, was derived from the society and from the living example of men like Epaminondas and Pelopidas. These were leading citizens, manifesting those qualities which insured for them the steady admiration of a free community—and of a Theban community, more given to action than to speech; moreover they were both of them distinguished military leaders—one of them the ablest organizer and the most scientific tactician of his day. The spectacle of the Theban military force, excellent both as cavalry and as infantry, under the training of such a man as Epaminondas, was eminently suggestive to a young Macedonian prince; and became still more efficacious when combined with the personal conversation of the victor of Leuktra—the first man whom Philip learnt to admire, and whom he strove to imitate in his military career. His mind was early stored with the most advanced strategic ideas of the day, and thrown into the track of reflection, comparison, and invention, on the art of war.

When transferred from Thebes, to the subordinate government of

a district in Macedonia under his elder brother Perdikkas, Philip organized a military force; and in so doing had the opportunity of applying to practice, though at first on a limited scale, the lessons learnt from the illustrious Thebans. He was thus at the head of troops belonging to and organized by himself—when the unexpected death of Perdikkas opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the throne. But it was a prospect full of doubt and hazard. Perdikkas had left an infant son; there existed, moreover, three princes, Archelaus, Aridæus, and Menelaus, sons of Amyntas by another wife or mistress Gygæa, and therefore half-brothers of Perdikkas and Philip: there were also two other pretenders to the crown—Pausanias (who had before aspired to the throne after the death of Amyntas), seconded by a Thracian prince—and Argæus, aided by the Athenians. To these dangers was to be added, attack from the neighboring barbaric nations, Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—always ready to assail and plunder Macedonia at every moment of intestine weakness. It would appear that Perdikkas, shortly before his death, had sustained a severe defeat, with the loss of 4,000 men, from the Illyrians: his death followed, either from a wound then received, or by the machinations of his mother Eurydike. Perhaps both the wound in battle and the assassination may be real facts.

Philip at first assumed the government of the country as guardian of his young nephew Amyntas the son of Perdikkas. But the difficulties of the conjuncture were so formidable, that the Macedonians around constrained him to assume the crown. Of his three half-brothers, he put to death one, and was only prevented from killing the other two by their flight into exile; we shall find them hereafter at Olynthus. They had either found, or were thought likely to find, a party in Macedonia to sustain their pretensions to the crown.

The succession to the throne in Macedonia, though descending in a particular family, was open to frequent and bloody dispute between the individual members of that family, and usually fell to the most daring and unscrupulous among them. None but an energetic man, indeed, could well maintain himself there, especially under the circumstances of Philip's accession. The Macedonian monarchy has been called a limited monarchy; and in a large sense of the word, this proposition is true. But what the limitations were, or how they were made operative, we do not know. That there were some ancient forms and customs, which the king habitually respected, we cannot doubt: as there probably were also among the Illyrian tribes, the Epirots, and others of the neighboring warlike nations. A general assembly was occasionally convened, for the purpose of consenting to some important proposition, or trying some conspicuous accused person. But though such ceremonies were recognized and sometimes occurred, the occasions were rare in which they interposed any serious constitutional check upon the regal authority. The facts of Macedonian history, as far as they come before us, exhibit the

kings acting on their own feelings and carrying out their own schemes—consulting whom they please and when they please—subject only to the necessity of not offending too violently the sentiments of that military population whom they commanded. Philip and Alexander, combining regal station with personal ability and unexampled success, were more powerful than any of their predecessors. Each of them required extraordinary efforts from their soldiers, whom they were therefore obliged to keep in willing obedience and attachment; just as Jason of Pheræ had done before with his standing army of mercenaries. During the reign of Alexander the army manifests itself as the only power by his side, to which even he is constrained occasionally to bow; after his death, its power becomes for a time still more ascendant. But so far as the history of Macedonia is known to us, I perceive no evidence of co-ordinate political bodies, or standing apparatus (either aristocratical or popular) to check the power of the king—such as to justify in any way the comparison drawn by a modern historian between the Macedonian and English constitutions.

The first proceeding of Philip, in dealing with his numerous enemies, was to buy off the Thracians by seasonable presents and promises; so that the competition of Pausanias for the throne became no longer dangerous. There remained as assailants the Athenians with Argæus from seaward, and the Illyrians from landward.

But Philip showed dexterity and energy sufficient to make head against all. While he hastened to re-organize the force of the country, to extend the application of those improved military arrangements which he had already been attempting in his own province, and to encourage his friends and soldiers by collective harangues, in a style and spirit such as the Macedonians had never before heard from regal lips—he contrived to fence off the attack of the Athenians until a more convenient moment.

He knew that the possession of Amphipolis was the great purpose for which they had been carrying on war against Macedonia for some years, and for which they now espoused the cause of Argæus. Accordingly, he professed his readiness at once to give up to them this important place, withdrawing the Macedonian garrison whereby Perdikkas had held it against them, and leaving the town to its own citizens. This act was probably construed by the Athenians as tantamount to an actual cession; for even if Amphipolis should still hold out against them, they doubted not of their power to reduce it when unaided. Philip further dispatched letters to Athens, expressing an anxious desire to be received into her alliance, on the same friendly terms as his father Amyntas before him. These proceedings seem to have had the effect of making the Athenians lukewarm in the cause of Argæus. For Mantias the Athenian admiral, though he conveyed that prince by sea to Methone, yet stayed in the seaport himself, while Argæus marched inland—with some returning exiles,

a body of mercenaries, and a few Athenian volunteers—to *Ægæ* or *Edessa*; hoping to procure admission into that ancient capital of the Macedonian kings. But the inhabitants refused to receive him; and in his march back to *Methone*, he was attacked and completely defeated by Philip. His fugitive troops found shelter on a neighboring eminence, but were speedily obliged to surrender. Philip suffered the greater part of them to depart on terms, requiring only that *Argæus* and the Macedonian exiles should be delivered up to him. He treated the Athenian citizens with especial courtesy, preserved to them all their property, and sent them home full of gratitude, with conciliatory messages to the people of Athens. The exiles, *Argæus* among them, having become his prisoners, were probably put to death.

The prudent lenity exhibited by Philip toward the Athenian prisoners, combined with his evacuation of *Amphipolis*, produced the most favorable effect upon the temper of the Athenian public, and disposed them to accept his pacific offers. Peace was accordingly concluded. Philip renounced all claim to *Amphipolis*, acknowledging that town as a possession rightfully belonging to Athens. By such renunciation he really abandoned no rightful possession; for *Amphipolis* had never belonged to the Macedonian kings; nor had any Macedonian soldiers ever entered it until three or four years before, when the citizens had invoked aid from *Perdikkas* to share in the defense against Athens. But the Athenians appeared to have gained the chief prize for which they had been so long struggling. They congratulated themselves in the hope, probably set forth with confidence by the speakers who supported the peace, that the *Amphipolitans* alone would never think of resisting the acknowledged claims of Athens.

Philip was thus relieved from enemies on the coast, and had his hands free to deal with the *Illyrians* and *Pæonians* of the interior. He marched into the territory of the *Pæonians* (seemingly along the upper course of the river *Axius*), whom he found weakened by the recent death of their king *Agis*. He defeated their troops, and reduced them to submit to Macedonian supremacy. From thence he proceeded to attack the *Illyrians*—a more serious and formidable undertaking. The names *Illyrians*, *Pæonians*, *Thracians*, etc., did not designate any united national masses, but were applied to a great number of kindred tribes or clans, each distinct, separately governed, and having its particular name and customs. The *Illyrian* and *Pæonian* tribes occupied a wide space of territory to the north and north-west of Macedonia, over the modern *Bosnia* nearly to the *Julian Alps* and the river *Sava*. But during the middle of the fourth century before Christ, it seems that a large immigration of *Galic* tribes from the westward was taking place, invading the territory of the more northerly *Illyrians* and *Pæonians*, circumscribing their occupancy and security, and driving them farther southward; sometimes ini-

pellung them to find subsistence and plunder by invasion of Macedonia or by maritime piracies against Grecian commerce in the Adriatic. The Illyrians had become more dangerous neighbors to Macedonia than they were in the time of Thucydides; and it seems that a recent coalition of their warriors, for purposes of invasion and plunder, was now in the zenith of its force. It was under a chief named Bardylis, who had raised himself to command from the humble occupation of a charcoal burner; a man renowned for his bravery, but yet more renowned for dealings rigidly just toward his soldiers, especially in the distribution of plunder. Bardylis and his Illyrians had possessed themselves of a considerable portion of Western Macedonia (west of Mount Bermius), occupying for the most part the towns, villages, and plains, and restricting the native Macedonians to the defensible, yet barren hills. Philip marched to attack them, at the head of a force which he had now contrived to increase to the number of 10,000 foot and 600 horse. The numbers of Bardylis were about equal; yet on hearing of Philip's approach, he sent a proposition tendering peace, on the condition that each party should retain what it actually possessed. His proposition being rejected, the two armies speedily met. Philip had collected around him on the right wing his chosen Macedonian troops, with whom he made his most vigorous onset; maneuvering at the same time with a body of cavalry so as to attack the left flank of the Illyrians. The battle, contested with the utmost obstinacy on both sides, was for some time undecided; nor could the king of Macedon break the oblong square into which his enemies had formed themselves. But at length his cavalry were enabled to charge them so effectively in flank and rear, that victory declared in his favor. The Illyrians fled, were vigorously pursued with the loss of 7,000 men, and never again rallied. Bardylis presently sued for peace, and consented to purchase it by renouncing all his conquests in Macedonia; while Philip pushed his victory so strenuously, as to reduce to subjection all the tribes eastward of Lake Lynchnidus.

These operations against the inland neighbors of Macedonia must have occupied a year or two. During that interval Philip left Amphipolis to itself, having withdrawn from it the Macedonian garrison as a means of conciliating the Athenians. We might have expected that they would forthwith have availed themselves of the opening and taken active measures for regaining Amphipolis. They knew the value of that city: they considered it as of right theirs: they had long been anxious for its repossession, and had even besieged it five years before, though seemingly only with a mercenary force, which was repelled mainly by the aid of Philip's predecessor Perdikkas. Amphipolis was not likely to surrender to them voluntarily; but when thrown upon its own resources, it might perhaps have been assailed with success. Yet they remained without making any attempt on the region at the mouth of the river Strymon. We must recollect

(as has been already narrated), that during 359 B.C., and the first part of 358 B.C., they were carrying on operations in the Thracian Chersonese, against Charidemus and Kersobleptes, with small success and disgraceful embarrassment. These vexatious operations in the Chersonese—in which peninsula many Athenians were interested as private proprietors, besides the public claims of the city—may perhaps have absorbed wholly the attention of Athens, so as to induce her to postpone the acquisition of Amphipolis until they were concluded; a conclusion which did not arrive (as we shall presently see) until immediately before she became plunged in the dangerous crisis of the Social War. I know no better explanation of the singular circumstance, that Athens, though so anxious, both before and after, for the possession of Amphipolis, made no attempt to acquire it during more than a year after its evacuation by Philip; unless indeed we are to rank this opportunity among the many which she lost (according to Demosthenes) from pure negligence; little suspecting how speedily such opportunity would disappear.

In 358 B.C. an opening was afforded to the Athenians for regaining their influence in Eubœa; and for this island, so near their own shores, they struck a more vigorous blow than for the distant possession of Amphipolis. At the revival of the maritime confederacy under Athens (immediately after 378 B.C.), most of the cities in Eubœa had joined it voluntarily; but after the battle of Leuktra (in 371 B.C.), the island passed under Theban supremacy. Accordingly Eubœans from all the cities served in the army of Epaminondas, both in his first and his last expedition into Peloponnesus (369–362 B.C.). Moreover, Oropus, the frontier town of Attica and Bœotia—immediately opposite to Eubœa, having been wrested from Athens in 366 B.C. by a body of exiles crossing the strait from Eretria, through the management of the Eretrian despot Themison—had been placed in the keeping of the Thebans, with whom it still remained. But in the year 358 B.C., discontent began in the Eubœan cities, from what cause we know not, against the supremacy of Thebes, whereupon a powerful Theban force was sent into the island to keep them down. A severe contest ensued, in which, if Thebes had succeeded, Chalkis and Eretria might possibly have shared the fate of Orchomenus. These cities sent urgent messages entreating aid from the Athenians, who were powerfully moved by the apprehension of seeing their hated neighbor Thebes re-enforced by so large an acquisition close to their borders. The public assembly, already disposed to sympathize with the petitioners, was kindled into enthusiasm by the abrupt and emphatic appeal of Timotheus son of Konon. “How! Athenians (said he), when you have the Thebans actually in the island, are you still here debating what is to be done, or how you shall deal with the case? Will you not fill the sea with triremes? Will you not start up at once, hasten down to Peiræus, and haul the triremes down to the water?” This animated apostrophe, reported

and doubtless heard by Demosthenes himself, was cordially responded to by the people. The force of Athens, military as well as naval, was equipped with an eagerness, and sent forth with a celerity, seldom paralleled. Such was the general enthusiasm, that the costly office of trierarchy was for the first time undertaken by volunteers, instead of awaiting the more tardy process of singling out those rich men whose turn it was to serve, with the chance of still further delay from the legal process called *Antidosis* or Exchange of property, instituted by any one of the persons so chosen who might think himself hardly used by the requisition. Demosthenes himself was among the volunteer trierarchs; he and a person named Philinus being co-trierarchs of the same ship. We are told that in three or in five days the Athenian fleet and army, under the command of Timotheus, were landed in full force on Eubœa; and that in the course of thirty days the Thebans were so completely worsted, as to be forced to evacuate it under capitulation. A body of mercenaries under Chares contributed to the Athenian success. Yet it seems not clear that the success was so easy and rapid as the orators are fond of asserting. However, their boast, often afterward repeated, is so far well-founded, that Athens fully accomplished her object, rescued the Eubœans from Thebes, and received the testimonial of their gratitude in the form of a golden wreath dedicated in the Athenian acropolis. The Eubœan cities, while acknowledged as autonomous, continued at the same time to be enrolled as members of the Athenian confederacy, sending deputies to the synod at Athens; toward the general purposes of which they paid an annual tribute, assessed at five talents each for Oreus (or Histiaæ) and Eretria.

On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Chares with his mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length extorted from Charidemus and Kersobleptes the evacuation of that peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory maneuvers and bad faith on their part. I have, in my preceding chapters, described these events, remarking at the same time that Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B.C. But her period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown by two important events—the Social War, and the conquests of Philip in Thrace.

The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands in the Ægean as well as the Grecian sea-ports in Thrace. The list included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos (this last now partially occupied by a body of Athenian *Kleruchs* or settlers), Kos, and Rhodes; together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War.

Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak we find unfortunately little information. There was now, and had always been since 378 B.C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund to which each of them contributed. But the Athenian confederacy which had begun (378 B.C.) in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defense, had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, toward purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos—Pydna, Potidæa, and Methone, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace—and the Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate synod—and made too in great part to become the private property of her own citizens as Kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution passed in 378 B.C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica.

In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet further to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries, scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens, is characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary orators—Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence money could be obtained; indeed some of the commanders, especially Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit by such depredations. Hence the armaments sent out by Athens sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat, preferring the easier and lucrative proceedings of levying contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading vessels met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally, and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but seldom regularly paid. The suffering, alarm, and alienation, arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly preceding the battle of Chæroneia.

Amid such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to neglect

the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own, and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations of unpaid armaments—discontent naturally grew up, manifesting itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian Bosphorus, took council together, and declared themselves detached from Athens and her confederacy. According to the spirit of the convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few months afterward—obligatory and indefeasible confederacies stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances, have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with accusations that she had formed treacherous projects against them. It was moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms, of the Karian prince Mausolus. Since the peace of Antalkidas, the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion either of satraps or of subordinate princes dependent upon Persia, who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests in the neighboring islands. Mausolus appears to have occupied both Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but further sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary troops. The government of Chios appears to have been always oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a special ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining and taxing the corn-ships from the Euxine in their passage through the Bosphorus—while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy, claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.

This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a formidable shock to the foreign ascendancy of Athens. Among all her confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and Isokrates, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens fifty-four years before (B.C. 412) by the news of the former revolt of Chios, shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios, whither Mausolus also sent a re-enforcement. The Athenians equipped a fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in

command of the fleet, Chares of the land force; the latter was disembarked on the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and land at the same moment, was concerted. When Chares marched up to the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the harbor. But the precautions for defense had been effectively taken, and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy's vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that of the brave admiral. Chares with his land force having been again taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.

This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never afterward repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to draw into the like defection other allies of Athens—among them seemingly Sestos and other cities on the Hellespont. For some months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet of 100 triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even strong enough to press the town of Samos by close siege, until at length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together a fleet of 120 triremes, under the joint command of Chares, Iphikrates with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of Byzantium, probably from the paramount importance of keeping open the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the corn-ships, out of the former, might come through in safety. To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege of Samos, and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow strait both fleets were collected—as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders, and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden storm, which, in the judgment both of Iphikrates and Timotheus, rendered it rash and perilous to assist in the execution. They therefore held off, while Chares, judging differently, called upon the trierarchs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight with-

out his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against his two colleagues, that he wrote a dispatch to Athens accusing them of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.

The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition, but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterward at Athens, Chares stood forward as the formal accuser of his two colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded in his attack by Aristophan, one of the most practiced orators of the day. Both of them charged Iphikrates and Timotheus with having received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians, and betrayed their trust; by deserting Chares at the critical moment when it had been determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might have been gained.

How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters of Iphikrates and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be recollected that the Athenian public (and probably every other public—ancient or modern—Roman, English, or French) would naturally sympathize with the forward and daring admiral, who led the way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikrates and Timotheus doubtless insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Chares, and would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feeling of the Athenian *Dikasts* might naturally be, that Iphikrates and Timotheus ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted, even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikrates defended himself partly by impeaching the behavior of Chares, partly by bitter retort upon his other accuser Aristophan. "Would *you* (he asked) betray the fleet for money?" "No," was the reply. "Well, then, *you*, Aristophan, would not betray the fleet; shall *I*, Iphikrates, do so?"

The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikrates was acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of 100 talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence turned, we make out but imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikrates, far from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding; while his son Menestheus tendered an accurate account, within his own knowledge, of all the funds received and disbursed by the army.

The cause assigned by Isokrates, the personal friend of Timotheus, is the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though as a general and on foreign service Timotheus conducted himself not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare forbearance toward the maritime allies whom other generals vexed and plun-

dered, yet at home his demeanor was intolerably arrogant and offensive, especially toward the leading speakers who took part in public affairs. While recognized as a man of ability and as a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies, chiefly among those most able to do him harm. Isokrates tells us that he had himself frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion) on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokrates), though admitting the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural disposition. If such was the bearing of this eminent man, as described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense unfriendly politicians, and even indifferent persons who knew him only from his obvious exterior. Iphikrates, though by nature a proud man, was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanor, and more alive to the mischief of political odium. Moreover, he seems to have been an effective speaker in public, and his popularity among the military men in Athens was so marked that on this very trial many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the Dikastery. Under these circumstances we may easily understand that Chares and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikrates, and that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every way to acquit him.

A fine of 100 talents is said to have been imposed upon Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokrates) ever imposed at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkis, where he died three years afterward, in 354 B.C. In the year succeeding his death his memory was still very unpopular, yet it appears that the fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed to compromise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that Timotheus, by his retirement, evaded payment of the full fine, so that his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in Athens.

The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained the honor of her name throughout the Eastern and Western Seas, and greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now taken from her; and the third, Iphikrates, though acquitted at the last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been subsequently employed on military command. These three were the last eminent military citizens at Athens, for Phokion, though brave and deserv-

ing, was not to be compared with either of them. On the other hand, Chares, a man of great personal courage, but of no other merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikrates and Timotheus, next as exalting Chares, to whom the sole command was now confided.

In the succeeding year, 356 B.C., Chares conducted another powerful fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being, however, not furnished with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign mercenaries, he thought it expedient on his own responsibility to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylium and the region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian king. Chares joined Artabazus with his own army, re-enforced by additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king's troops under the command of Tithraustes, and gained a splendid victory; upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally as to place the whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home were at first much displeased with their general for violating his instructions and withdrawing his army from its prescribed and legitimate task. The news of his victory, however, and of the lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude peace with the revolted allies, who on their part were not less anxious to terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged and negotiations opened, in the ensuing year (355 B.C., the third of the war) a peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognized the complete autonomy and severance from their confederacy of the revolted cities Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.

Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power and lowered the dignity of Athens. Imperfectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B.C., when she had contended with transcendent vigor against similar and ever greater calamities, only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly, and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B.C.) he notes the poverty of the treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact but too notorious.

But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did

not come alone. It had the further effect of rendering her less competent for defense against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B.C.), had sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this interval Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they let slip this favorable opportunity of again enforcing by arms pretensions on which they laid so much stress—I have before partially (though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer the moment of active operations as they did. Toward the close of 358 B.C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior, he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are said to have been unfavorably disposed toward him, and to have given him many causes for war. It is not easy to understand what these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively against Philip.

Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigor; but such was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince. Their envoys Hierax and Stratokles, reaching Athens shortly after the successful close of the Athenian expedition to Eubœa, presented themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance of rescue from Macedonian dominion. We are not certain whether the Social War had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counterworked the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town, yet recognizing it as belonging of right to them, and promising to restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.

Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only all-important—as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pangæus—but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defense, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not unwelcome at Athens—where strong aversion was entertained toward them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognize these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians toward Philip was highly favorable. Not only had they made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in dismissing honorably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argæus. Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is necessary to dwell upon the motives which determined Athens on this occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few of her resolutions which she afterward more bitterly regretted. The letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.

Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defense thus gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach in the walls, sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled, the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favor was shown by Philip toward those who had helped in the betrayal.

Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance, not less for defense than for offense. It was not only the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took no steps to fulfill his promise of handing over the place to the Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid or voluntary, in the public assembly.

It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach with Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip. But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an ancient Macedonian seaport. Accordingly they proposed to open negotiations with him for the exchange of Pydna against Amphipolis. But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings; so that Antiphon and Charidemus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were proceeding, to insure the acquisition of Amphipolis—was persuaded to repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still as a friend.

The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations, while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis contrary to his engagement. But he now altered his policy, and contracted alliance with the Olynthians, whose friendship he purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying between

Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with former Macedonian kings), but also by conquering and handing over to them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa. We know no particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities merely inform us, that during the first two years (358-356 B.C.), while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the town; and he probably availed himself of the propositions made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith, since they would have good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand, contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior offense toward Macedonia, are said to have been slain, while even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in dispatching forces. But either the pressure of the Social War, or the impatience of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment, or both causes operating together, made them behindhand with the exigency. Several Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some being ransomed by Demosthenes out of his own funds; yet we cannot make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens. If any was sent, it came too late.

Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa, though the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was both long and costly, and though there was a body of Athenian settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place expelled from their houses and properties. Even for the rescue of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service. The relieving force dispatched seems to have consisted of a general with mercenary foreigners, who, as no pay was provided for them, postponed the enterprise on which they were sent, to the temptation of plundering elsewhere for their own profit. It was thus that Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis. After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about Amphipolis, she was yet further mortified by seeing Pydna pass into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaints against the aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of their countrymen in sending relief.

These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance prodigiously his power and ascendancy. He had deprived Athens of her hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have retained the town of Methone, instead of the series of ports round the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus. He had conciliated the good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa; the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of Pallene, giving them the mastery of that peninsula, and insuring (what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens. He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of mining, and from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krenides, recently founded by the Thasians. Moreover, he took such effective measures for increasing the metallic works in the neighborhood, that they presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus, not less than 1000 talents per annum. He caused a new gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers in training; for the nations of the interior—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip—under his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time—defeated them, and again reduced them to submission.

It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemos prince of the Molossi, and descended from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis. The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstacy amid the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysus. To this species of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation. Her temper and character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to Philip. But in the year 356 B.C. she bore to him a son, afterward renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year, not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received

nearly at the same time, three messengers with good news—the birth of his son; the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of his running horses at the Olympic games.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip, during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself in Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it: how he had further strengthened himself by enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Demeter at Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ: while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Eteans or Ænians, Æcheans, Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation:

Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythræ or Priene.

That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, began to meet for the dispatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her, together with a fine of 500 talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretense, though a very slight pretense, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city. Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-Hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antiquity, could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

In the year 357 B.C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas. Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of

the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive invasion of Bœotia; while according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them. Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was imposed upon them; of what amount, we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendancy in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraved along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians; against whom it was accordingly proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left now to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance; which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by reasserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons. Our enemies, the Thebans (he added)

are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an Amphiktyonic major: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice."

Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus, under the name of the "rocky Pytho"—a name still applied to it by Herodotus. The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused, by Sparta, upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B.C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans dispatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly afterward, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians, restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their temple management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421 B.C., and retained it without question, under the recognized Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians; who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through

superior force. His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to King Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, toward its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians, as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and religious agency of the place. It is probable that when thus suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended—especially its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of 5,000 men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he dispatched envoys to all the principal states—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful usurpation; that they

were prepared to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.

The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænians, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnetes, Perrhæbians, Athamanes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them, moreover, belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the words thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess—chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites—she replied, that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer favorable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from further signs and omens occurring at the moment. It is probable however that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial; alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation toward the bodies of their own slain. So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the rocks called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force—"to assist the god,"—to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians. It appears that a special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders by name—Philomelus and Onomarchus, perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.

The peril of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defense of the Amphiktyonic assembly; nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force, for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any further aid derivable from

private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however; as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for. But whatever may have been his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which, the exigencies of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force. Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favorites.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men; chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were, however, now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a re-enforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans, confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted awhile with indecisive result, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town of Neon, amid embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until further resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures of

captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition; for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly under the name of allies. In fact, so irresistible was his ascendancy by means of this large paid force under his command, that both Demosthenes and Æschines denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself after some time at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and iron into arms; so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deinicha, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile-minded Messenians, to the Spartan Ephors and Senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to

gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians, among them the powerful despots of Phæræ, whom we afterward find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way: and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet further, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.

Through such combination of profuse allurements, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, with which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alponus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly. Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Boeotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Charoneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to return into Phokis.

Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians by want of money. We know, at least, that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5,000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians. The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offense to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against the Persian arms. Three years afterward, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.

While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the

captive Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves. This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdera and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese, but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast. Apollonides of Kardias was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however, finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardias. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a further detachment of *Kleruchs* or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptes. It was in the ensuing year (352 B.C.) that the Athenians also dispatched a fresh batch of 2,000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B.C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B.C., he had captured Pydna and Potidea, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadae at Larissa in their struggles against Lykophron and Peitholaos, the despots of Pheræ: he had further again chastised the interior tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians, Pæonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence. It appears to have been in 354-353 B.C., that he attacked Methone, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methone was doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidea; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defense. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample

time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises—or (which is more probable)—the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on shipboard, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methone till too late. The Methonæans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs. But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.

Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese has been already related, and his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron, the despot of Phæra, possessed the greatest sway, while the Alcuaðæ of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip, who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a re-enforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the Phokians.

So strong were the Phokians now that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus, with diminished apprehensions of being counter-worked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated, or even anticipated. And though, when

that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion, as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs; nevertheless political interests so far prevailed that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes. To restrain "the Leuktrian insolence of the Thebans," and to see the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiae, Plataea, restored to their pristine autonomy was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messene, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353-352 B.C., that the Megalopolitans dispatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 354 and 353 B.C. that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354-353 B.C. on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353-352 B.C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.

A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was above twenty-seven years old, being born, according to what seems the most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382-381 B.C. His father, named also Demosthenes, was a citizen of considerable property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschines says nothing against him; his mother Kleobule was one of the two daughters and co-heiresses of a citizen named Gylon, an Athenian exile, who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and exporter of corn in Bosporus, sent his two daughters to Athens, where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian citizens—Demochares and the elder Demosthenes. The latter was a man of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories—one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves; the other, of couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus (378 B.C.), the elder Demosthenes was enrolled among the richest class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375

B.C., leaving his son Demosthenes seven years old, with a younger daughter about five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were confided to the care of three guardians named under his father's will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of insuring their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as family connections and friends—administered the property with such negligence and dishonesty that only a sum comparatively small was left when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority and became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own property. During his minority his guardians had continued to enroll him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth fourteen talents—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenes on his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce the father's will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances, he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus—and obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents. Payment, however, was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onetor, brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration, Demosthenes had still received nothing, nor do we know how much he ultimately realized, though it would seem that the difficulties thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the actions of which he speaks as intended, against the other two guardians—Demopon and Therippides.

Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical exercise. By earnest entreaty he prevailed on his tutors to conduct him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens, delivering an harangue in the *Dikastery* on the matter of *Oropus*. This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes, stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the passion excited, when, on attaining his majority, he found himself cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged, according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally, he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition

of an incompetent speaker and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual defense and safety. It appears also that he was, from childhood, of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame, so that partly from his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother, he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the palæstra. His delicate clothing and somewhat effeminate habits procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried to connect with degrading imputations. Such comparative bodily disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isokrates, and Aristotle—an education applying alike to thought, word, and action, combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy and the mental force of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after his death.

As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him; yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochos, friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokrates were both at this moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokrates, was in great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the discourse of Plato, of Isokrates, and others. As an ardent aspirant he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers. But besides living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydides with indefatigable labor and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole history eight times over with his own hand; according to another, he learned it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from memory when the manuscript was accidentally

destroyed. Without minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that Thucydides was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How much the composition of Demosthenes was fashioned by the reading of Thucydides—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.

While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style, Demosthenes had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature, like Æschines, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude. Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with which Demosthenes overcame his defects, in such a manner as to satisfy a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to overcome the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without interruption in a subterranean chamber, practicing night and day either in composition or declamation, and shaving one-half of his head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles, and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction of his external defects. On another occasion he was pouring forth his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him, with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement; probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming before a tall looking-glass. After pertinacious efforts for several

years, he was rewarded at length with complete success. His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savoring of low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his speeches as over-labored and smelling of the lamp.

So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced "Action" to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator. If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual hearers—we must recollect that his speeches are (not less truly than the history of Thucydides) "an everlasting possession rather than a display for momentary effect." Even among his contemporaries, the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker, was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full excellence could only be thus appreciated; while to the after-world, who knows them only by reading, they have been and still are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius. The action of Demosthenes—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously earned—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of Demosthenes; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic *ideal*, are in truth quite as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not permitted to know. Our informants have little interested in him except as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learned, nor from whom, nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with force and majesty of expression, but also that conception, of Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his countrymen—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest statesman.

In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history of Demosthenes. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants in the *Dikastery*; for which compositions he was paid, according to usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the *Dikastery*; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a law, proposed by Leptines, for abrogating votes of immunity passed by the city in favor of individuals, and restraining such grants in future. Nothing is more remarkable, in this speech against Leptines, than the intensity with which the young speaker

enforces on the people the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some wealthy youths—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy banker Pasion—whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking. This we learn from the denunciations of his rival Æschines; who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy families—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed mother—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But Æschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more disparaging, because Demosthenes belonged to a trierarchic family, of the highest class in point of wealth.

It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenes. Phokion was a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year 402 B.C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenes. At what precise time his political importance commenced we do not know; but he lived to the great age of 84, and was a conspicuous man throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in 376 B.C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all, superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence from plunder and speculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an honorable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence probably his surname of Phokion the Good.

I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not innocent on this point; moreover, even when a man was really innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered more or less of doubt admissible against him. Thus Demosthenes—being known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches composed or rhetoric communicated—was sure to be accused, justly or unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence, even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt—at least during the period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip. But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one—was notoriously

and obviously poor—went barefoot and without an upper garment even in very cold weather—had only one female slave to attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus stood forth prominently to the public eye. Combined as it was with bravery and fair generalship, it procured for him testimonies of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of Strategus or General of the city—that is, one of the Board of Ten so denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens—and elected too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or even been present at the choice. In all Athenian history we read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honors to the same individual.

According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road open to honors or political influence, was, by a seductive address, and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery, or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion. He was no orator—from disdain rather than incompetence. Besides receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of Plato as well as of Xenokrates, in the Academy; and we are not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent reply. Once when about to speak in public, he was observed to be particularly absorbed in thought. "You seem meditative, Phokion," said a friend. "Ay, by Zeus," was the reply—"I am meditating whether I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to address to the Athenians." He knew so well, however, on what points to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschines. Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, "Here comes the cleaver of my harangues." Polyeuktus—himself an orator and a friend of Demosthenes—drew a distinction highly complimentary to Phokion, by saying—"That Demosthenes was the finest orator, but Phokion the most formidable in speech." In public policy, in means of political effect, and in personal character—Phokion was the direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life—he doubtless alike despised.

As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to hearers or not. His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole proceedings; and ap

pears especially in the memorable remark ascribed to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he asked—"Have I not unconsciously said something bad?" His manners, moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said to have been kind. He had learned in the Academy a sort of Spartan self-suppression and rigor of life. No one ever saw him either laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.

If then Phokion attained the unparalleled honor of being chosen forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagoguery. We may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any super-eminent service, though on various occasions he conducted himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be found in the fact, that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people, went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While despising their judgment, he manifested no greater foresight, as to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between 360-336 B.C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts, personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made himself the champion; addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused the same policy merely because they found it easier for the time to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have been exalted by war. Moreover most of the eminent military leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion, and he almost alone among

them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been formerly habitual. Hence he was sustained by the peace-party and by the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or care for personal popularity on his own part.

The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chæroneia, was eminently mischievous to Athens; all the more mischievous, partly (like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phokion—which might be called prudence, after the accession of Alexander—was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had been willing to employ it she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible, destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchers—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war expenditure—all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms: thus playing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay.

The love of peace, either in a community, or in an individual, usually commands sympathy without further inquiry, though there

are times of growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally had become adverse to the burden of military service; while, on the other hand, the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented. Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of 432 B.C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger, fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of Athens. “He accounted it holiday work to do duty in her service (it is an enemy who speaks); he wasted his body for her as though it had been the body of another.” Embracing with passion the idea of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action, was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action. Such was the Perikleian Athenian of 431 B.C. But this energy had been crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B.C. had as it were grown old. Pugnacity, Panhellenic championship, and the love of enterprise had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping, refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it; but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion, in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigences against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty which he could scarcely be induced to perform.

Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition to military service. In the year 431 B.C., these Peloponnesians (here too we have the concurrent testimony of Perikles and Archidamus) had been forward for service with their persons, and only backward when asked for money. In 383 B.C., Sparta found them so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle of pecuniary commutation; just as Athens had done (about 460–450 B.C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of Delos.

Amid this increasing indisposition to citizen military service, the floating, miscellaneous, bands who made soldiership a livelihood

under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to year. In 402-401 B.C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted by lucrative promises away from their homes. But active men ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from poverty, exile, or love of enterprise; they were put under constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikrates and others, as peltasts, or light infantry, to serve in conjunction with the citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since the Cyreians in their upward march; the Phokians also in the Sacred War having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose (as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe) Condottieri like Charidemus and others—generals having mercenary bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor, brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokrates makes repeated complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece. Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies were formed during the interval between 400-350 B.C.; in fact, the space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally. Isokrates, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration, and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day. He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.

This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but where also the charm and stimulus of peaceful existence was most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society from political freedom and intelligence; breaking up that many-sided combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed,

which formed the Hellenic ideal—and throwing the defense of Greece upon armed men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian world was thrown upon its defense against Macedonia led by a young prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable even of improving, the best ideas of military organization started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B.C., as we know from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population also retained, amid rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian cities.

Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organizing genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had been in the time of the first Perdikkas, when the king's wife baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds ill-clothed and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but of fixed residences. The men of substance were armed with breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble destitute of order, armed with wicker shields and rusty swords, and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert, to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbors. Among some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was marked by a degrading badge. These were the men whom Philip on becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of Xerxes, when the Spartan king Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an inmate of Greece, and as a guaranty of Grecian courage.

Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight, renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe, as the perpetual aggressions and systematized warfare of his new enemies could be counterbalanced only by an equal continuity of effort on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.

Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece

since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the citizen force and the increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.

Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 351 B.C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies. At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of 300 sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable. It appears that Mausolus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king's designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him. The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterward in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterward asserted, that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defense of Greece.

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-Hellenic patriotism which afterward rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles. But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-Hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favorable

view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money. He exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens, as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less inferior to him than in the former.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

“Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him—as well on our account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done toward him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretense for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war

when you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation."

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection, for improving and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to insure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. "In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burden of action upon his neighbor—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend," etc.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character—energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the uselessness of votes in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burden indispensable for execution! Demus in the *Pyx* (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison) still remained Pan-Hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes, together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Boeotian towns which she now held in dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea; predictions cordially welcomed by the miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messene; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Oropus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the Trikararum, from the Arcadians and Argæians. This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Oropus. But it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of the Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In then Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.

Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration *De Symmoriis*, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenes lays down, as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-Hellenic aggregate comparatively defenseless against Philip or any skillful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her in statu quo, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messene. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to

Athens in recovering Oropus, and in reviving the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantinea against the Megalopolitans. Though himself sharing this sentiment, Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messene, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messene, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her further aggrandizement.

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs, at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Aleuadae of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his recent acquisition of Methone left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were, as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting himself to regain that ascendancy over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in checking the further progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendancy. He sent into Thessaly a force of 7,000 men, under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from

Thessaly, while Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by further victory in Boeotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before. It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval for restoration and re-enforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, said to consist of 20,000 foot and 500 cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Phæræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip's coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet under Chares, co-operating with him. Here a battle was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths, as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an

unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.

This victory procured for the Macedonian prince great renown as avenger of the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defense, capitulated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, 2,000 in number, into Phokis. Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidæa, and Methone), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and dispatched, it did not arrive in time. Pagasæ surrendered and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasæan Gulf, the great inlet of Thessaly.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push this advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thessalians by promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.

The Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedon from coming to co-operate with the Thebans on the southern side of it, not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expedition were overcome. Chiefly from this

cause—but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian armament under Nausikles (amounting to 5,000 foot and 400 horse, according to Diodorus) was fitted out with not less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defense that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterward does Demosthenes, in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigences arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than 200 talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually, we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public, however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendancy was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus.

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained re-enforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (1000 men), and from the Peloponnesian Achæans (2,000 men). Phayllus, the successor (by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defense. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus; incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Kræsus were now melted down and turned into money; 117 bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; 360 golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents. The abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact,

that beautiful youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphyle. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw. Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever. The Phokian leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopyke, which rescued the Phokians from destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves. Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.

The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to co-operate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens—and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterward, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops—expelled from

Asia—and constrained to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip. The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes; but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians—who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ—partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent 4,000 foot, and 500 horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured 3,000 of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and 150 Thessalian horse from Lykophron, the expelled despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his re-enforcements, and got together his aggregate forces, earlier than the enemy. He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helisus, presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They left however a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on, until at length the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting

Megalopolis and Messene; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on, in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander Phayllus presently died of a painful disease—the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans; while Phalækus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Charoneia, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.

We know the successive incidents of this ten years' Sacred War only from the meager annals of Diodorus; whose warm sympathy in favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes. Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple. The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of 300 talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure—he required Grecian soldiers as much as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military improvements and maneuvers which Philip had been gradually organizing since his accession, was now exhibited

in formidable efficiency. The king of Macedon had become the ascendant soldier and potentate hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears, or hopes, or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates (delivered between Midsummer 352 B.C. and Midsummer 351 B.C.), we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to reflecting Grecian politicians. "It is impossible for Athens (says the orator) to provide any land force competent to contend in the field against that of Philip."

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he had assembled round him—especially the lochages or front rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover the excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded ascendancy in that country, from his expulsion of the Phærean despots and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administration. The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus materially increased.

But besides his irresistible land force, Philip had now become master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis but also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties. But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy indeed was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Phæræ and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendancy over the Magnetes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf. That Gulf (now known by the name of Volo) is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless. The naval force belonging to Phæræ and its sea-port Pagasæ was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots Jason and Alexander; at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with

the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan Gulf, the command of which he further secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasæ. Such additional naval means, combined with what he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian Islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes. Such was the mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her commerce and even her coasts were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip's marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, etc.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts. The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip. That prince, having spent a few months, after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendancy over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost of all. Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

In November 352 B.C., intelligence reached Athens, that he was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the Chersonese, that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were

threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of 45 being made liable to serve on the expedition—and to raise 60 talents by a direct property-tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted—before it could be determined, amid the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burden of trierarchy should be distributed—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead. The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more favorable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of further immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to dispatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.

At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his own ingenuity and valor. His friends confidently averred before the Athenian assembly that he was the only man capable of putting down Philip and conquering Amphipolis. One of these partisans, Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be passed insuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by an accuser named Euthykses, who borrowed a memorable discourse from the pen of Demosthenes.

It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip, which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness, proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and cheating them into a belief than no further efforts were needed. That belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known, and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly, and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men—probably Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general, along with him—either did not feel, or could not bring themselves to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and

on the sufferings of those allies to whom she owed protection—combined with accusations against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never paid—still the recognized public advisers shrank from appeal to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens. The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in established footing and influence—Demosthenes, now about thirty years old—in an harangue known as the first Philippic.

We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public adviser in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years before, he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the general lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City, as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties, were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion, of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad. But he had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse *De Symmoriis*) only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed, yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation under more pressing exigencies. He has to protect interests already suffering, and to repel dishonorable insults, becoming from month to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amid a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers; who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is convoked, probably to hear some further instance of damage committed by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.

It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—"Who among the citizens above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of the other citizens in his turn?" Though this old proclamation had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. "Had their recommendations been good, you need not have

been now debating the same topic over again"—says Demosthenes as an apology for standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.

His views indeed were so new, so independent of party sympathies or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes, not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but also on the people themselves. It is from this proclaimed fact that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement. Athens contended formerly with honor against the Lacedæmonians; and now also she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause. Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal energy, perseverance, and ability, while the Athenian citizens had been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it. Should the rumor prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.

After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens, and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable, Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way. What is past cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best way of providing remedies for a difficult future.

He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is to be kept ready to sail at a moment's notice, and to meet Philip in any of his sudden outmarches to Chersonesus, to Thermopylæ, to Olynthus, etc.

Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot immediately to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his own country. Two thousand infantry, and 200 horse, will be suffi-

cient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—500 of the former and 50 of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens. The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays, relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none for a very long time. The orator then proceeds to calculate the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not full pay, but simply the cost of each man's maintenance. At the same time, Demosthenes pledges himself that if thus much be furnished by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war; and that, too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The total annual cost thus incurred will be 92 talents (=about £22,000). He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his other armament, of 50 triremes; which are to be equipped and ready at a moment's notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent service.

His next task is to provide ways and means for meeting such additional cost of 92 talents. Here he produces and reads to the assembly a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing. Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to appreciate the views of Demosthenes. It must have been more or less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an eisphora or property-tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator's speech.

Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the force. The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of Philip from his captures at sea would be arrested. The quarters of the armament might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos, Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by Philip for his aggressions.

The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) in men, money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed. The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike,

and then put up their hands to follow his blow. They never sought to look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations. While their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others, were not only celebrated with costly splendor, but pre-arranged with the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail at the moment of execution—their military force was left without organization or pre-determined system. Whenever any new encroachment of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation, and before a force could be placed on ship-board, the moment for execution had passed. This practice of waiting for Philip to act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion beforehand.

To provide and pay such a standing force is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenes; the absolute necessity that it shall consist, in a large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies, who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach, than to the enemy. The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterward for that which he could not help was unprofitable disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done, then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor, and might be held to a rigorous accountability if he did not. Such was the only way in which the formidable and evergrowing force of their enemy Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs, and two hipparchs, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs of the city and in the showy religious processions. They left the real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus. Such a system was disgraceful. The honor of Athens ought to be maintained by her own citizens both as generals and as soldiers.

Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First Philippic, the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes to the Athenian assembly in reference to the war with Philip. It is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible in its

appeal to the emotions, bringing the audience by many different roads to the main conviction which the orator seeks to impress, profoundly animated with genuine Pan-Hellenic patriotism, and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years old—young in political life—and thirteen years before the battle of Chæroneia, taking accurate measure of the political relations between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavorable, and fortelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such management had its roots; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction, and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to the people throughout all the Olynthiacs and Philippics. We note his warnings, given at this early day, when timely prevention would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation, in foresight, and in the courage of speaking out unpalatable truths. More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortunes to his bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman is properly responsible. The first of all things is—"To see events in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their duties." The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove how justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in their beginnings" and given timely warning to his countrymen. It will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen, that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfill the remaining portion of the statesman's duty—that of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the public enemy.

We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote of this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working arma-

ment was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B.C.) that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers. Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote of the assembly, though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being even put in execution afterward.

Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions, assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than the Persian king. The reports of Persian force and preparation prevalent two years before, when Demosthenes delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction against Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous, in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic, and reverts to them on many occasions afterward. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip's secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries than to employ paid spies in his operations of war; while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidaea, Olynthus, and elsewhere Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies, is an assertion so intrinsically probable that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

Even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of Athemus—and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methone, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too clear that a Prince who stretched his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B.C.), the Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before November 352 B.C.

Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to insure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their co-operation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

A few months afterward (at the date of the first Philippic) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~was~~ ^{was} adjoining to his own.

In this state of partial hostility ~~and~~ ^{and} without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B.C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to

Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip. But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians; at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust continued for several months, until at length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly toward the middle of 350 B.C.; a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretense for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidike. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of a dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city, moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through these predisposing circumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighboring peninsula of Chalkidike. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas

II. had given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbe: Philip himself had given to them the district of Athemus. Possessed of so much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations in the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered. If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would insure to him the co-operation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means, however, were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign—completed it.

Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty and without even real war—there is ground for believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after the victory. The two years and a half between midsummer 350 B.C., and the commencement of 347 B.C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phenomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidike were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and

invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip's father, Amyntas, and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the 99th Olympiad (384 B.C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy. Far more vehement would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this plainly indicated in the phenomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose: we shall see Æschines passing out of a free-spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshiper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-Hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general result of Philip's Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B.C., as to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had, nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip's movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B.C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B.C. He raised pretenses for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys, all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon

this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite co-operation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidike—since it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to co-operate against Philip in Chalkidike. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterward, but before circumstances had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands *second* in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third is really the latest; all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B.C.

In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be dispatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But his recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to the situation of their territory, close on Philip's flanks—to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to

Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. "I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military movements and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if only you Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had *not* been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who in former days contended for Pan-Hellenic freedom against the Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights of other Greeks—that *you* now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defense of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing left now to lose—we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person

by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterward—which we cannot do, so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symnories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius, there is an unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others; but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to his honor—that he descried and measured foreign dangers before they were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds—combating and habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure.

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to co-operate with Olynthus in the war against Philip. Such unhappily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us that he would not slacken in his attack—and that in the course of a month or two he would master more than one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy. Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought

by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip's arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip's conquest of Chalkidike. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil. Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action. He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments dispatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without such twofold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved. Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless ally. Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it afterward, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if ever,¹ was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretense for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens. The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past errors and shortcomings. She ought to look well and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to

wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus, and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable, his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.

“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and other treasures to act aggressively against Philip's own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail.—As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for further provision—if not, then need exists; but above all things, money *must* be found. What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theoric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction that soldiers *must* be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it not a single essential step can be taken. There are, moreover, different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts.”

It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theoric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called *Graphe Paranomon*. But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it—direct

taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be resorted to as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theoric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition appears to have been sent toward the autumn of 350 B.C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology of this period. It presently gained some victory over Philip or Philip's generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is, indeed, possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip's progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B.C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Chares over Philip's general Adæus, we cannot say.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the conviction that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, toward their Olynthian allies and toward their own ultimate security—is the scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order of time; delivered toward the close of the year 350 B.C. Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.

“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson. They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There *was* indeed a time—and that too within my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and punished

Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him; presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved; Philip would have been put down *then*, and would have given you no further trouble.

“Those matters indeed are passed, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip’s game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans are your enemies.

“All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once. Do not submit to them any propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture—I mean those which regard the Theoric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Theoric distribution among those who stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself without any benefit to the city—while his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopu-

larity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment.”

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meager abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of 350 B.C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B.C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.

After the successful expedition of 358 B.C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synd of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund. During the third quarter of 352 B.C., Menestratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens. But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B.C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of communication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly toward the summer of 351 B.C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had dispatched thither various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid toward that object. Philip's naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Geræstus

in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian corn-ships; insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

About the beginning of 349 B.C.—while the war of Philip unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens—hostilities probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Menestratus) with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application. But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch. The Athenian assembly determined to dispatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites. The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikeratus, Euktemon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel. A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis, collected as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens, and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip's commanders in the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis. The anti-Athenian force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion's position was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm. Many of the slack and disor-

derly soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though he at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and press for re-enforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens unparallled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory. Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of the victory. Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness. Kallias seems to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.

The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety. On the former dispatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of the cavalry, a re-enforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense with any immediate re-enforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as choregus for his tribe the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theater and amid the full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who, besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the people, who passed an unanimous vote of censure. This procedure (called *Proboule*) did not by itself carry any punishment, but served as a sort of *præjudicium*, or finding of a true bill; enabling Demosthenes to quote the

public as a witness to the main fact of insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular tribunals; which he did a few months afterward, but was induced to accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of 30 minæ before the final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.

From the dispatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament: while the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were afterward tried. But he was reproached by his enemies for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named Euktemon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his duties as choregus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so that Euktemon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non performance of his engagement. Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved epithet of deserter was ever afterward put upon Demosthenes by Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even applied the like vituperation to most of those who took part in that assembly wherein the Proboule or vote of censure against him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa; probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armor and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa, as commander of the horsemen; yet, when the horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself defrayed. How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B.C.—Olymp. 107, 4); his old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering office.

What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself

by the enemy. The hostile parties in the island, aided by Philip, were not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B.C. that they applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip in 346 B.C.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at the same time the burden of two wars. We know that they had to provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once; and that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B.C. Of the horsemen who had gone from Athens to Eubœa under Meidias, to serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during that half-year. Meidias did not cross with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of Athens. We may farther conclude that a more numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea alone; besides which Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and peltasts.

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half of the year 349 B.C. was one in which Athens was driven to great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa. What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this year 349 B.C. probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic, and Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidike into the following year. After a summer's campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to him.

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Atheni-

ans in the first half of 349 B.C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the *Dikasteries*, which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some time—for how long we do not know.

To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to the *Theoric Fund* for the various religious festivals—or should be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a (*probouleuma*) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it to the public assembly. Under such authority Apollodorus made the motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers. Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality, under the *Graphe Paranomon*. Apollodorus was brought before the *Dikastery*, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend and relative the prosecutor of Neera) through suborned witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The *Dikasts* however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which he actually paid.

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterward, always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one—is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from the *Theoric Fund* to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been out voted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable to those penal consequences which afterward actually fell upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly,

should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before midsummer 349 B.C., would probably return after a campaign of two or three months, and after having rendered some service against the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing eighteen months (from midsummer 349 B.C. to the early spring of 347 B.C.) During the year Olymp. 107, 4, if the citation from Philochorus is to be trusted, the Athenians dispatched to their aid three expeditions; one at the request of the Olynthians, who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of 2,000 peltasts under Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second went thither under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering Chalkidians; consisting of 18 triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of Pallene, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and Charidemus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits. It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress in Chalkidike. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin; but to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there. The Athenians complied, dispatching thither 17 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, and 300 horsemen, all under the command of Chares.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable. Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterward) affirms that the Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus 4,000 citizens, 10,000 mercenaries, and 50 triremes. He represents the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator's language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna and Torone are said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance. After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbors—the Thracian Methone and Apollonia. In forcing the passage of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance that his troops were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an Olynthian archer named Aster, and lost the sight of that eye completely, notwithstanding the

skill of his Greek surgeon Kritobulus. On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia. Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament was still in the town to aid in the defense, so that the Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were disappointed. How long the siege lasted—or whether there was time for Athens to send further re-enforcement—we cannot say. The Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philipizing party, headed by the venal Euthykrates and Lasthenes, brought about the banishment of their chief opponent Appollonides, nullified all measures for energetic defense, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this party, having 500 cavalry under his command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader. Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete—toward the end of winter 348-347 B.C.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula. The persons of the Olynthians—men, women, and children—were sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is said to have destroyed together with Apollonio, Methone, Stageira, etc.—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes, speaking about five years afterward, says that they were so thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible. Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe, that they were dismantled and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part non-resident, and probably of favored Grecian grantees also. Though various Greeks thus received their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that not long afterward they were dismissed with dishonor and contempt.

In this Olynthian war—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip—Athens too must have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely, that in her entire war against Philip from the time of his capture of Amphipolis in 358-357 B.C. down to the peace of 346 B.C. or shortly afterward, she had expended not less than 1500 talents.

On these computations no great stress is to be laid; but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all reluctance she was obliged to do something: what she did was both too little, too intermittent, and done behind-time, so as to produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless the aggregate cost, in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end to the proposition of taking from the Theoric Fund. Means may also have been found of economizing from the other expenses of the state.

Though the appropriation of the Theoric Fund to other purposes continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet in the way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced at by Demosthenes and others. And whenever money was wanted for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or from direct property tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of the Theoric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve of the battle of Chaeroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized twelve years after he had begun to enforce them.

This question about the Theoric expenditure is rarely presented by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of alms-giving to the poor—and sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history; pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or predominant purpose of the Theoric expenditure. That expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and the contemporary world—very different in this respect from the modern—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the whole range of social pleasures. Now the Theoric Fund was essentially the Church Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure, given in order to insure

that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given to any one who was out of Attica—because, of course, he could not attend—but given to all alike within the country, rich or poor. It was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the gods than in regard to the city; but it was only one portion of the total disbursements covered by the Theoric Fund. To this general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen.

We neither know the amount of the Theoric Fund, nor of the distributions connected with it. We cannot, therefore, say what proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure—itself unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing of expenditure in manifestations for the honor of the gods, was accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson; moreover, magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the protection and favor of the gods. We may affirm, however, upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a peace establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative exigencies, were starved in order to augment the Theoric surplus. Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure, and social brotherhood.

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war fund. Such provision had been made half a century before under the full energy and imperial power of Athens—when she had a larger revenue, with numerous tribute-paying allies—and when Perikles presided over her councils. It might have been better if she had done something of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps if men like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked ascendancy, she would have been advised and prevailed on to continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals. What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other case

than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into the festival-expenditure—truly denominated by Demades the cement of the political system—without impairing in the bosom of each individual, that sentiment of communion, religious, social, and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens for not converting her Theoric Fund into an accumulated capital to meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money available for war?

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed, and the Theoric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious, the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax, from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to evade this burden by requiring that the festival-fund should be appropriated instead; thus menacing what was dearest to the feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out of the budget for the maintenance of religion. We may judge how strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally, by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had borne a certain burden of direct taxation, their complaints would become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burdens of the war. But even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

We see this conflict of interests—between direct taxation on one side and the festival-fund on the other, as a means of paying for war—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked in the fourth Philippic. Unhappily the conflict served as an excuse to both parties, for throwing the blame on each other, and starving

the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance, shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither—tries to mediate between them—and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece as well as of Athens at stake—he urges every species of sacrifice at once; personal service, direct tax-payments, abnegation of the festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes the other; but oftener of all, comes his appeal for personal service. Under such military necessities, in fact, the Theoric expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace, against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security of Athens were to be preserved. The same want of energy which made them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals; nor, indeed, would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their festivals, had their remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing less could have saved them than simultaneous compliance with all the three requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B.C.; which compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B.C.

APPENDIX.

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

RESPECTING the true chronological order of these three harangues, dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and still continue among modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial words, but places them in a different chronological order from that in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the series; the third, as second; and the first as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these speeches by the order in which they stand edited, though, as far as I can judge, that order is not the true one.

Edited order..... I. II. III.

Order of Dionysius..... II. III. I.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order, the main argu-

ments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes, places this dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs, affirming that it is conclusive and sets the question at rest. Bohncke also (Forschungen, page 151) treats the question as no longer open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 183-87) expresses himself with equal confidence in favor of the order stated by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in the same opinion, though with less confidence, and with a juster appreciation of our inadequate means for settling the question. See the Appendix iii. to the fifth volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I agree with him that unqualified confidence in any conclusion as to the order of these harangues is unsuitable and not warranted by the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the contemporaneous history, of which we know little or nothing from information in detail.

On the best judgment that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second Olynthiac *first* of the three. I concur with the edited order in placing the third *last*. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix, that this arrangement has been vindicated in a dissertation by Stueve. I have not seen this dissertation, and my own conclusion was deduced—even before I knew that it had ever been advocated elsewhere—only from an attentive study of the speeches.

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|---|-----|------|------|
| Edited order..... | I. | II. | III. |
| Order of Dionysius..... | II. | III. | I. |
| Order of Stueve (which I think the most probable).... | II. | I. | III. |

To consider first the proper place of the *second* Olynthiac (I mean that which stands *second* in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is that scarcely anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted, but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11—"Quid ! quod ipsorum Olynthiorum hac quidem in causa tantum uno loco facta mentio est—ut uno illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsa oratione, qua in causa esset habita, certis rationibus evinci posset." How are we to explain the absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens; he might now, therefore, calculate that his first discourse remained impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was to combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural to a reader of Demosthenes who passes from the first printed discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian assembly, nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or American Congress, could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first discourse—if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon, so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them again for the same purpose—I cannot believe that he would allude to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be "ad concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos" (to use the words of Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus. If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse

like the second Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; he would repeat anew, and more impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that city, and the urgency of assisting it, were *not* the main drift of Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is to encourage and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip, taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just acquired, but taking her in only as a valuable auxiliary (*ἐν προσθήκης μέρει*) to co-operate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive aid from Athens, not presenting her either as peculiarly needing succor, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at first *in forma pauperis*, as if she were in danger and requiring aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal, offering to co-operate against a common enemy, and tendering an alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will, of course, want aid, but she can give co-operation of equal value. Demosthenes advises to assist her—this comes of course, when her alliance is accepted: but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of what she will *give* to the Athenians, in the way of co-operation against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to *her* which the Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable *them* the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover, Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip's arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at the opening of the second Olynthiac), *τὸ τοὺς πολεμήσαντας Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χωρὰν ὁμορὸν καὶ δυνάμιν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκείνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἰτα τῆς ἐαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστανιν εἶναι, δαιμονία τινι καὶ θεῖα πατάσασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσία* (p. 18).

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the vulnerable as well as the odious points of Philip, and striving (as Petrenz justly remarks) to "excite and exasperate the minds of the citizens."

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions, leaving the Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves. It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news come from Thrace, and deliverably complaining envoys to announce them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is now—"Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think what will happen if they are ruined: there is nothing to hinder Philip in that case from marching into Attica." The views of Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both to the first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall) mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theoric Fund; whereas, in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted to—and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three, and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theoric Fund in the third

oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to the first, and not prior, as Dionysius places it.

As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was delivered after Athens had sent some succor to Olynthus, whereas both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius (as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration recognizes Athens as having done *something*, which the two first do not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens (p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned by her; and the triumphant hopes noticed by Demosthenes as actually prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained to be dealt with. Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without delay, and dwells upon the Theoric Fund as one means of obtaining money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall, indeed, argues that the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time. His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of *Athens herself* is mentioned as involved—*τὸν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε*: upon which I may remark, that the reading *αὐτῶν* is not universally admitted. Dindorf in his edition reads *αὐτῶν*, referring it to *πραγμάτων*; and stating in his note that *αὐτῶν* is the reading of the vulgate, first changed by Reiske into *αὐτῶν* on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more distinct contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II., I., III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second Olynthiac first, and with the common order in putting the third Olynthiac last.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 n.c., as far as we can make out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present

themselves of the diversities of suffering which befell these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string, as he traveled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the *Dikastery*. Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details, yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population.

Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquest, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnean Apolophanes, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip's elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of insuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage. Philip also found at Olynthus his two exiled half-brothers, who had served as pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death.

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable re-enforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the *Ægean*. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides widespread odium incurred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general. In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidike, and the great aggrandizement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a further circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives

along with the rest. No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since the defeat of Tolmedes at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amid the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares with his armament was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him.

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus, and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece, they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.

This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368) to the battle of Mantinea (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B.C.); in which last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atrometus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother Glaukothœa made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rights of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one and the other in a menial capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes; who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees

to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.

As envoy of Athens dispatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine with Athens for the defense of the liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered, however, much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy. The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterward in his speech before the assembly with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip's combined employment of arms and corruption.

Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B.C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no sincere or hearty co-operation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fullness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterward became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendancy for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of

the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war. This severe decree, however, was passed at the same time that the disposition toward peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B.C., the Eubœans tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during the ensuing year. The Eubœan envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens. Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidike, and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip's cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B.C.: after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war, yet the Athenian public took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions toward Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a

decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates was impeached some time afterward before the Dikastery, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favor.

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made an opening, of which, however, it did not suit Philip's purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip's hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to insure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen. This touching appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it; Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to show that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, traveling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus, had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip's intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem

with Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings; which he did, first before the Senate—next before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions toward Athens; desirous not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October 347 B.C.; Æschines, and the other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and Thebans was turning—as all events had turned for the last ten years—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the command of Phalækus in place of Phayllus, had maintained their position against Thebes—had kept possession of the Boeotian towns Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia—and were still masters of Alponus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylæ adjoining. But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves. The mercenary force necessary to their defense could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of 10,000 talents (= about £2,300,000), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the *Iliad*, as well as on other grounds of surmise) to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of

Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendancy declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death. Phalækus however still retained his ascendancy over the mercenaries, about 8,000 in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators (Demosthenes seemingly among them) attempted, under the prevalent uneasiness about Philip. But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pylæa (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ) which the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

The king of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present Deity, ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the center of Peloponnesus—as Æschines, on return from his mission, had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number—he was now furnished with a pious pretense, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defense, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in

Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter Thessaly—where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus. Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347 B.C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it—Alponus, Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries. This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking toward Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens—besides the refusal of co-operation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus—to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty because it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home—not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on *his* coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the

extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylæ; as it had turned 133 years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace—keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes—prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ—and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-Hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guaranty of the pass might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B.C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he choose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were chosen—Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatrokles, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausikles, and Aristodemus the actor.

Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, a representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Parynon, and Iatrokles had already been gained over as partisans by Philip, while in Macedonia; moreover Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed by Nausikles; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover. Though Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or humiliating terms. But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until afterward, when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning toward Philip. Both he and Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behavior of Æschines.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December, 347 B.C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasan Gulf, where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterward; lastly, boastful, even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and

there address to him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Æschines and Demosthenes.

Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever. He then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip. Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.

Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of Æschines, and according to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from Æschines; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretenses of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging manners of Philip, especially when entertaining them at the banquet: with others he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assem-

bly; while Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution, that they should be crowned with a wreath of honor, and invited to dine next day in the prytaneium.

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous for peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtless but too familiar to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the incontestable right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think that, by this process, he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would have been much to the purpose in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When Æschines reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honorable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedonia—Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, etc.—had been

so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Æschines addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission. We shall see him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month of Elaphebolion (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms, expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally, stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received as her ally. But in spite of such amenities of language, affording an occasion for his partisans in the assembly—Æschines, Philokrates, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatrokles, and others—to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions—Philip would grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschines appears to have made some boast. Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptes in Thrace. He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the Chersonese until the Athenians should have had an opportunity of debating, accepting, or rejecting, the propositions of peace. His envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoys on their return.

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spoke first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine-drinking. Æschines dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent oratory—after which he recounted the principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip, intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenes, in case any point should have been omitted by the previous speakers. Demosthenes then made his own statement, in language (according to Æschines) censorious and even insulting

toward his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschines in his vanity chose to pre-occupy all the best points in his own speech, leaving none open for any one else. Demosthenes next proceeded to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip—and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytaneis should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion (a day sacred to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behavior of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenes further moved in the Senate, that when Philip's envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honor at the Dionysiac festival.

Presently these Macedonian envoys—Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus, arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly (as it would seem in that very assembly), Demosthenes proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were, the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival and the assembly in the temple of Dionysius which followed upon it. At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their place of honor at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled, to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned, that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guaranty against his further encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation, while a certain number were still absent and expected to return, the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some

distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory) was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens toward conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytaneis should convene two public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They further recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same condition as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenes in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion) for decision of the question of peace and alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.

Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed assemblies were held—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip—Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus—were present both at the festival and the assemblies. The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterward (from which alone we know the facts) the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philocrates, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited. It was Philocrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod respecting absent envoys and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip: who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other,

He included in his proposition Philip with all his allies on one side, and Athens with all her allies on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens—the Phokians, and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.

What part Æschines and Demosthenes took in reference to this motion it is not easy to determine. In their speeches delivered three years afterward, both denounce Philokrates; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Æschines in his earlier and Æschines in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenes accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokrates; but of having changed his politics during the night, and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter so warmly as to convert the hearers when they were predisposed the other way. Æschines altogether denies such sudden change of opinion, alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favor of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed. Yet Æschines, though in his earlier harangue (*De Fals. Leg.*) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th, in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having spoken at great length on that very day, the 19th, and of having thereby altered the temper of the assembly.

In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschines upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly ascribed to him by Demosthenes. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he nor Demosthenes can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so—if we are to believe the statement of Æschines (we have no statement from Demosthenes) as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschines) had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances, since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys Antipater and Parmenio were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and Philip had agreed (as Æschines himself states) to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Mace-

donian envoys. To tell them—"We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance"—would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory maneuver for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenes nor Æschines can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterward. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Æschines himself, but the general public of Athens, were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenes, though less anxious, was favorable to it. Neither of them was at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the town of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the assembly. That Æschines supported the same motion entire, and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus, the friend and partisan of Æschines, told the Athenians the plain alternative: "You must either march forthwith to Peiræus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theoric Fund to military purposes—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokrates." Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschines is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures: Eubulus his opponent now holds them out in terrorem, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the statu quo, which recognized Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens—I do not believe that even Demosthenes, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterward to have vehemently opposed it.

I suspect, therefore, that the terms of peace proposed by Philokrates met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other

modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokrates provided—that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other: that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens. Nor was any special mention made about Kersobleptes.

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of the two assembly-days—the nineteenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of course—without the fault of any one—it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests from being yet further multiplied, and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month (six days after the previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and his allies. Next, it was resolved that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip's envoys.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions—Thermopylæ and the Hellespont—which Philip was sure to covet, and which it most behoved Athens to insure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokrates, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Æschines tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the latter) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this—that in both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, and as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as an

ally of Athens. Amid such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear—both from Æschines (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes—first, that the envoy from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to recognize Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and Æschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them—the leaders of the peace, Æschines and Philokrates, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises, and unauthorized assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the king of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens) from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city—restoring also the autonomy of Thespiæ, Platæa, and the Boeotian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances—previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others—of Philip's anxiety to win favorable opinions from the Athenians—were now still further magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by recovering for her Oropus.

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokrates, Æschines, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely deluded the assembly; and induced them, not indeed

to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Phitokrates had at first proposed—but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians. These latter were thus shut out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had recognized their right to be included. Their deputies were probably present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater, without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip—will be seen to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterward. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokrates, Æschines, and the other enjoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found easier credence and welcome, because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenes; who, on this occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokrates) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterward, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a fact, we shall find Demosthenes earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition was at best only faint, when the positive refusal of Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterward. Probably the temper of the Athenians—then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschines and Philokrates—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace; the more so as Demosthenes, if he called in question the assurances of Æschines as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of mere skepticism and negation; of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable antici-

pations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenes, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B.C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it—the abandonment of the Phokians—was first shuffled in.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptes) in the Board-room of the Generals. It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod—the same persons who had been employed in the first embassy—to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.

The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly and individually with Philip; but they were further enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, “to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens.”—“It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Æschines to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip.” Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however, Æschines unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was, in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the king of Macedon, the most active of living men, would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was further known to Æschines and the envoys that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy. Moreover on the day of, or the day after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a dispatch had reached Athens from Chares, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great part of his kingdom. Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for dispatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace just concluded was based on the *uti possidetis*, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenes that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.

The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction—or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenes urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the third of the month Munychion (April—nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenes made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus, the Athenian commander at Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be. But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia: where they remained inactive at Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenes recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the third of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part, Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage. The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate—confirms the supposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his colleagues became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged. His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. *Æschines* affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either on the road or at the resting-places.

Pella was now the center of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens; places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues, Æschines—assuming credit to himself for a view, larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to Thermopylæ (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain from the large force mustered near Pelia), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenes (according to the statement of Æschines) opposed this recommendation—insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip's march to Thermopylæ. At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first.

According to this rule, Demosthenes was first heard, and delivered a speech (if we are to believe Æschines) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful toward his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame. The turn now came to Æschines, who repeats in abridgement his own long oration delivered to Philip. We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Æschines, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenes. Æschines addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip's intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities, small as well

as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip's expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and just. He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favored.

Demosthenes, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokrates. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip. This (he says) was all that lay in his power to do, as an individual: in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had written a dispatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another dispatch of their own with false information. Then, he had resolved to come home personally, for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.

The general description here given by Demosthenes, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed it coincides substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to counterveil confident assertions on the favorable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of marching southward toward Thessaly and Thermopylæ. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian auxili-

aries; a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip's open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others that he was marching southward with intentions favorable to the Phokians—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave most explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. So far indeed was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed. The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians—the Phokian envoys, together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who on their side came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes. Such was the disgraceful auction wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world: following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amid such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him—with the aid too of Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Phere near the Pagasean Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans. It was at Phere that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies. This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion; after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities,

all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively. And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip's allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise, and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing defense. The oath which ought to have been administered in Thrace—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording further presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretense; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly afterward) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.

In administering the oaths at Phæræ to Philip and his allies, Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale. But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip toward that people were highly favorable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was

then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy—recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies. A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment's notice to be employed on sudden occasion. The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the prytaneum; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held; where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us), Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name of his colleagues generally. He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demosthenes before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy—but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Phæræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. “But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Boeotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression toward the Boeotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your own,

that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Plataea and Thespieæ. Nay more, you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues.” These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes. Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival, which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforseen vicinity of Philip; which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylae, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favorable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious. It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had further means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylae, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility

to himself; while Philokrates amused the people by saying—"No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should not think alike. He is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine."

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians. Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens on the (13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ. Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply. The two letters must have been dispatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip, which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier, while Phalækus and the Phokians, having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length, were sure to attempt resistance if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighborhood from the want of provisions, the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea. Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment, to which purpose his letters were well adapted in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies, not as allies of the Phokians. Not only they would be in the midst of his superior force, and therefore as it were hostages, but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance

with their wishes and interests, and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well toward the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (beside the standing dislike of the citizens toward military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years' standing, and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf; which was all that Philip wanted.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents) both from Athens and Sparta, feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with 8,000 or 10,000 mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans, yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay, that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta, during the spring, while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ, with 1000 Lacedæmonian auxiliaries. The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the co-operation of a superior fleet at sea. Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus, to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side toward Boeotia.

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B.C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn in March, 346 B.C. Though compelled to endure not only the

refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them, they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans, that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded; still the fair words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip's good intentions toward them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ, and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens, Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader Phalækus to surrender the pass, and offered him terms, Phalækus would make no reply until his deputies returned from Athens. These deputies, present at the public assembly of the 16th Skirro-phorion, heard the same fallacious assurances as before, respecting Philip's designs, repeated by Philokrates and Æschines with unabated impudence, and still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokrates and adopted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of war, from a city which still continued in name to be their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was left except to make the best terms they could with Philip. To defend Thermopylæ successfully without Athens—much more against Athens—was impracticable.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirro-phorion, the Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to Phalækus, whom they reached at Nikæa near Thermopylæ about the 20th of the same month. Three days afterward, Phalækus, with his powerful army of 8,000 or 10,000 mercenary infantry and 1000 cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip. The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of Athens and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little before. It was stipulated in the

convention that Phalækus should evacuate the territory, and retire wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves on the mercy of the conqueror.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsia, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.

In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above mentioned, reappointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion—June) the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Æschines, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed as to be unable to go. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms, that the illness was a mere concerted pretense, in order that Æschines might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling at Athens likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which Æschines knew to be at hand, from Phokis. Others having been chosen in place of Æschines and Demosthenes, the ten envoys set out and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the mainland on the other side of the Eubœan strait. On the 23d of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report. The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokrates and Æschines) now dashed to the ground—not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylæ, the defense at once of Attica and of Greece, and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by

Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed these votes—To put the Peiræas, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defense—To bring within these walls for safety all the women and children, and all the movable property, now spread abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of Athens.

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition ; or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay aside the pretense. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were favorable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself ; though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban ; and though he had affirmed (this however rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated by the Macedonians, Thebans, and Thessalians, in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long deferred triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens ; but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive ; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Kallisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises ; which, when enlarged upon by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to please the Athenians and lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip's passage of Thermopylæ, when he was in full co-operation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Æschines boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offense of Athens. And we cannot doubt that the restoration of

the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to countervail the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus. The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient and oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi. No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans; but they were required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, further, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the propositions made in the assembly. The Ceteans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Æschines takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to hear their defense, and thereby preserved their lives. But though the terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the country—all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and giving vent to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation against sacrilege—went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped and slain—that children were torn from their parents, wives

from their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples— that Philip took for himself the lion's share of the plunder and movable property—all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate. Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years afterward, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women, and little children, without adults—ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields. Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terrors and majesty of Philip's name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle, by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other places commanding the pass. He was extolled as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phalækus, and become master of the twenty-two Phokian cities, all without striking a blow—was accounted the most wonderful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August, 346 B.C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians; an honorary pre-eminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason of Pheræ had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated. It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons—affected even to

disregard the assembly as irregular—and refrained from dispatching their sacred legation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival. The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbor. And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens in his reception, prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious, and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the king of Macedon.

Here, then, was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the Hellenic world: first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner and uncovered frontier of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece, and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.

How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonorable and ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless the explanation of this proceeding is to be found, partly, in the general state of the Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort—sickness and shame at their past war with Philip—alarm from the prodigious success of his arms—and pressing anxiety to recover the captives taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschines and a majority of his colleagues, who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their proceedings on the second embassy in such manner that he was actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known at Athens.

Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness, there appears in the admissions of Æschines himself sufficient evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The dilatory measures of the second embassy—the postponement of the oath-taking until Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ—the keeping back of information about the danger of that pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating on the conjuncture—all these grave charges remain without denial or justi-

fication. The refusal to depart at once on the second embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all—the false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip's purposes—are plainly admitted by Æschines.

In regard to these public assurances given by Æschines about Philip's intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgment; while the hypothesis of honest error is yet refuted by his own subsequent conduct. "If (argues Demosthenes) Æschines had been sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before his countrymen, respecting of Philip's designs—then on finding that the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschines visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his avowed partisan and advocate." Such conduct is inconsistent with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove—that the proceedings of the second embassy all bear out—that Æschines was the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of Æschines betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent, but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ, only exhorting him, when he comes there, to act against Thebes and in defense of the Boeotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within Thermopylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute Boeotia—even if it could have been made sure that such would be the first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylæ, betrayed once before by Ephialtes the Malian to Xerxes, was now betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic power yet more formidable.

The ruinous peace of 346 B.C. was thus brought upon Athens not simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of Æschines and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenes had certainly no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority of the envoys; a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as

from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably troublesome by Æschines. Demosthenes affirms too, that after fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal return and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were frustrated. Whether he did all that he could toward this object, cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any shortcomings. The only point upon which Demosthenes appears open to censure is, on his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on probable grounds against him, amid the multifarious accusations, chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his opponent.

Respecting Philokrates—the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace—we learn, that being impeached by Hyperides not long afterward, he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned in his absence. Both he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus; and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth at Athens with impudent ostentation. These are allegations in themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace, having disappointed every one's hopes, came speedily to be regarded with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.

The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus; from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory, and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the sea toward Tarentum, near which city he was slain a few years afterward. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent that his engines "were burned by the divine fire," and he himself with several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames. His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis; but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold into slavery or put to death. Even the wives of the Phokian leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred donatives out of the Delphian

temple, were visited with the like extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favor no less manifest toward their champion Philip, whom they exalted more and more toward the pinnacle of honor and dominion.

CHAPTER XC.

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B.C. TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

I HAVE described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the re-establishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B.C., whereby Athens, after a war feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylæ—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own troops. The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia; yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defense, was profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretense to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be executed by Philip. These recommendations, prudent under

the circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterward came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip's new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into detail, Isokrates published his letter addressed to Philip—the *Oratio* and *Philippum*. The purpose of this letter is to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip's exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power as his ancestor Herakles had made in early times. He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behavior toward all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which existed among the Lacedæmonians toward the Spartan kings. Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokrates, since he published the *Panegyric* (380 B.C.—thirty-four years before), wherein he invokes a united Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokrates toward Philip—himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenes terms him) by power and position. As Æschines, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokrates relies upon his skillful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conqueror of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate;

and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B.C. in reference to Philip.

From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip's name in Greece after the peace of 346 B.C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus. About the time of the peace of 346 B.C. in Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers. Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of 40 triremes and 8,000 mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again brought under the Persian authority.

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a re-enforcement of 4,000 Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defense. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having further defeated the neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defenses of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of 100

triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration 40,000 persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had in his army 10,000 Greeks: 6,000 by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; 3,000 by request from Argos; and 1,000 from Thebes. To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force; not less than 20,000 mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defense. But these ample means of defense were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas. Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell with little resistance into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the temples were pillaged with an immense booty to the victors—and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterward resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder. They constituted in fact the principle element of force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters, while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

By this re-conquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition, and even exalted the Persian empire in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence: while Mentor, rewarded with the sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard. He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the main-land opposite to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood, Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed most to his celebrity is that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348-347 B.C.—and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed his signet-ring to send counterfeited orders whereby he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectively under Persian dominion.

The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B.C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B.C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years is beyond our power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes; which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time, touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture upon.

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in

the various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia and Leukas, in Eubœa, and Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis, Messene, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and his active co-operation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all pretension to Messene. He established a footing in Elis, by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians—deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas. He further attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that region—Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have failed. Detachments of his troops showed themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians. Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly, distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Phæræ, the city most disaffected to him. We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the Greek cities on and near the Hellespont. He is said further to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip's auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.

It was Philip's policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving among its members a spirit of

vigorous and united defense. In or before the year 344 B.C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys. He addressed both to the Mesenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy toward Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren. Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views. But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B.C.) to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world. Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip's partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python, addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments toward Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace—"That each party should have what they actually had"—it was moved to substitute this phrase—"That each party should have their own." 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amend-

ments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled. Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens. Moreover he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleids, for having shown hospitality toward them. The original treaty therefore remained unaltered.

Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip's acceptance the two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighboring sea—and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to *restore* the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him—or to *give* it to her even should they decide in his favor.

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift *proprio motu*—Æschines and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables. "Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he *gives* it to us, or *gives it back* to us?" The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as a gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip, that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed

piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration: partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference with their insular ascendancy.

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B.C.) the inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparethus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding Philip addressed several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparethus, and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer toward renewal.

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the side toward Beotia, now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum. In Megaria an insurgent party under Periklaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip's troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ, the Megarian port on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprised of this conspiracy the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokian, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time re-established the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea. In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded to second the views of Philip's chief adherent Philistides; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person of the opposing leader Euphraeus, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip's instrument; while Euphraeus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured 1000 Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthemus, in order to break the easy communi-

cation with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus. On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace, where he passed at least eleven months, and probably more, leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

Respecting this peninsula angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopceithes with a body of mercenaries, unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could: while Philip had taken under his protection and garrisoned Kardias—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence and admitted at the peace of 346 B.C., by Æschines and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths. In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs. And when they complained he insisted that they should deal with Kardias as an independent city, by reference to arbitration. This they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardias as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopceithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens. While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes, upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopceithes at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech and his third Philippic were delivered in 341–340 B.C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B.C. In both he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility toward Philip which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopceithes, but also

to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a strenuous war in reality. Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and re-enforcing Diopceithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip's attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected toward her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger; overridden by Philip's prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before. They perceived—what the orator had long ago pointed out—that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus.

From this time to the battle of Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy—to Peloponnesus (344-343 B.C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians, and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians—and subsequently the dispatch of a military force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria. This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens. Kallias also, with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success. On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens were renounced; and in place of it was constituted

an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens. In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks. He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B.C.) in traveling as missionary through Peloponnesus, to organize a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B.C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.

While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopceithes, and may perhaps have carried to him some re-enforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly disposed toward Athens—from recollections of the Social War, and from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes employ his eloquence at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the further preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active co-operation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens.

At this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterward commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea, a little before Midsummer 340 B.C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese, by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the already accumulated

causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war. Shortly after Midsummer 340 B.C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal decree to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B.C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens; a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hostilities. He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of Nikias his herald carrying dispatches; the Athenians (he alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had read the dispatches publicly in their assembly. He complained that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos in harboring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive proceedings of Diopetides in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming intervention of Athens in defense of the Thracian princes Teres and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had co-operated with his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behavior of the Athenians in refusing, when he had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to "conclude

a just convention on behalf of the Greeks generally.”—“Had you acceded to this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them—as those affirm who knew your government best—peace is war, and war peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover, by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents, to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from *them*.”

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip's allegation—that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendancy everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel that further acquiescence in these proceedings would only insure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture, which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.

War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of 30,000 men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen. His attack on this place was remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the

extended scale of the military operations. Perinthus was strong and defensible, situated on a promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward toward the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity, toward the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up movable towers said to be 120 feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip's promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, cooperated. A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared, much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offense against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion, instead of the loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians, Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium. Compelled to

abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was further baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.

These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B.C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected trade-ships so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece: and Demosthenes, as statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip's marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip's hands. The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese; while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprise, during the spring of 339 B.C., against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return, however, across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a

sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being himself badly wounded through the thigh. This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B.C.

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organized than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip in the summer of 340 B.C. Enjoying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy, he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

The law of Pericles (adopted in 357 B.C.) had distributed the burden of the trierarchy among the 1200 richest citizens on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called *Symmories*, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the 300 richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the *Symmories*, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about 40, 50, or 60 minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same *symmory*. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each; if on the other hand many triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion toward the cost. The richer members of the partnership thus paid no greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from these poorer members.

According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic *symmories* were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted them-

selves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament. In addition to such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose, in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B.C.

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was impeached, moreover, under the *Graphe Paranomon*, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these mighty enemies.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished. Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried before the *Dikastery*, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the *Dikasts*; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the established fine. And so animated was the

temper of the public at that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion; partly in consequence of the opposition of *Æschines*, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose. It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both of them—especially those of *Demosthenes*, which must have been numerous—have not been preserved.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest. How long the law remained unchanged we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and *Demosthenes* boasts that during the entire war (that is from the renewal of the war about August, 349 B.C., to the battle of *Chæroneia* in August, 338 B.C.) all the trierarchies named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.

Probably the first fruits of the *Demosthenic* reform in Athenian naval administration was the fleet equipped under *Phokion*, which acted so successfully at and near *Byzantium*. The operations of Athens at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the *Social War*.

But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defense by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the *Amphiktyonic* assembly against the *Lokrians* of *Amphissa*. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian *Æschines*, it more than compensated *Philip* for his repulse at *Byzantium* and his defeat by the *Triballi*; bringing, like the former Sacred War, aggrandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in an earlier portion of this work, the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590–580 B.C.), about two centuries before the birth of *Æschines* and *Demosthenes*. That war had been undertaken by the *Amphiktyonic* Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing seaport of *Kirrha*, situated near the mouth of the river *Pleistus*, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of *Delphi* to the sea. *Kirrha* was originally the port of *Delphi*, and of the ancient *Phokian* town of *Krissa*, to which *Delphi* was once an annexed sanctuary. But in process of time *Kirrha* increased at the expense of both, through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed

there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed. But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit, and took into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much, however, we make out—not merely from Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled and claimed by the Lokrians as their own. This, indeed, was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained untilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian tem-

ple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians, their enemies of long standing. One of the first objects of Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against their attacks, and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief—must have found the Amphiissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover, they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their enemies, the Phokians.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March, 339 B.C.) was held at Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagore or vice-legates, Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles. We need hardly believe Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his favor. Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Æschines.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Plataea, a century and a half before—with an inscription to this effect—"Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks." It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stripped of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers) in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or solemnities; which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans, and to the Amphiissian Lokrians as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Æschines) to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission

of the religious solemnities. But this is denied by Demosthenes; who states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons—which they never had sent. Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having received bribes to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not—at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platæa should stand as matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes, the steadfast champion of the god.

“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words of Æschines), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defense. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian—of extreme rudeness and brutality—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse—interrupted me and exclaimed—‘Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

“To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear: I cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. ‘You see, Amphiktyons (said I) that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbor!’ I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—‘Here am

I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared, to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods; do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications if you permit these accursed Amphiſſians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring, —They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athene Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.”

Such is the graphic and impressive description, given by Æschines himself some years afterward to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B.C.; on the lofty site of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance, as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphiſſian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to rhetorical exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschines had accused the Amphiſſians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphiſſian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amid such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha. On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed, which the herald

formally proclaimed—That on the morrow at daybreak the whole Delphian population of sixteen years and upward, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes; That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defense of the god and the sacred property; That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition—the Amphiktyons with Æschines placed themselves at the head—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population, with whom a few hours before they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately. None were put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thesalian of Pharsalus named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities—but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Ther-

mopylæ for a future day—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphihtyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B.C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusation preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphisian Lokrians—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the lookout for it; while defense was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with the defense, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphisians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphihtyons to a pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphihtyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines, when accusing the Lokrians—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech—found these Amphihtyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphihtyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion,

thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time and in the same manner as he stated them afterward, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers. So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—"Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war." But his predictions were cried down as illusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival. Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians; a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But further information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized burst of ill-temper from some rude individual. Though Æschines had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective. Both the Senate and the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all

interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. "The Hieromnemones and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part, either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers." This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschines indeed tells us that it was only procured by crafty maneuver on the part of Demosthenes, being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover, Æschines, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens, nor any from Thebes—a fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency toward concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphiſsians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary, states that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those who did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried. The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of the two; for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B.C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Boeotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphiſsians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprise as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterward violated by them, was

at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation, concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. "If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer." The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

At the autumnal meeting, where this fatal measure of calling in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (*Æschines* among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of *Demosthenes* had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. *Æschines* was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of *Demosthenes*, from heading the crusade against *Amphissa*, when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty. What part *Thebes* took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Magnetes, etc. It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and *Æschines* to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B.C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of *Amphissa*. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents, in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he

took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B.C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation. Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his further projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

His march from Thermopylæ, whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Beotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenseless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B.C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to re-establish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium, the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to refortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different, or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her co-operation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof, he claimed of them at least a free passage through Beotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B.C.; yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about co-operation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians—Eubulus—Aristophanes—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans. Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had

ever been accomplished. The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible. To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he dispatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achaean, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic allies who were accompanying his march.

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate that free passage, and a Theban re-enforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first *Olynthiac*) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica. If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but understood as directed toward Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defense of their frontier. Neither their families nor their moveable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or Agis.

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the residing tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at day-break. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands for traders selling merchandise. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for

the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—"Who wishes to speak?" Not a man came forward. He proclaimed the words again and again, yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. "Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorably to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favor, that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion toward Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip's partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents, who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they thing fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honor as well as of policy."

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition. Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home

immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast. According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus. Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendancy over Bœotia. "If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of war."

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the pre-established feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contrast with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban assembly: determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts, with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph: by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivaled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence—though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any reference to the jealousies and animosities of

the past, and on terms even favorable to Thebes, as being more exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them. The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial co-operation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the center of operations was constituted at Thebes.

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendancy to Demosthenes, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes. So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban co-operation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy. But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes. As far

as we can judge, they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia was hostile—or by sea while the Amphiſſians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia, during the autumn and winter of 339–338 B.C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens. To Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of 1000 drachmas. Demosthenes was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March, 338 B.C.

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-Hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B.C. the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in reoccupying and securing their towns. Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii and others, that it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two. These walls were seen, five centuries afterward, by the traveler Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world. Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defense of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main The

ban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August, 338 B.C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia. But respecting the intermediate events we are unfortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubæans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyraans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Corinthians. As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B.C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts. The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March, 338 B.C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace; but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with

means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization after the continued improvements of his twenty years' reign—would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B.C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and further, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphiſſians a large body of 10,000 mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause. It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphiſſa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false dispatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place. The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphiſſians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Charoneia, the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighboring fields. His numbers are stated by Diodorus at 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known. We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians took no part in the war. All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look toward Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their

statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least insured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean. Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defense of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined accept them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace, and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes “became out of his mind” (such is the expression of Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of insuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians; while his youthful son Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and

energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks, while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia." It is further said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks. Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterward, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field; we may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chæroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners. The Theban loss is said also to have been as heavy as the Achean. But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and

disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals, Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterward publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the *Dikastery*. What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Chares—who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenes also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle. The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amid all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly, wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defense. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defense, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled; enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privileges of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthworks, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications. Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habit-

ual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment. Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchers—as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistokles. The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens. By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defenses of the city and of Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Træzen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and collect money, in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defense.

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of the Ægean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defense, listened only to a disgraceful timidity, and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea. Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant-vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from the field of Charoneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites. At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand. According to another account, the demeanor of Philip toward the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing. However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh toward Thebes and lenient toward Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty,

according to Grecian custom, was never refused, and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any further resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power. He put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippizing Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one. The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus and Platea, probably also Thespie and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.

At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers, who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defense which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself. He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion. Among them was Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald, to the same effect, had been previously refused. Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty. At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the 2,000 prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain

Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a further cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions to headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-Hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and *Ægæ*. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians. But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It insured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible.

Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his further progress. Thebes—an inland city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was prostrated by the battle of Chaeroneia, and left without any means of successful defense. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore that—with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favor; of what precise nature we do not know. Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of 2,000 captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens.

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favorable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful. And when the time came for electing a public orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated for the slain at Chaeroneia—he was invested with that solemn duty, not only in preference to Æschines, who was put up in competition, but also to Demades the recent mover of the peace. He was further honored with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it appears that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one of the joint managers of the Theoric Fund, and as member of a Board for purchasing corn; he was also shortly afterward appointed superintendent of the walls and defenses of the city. The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was impeached by Aristogeiton under the *Graphe Paranomon*, for his illegal and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror of the defeat at Chaeroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves, citizenship to metics, and restoration of citizenship to those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occur-

rence of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree; nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed its defense on the true and obvious ground—"The Macedonian arms (he said) darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the battle of Charoneia." The substantive defense was admitted by the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from rhetorical critics.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Boeotia—having constrained Athens to submission and dependent alliance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia, at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading Akarnanians who were opposed to him—Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argæians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; toward Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis. We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised. The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a

maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens. It appears that Samos was still recognized as belonging to them—or at least such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian kleruchs or outsettlers, first established in the island after the conquest by Timotheus in 365 B.C., and afterward re-enforced. For several years afterward, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendancy henceforward disappears.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late to murmur. We cannot wonder at their feelings. Together with the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by Philip and to furnish her quota toward the execution. Moreover, this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B.C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip; who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias. In the spring of 336 B.C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother Alexander of Epirus. This step provoked violent dissensions among

the partisans of the two queens, and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amid the intoxication of the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra, to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath—"Do you then proclaim *me* as a bastard?"—at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander; who retorted—"Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another." After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterward, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander; while the friends of Attalus stood high in favor.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra. His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia, the chief Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to conciliate him still further, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias. For this marriage, celebrated at Ægæ in Macedonia in August, 336 B.C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendor, commemorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra. Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions, among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of Kinyras, etc., with every species of attraction known to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were

carried in solemn procession into the theater; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offense peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out, amid discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man. Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias, but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult)—being of course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king himself, together with her husband and his new wife. That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult his feelings and to insure his succession—lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates is also said to have contributed to

the deed, though seemingly without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an improbable report) by his gold.

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theater, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amid some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralyzed with astonishment and consternation. At length, however, some hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him immediately.

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favor his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhibæus, sons of Aeropus; but it seems that there were others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lynkestis. It was he who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armor, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace.

This "prima vox" was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip's reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias. While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have organized an opposition to Alexander in favor of the infant prince;

which opposition might have had some chances of success, since they had been in favor with the deceased king, and were therefore in possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took them unprepared, and for the moment paralyzed them; while, before they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not wonder, therefore, that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other accomplices, but also promoting him to great honors and important military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side, nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the last of which was done, seemingly through the co-operation of Parmenio (who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas. The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death shortly afterward. Other persons also were slain, of whom I shall speak further in describing the reign of Alexander.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present, the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in the theater, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known. Among the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that one was Olympias.

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty-three years. Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighboring sea-coast. At his death, Macedonian ascendancy was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian, and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognized the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps, with a few rare interruptions; but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable

personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbors and enemies—that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even toward allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose—this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it. Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch of military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense of all his neighbors—the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognized, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalkidike and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one inhabitaney to another.

Besides his skill as a general and politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. The testimony of Æschines as to his effective powers of speaking, though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander, tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatizes not only the perfidy of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian body-guard, 800 in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only Centaurs and Lastrygons. The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost on an Oriental scale; and the dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those

days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's *Hellenica*) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphikrates. How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In council and speech Demosthenes sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia—at Byzantium and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that "public inefficiency," at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschines complains; and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find, during the reign of his son Alexander, the like genius and vigor exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject province.

CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THEBES.

My last preceding chapter ended with the assassination of Philip of Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then twenty years of age.

It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily, indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon, is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependants of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to

concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences, continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not trusted to the word of the Thebans, but insured by the Macedonian garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each Hellenic city, small and great—maritime, inland, and insular—(with the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of Philip.

Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia. Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her conqueror—"Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit." The Macedonians, though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially Hellenized, but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the headship under the declared pretense of satisfying the old antipathy against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic literature) over a large breadth of Asia—opening that territory to the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence, of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their Macedonian masters. In the succeeding chapters will be recorded the unavailing efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the other leaders perished.

Alexander (born in July, 356 B.C.), like his father Philip, was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors, some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of Philip's character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of a barbarian prince, not the ingenium civile, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander's childhood was intrusted. Of course the *Iliad* of Homer

was among the first things which he learned as a boy. Throughout most of his life he retained a strong interest in this poem, a copy of which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike *Odyssey*. Even as a child, he learned to identify himself in sympathy with Achilles—his ancestor by the mother's side, according to the *Æakid* pedigree. The tutor *Lysimachus* won his heart by calling himself *Phoenix*—*Alexander*, *Achilles*—and *Philip*, by the name of *Peleus*. Of Alexander's boyish poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old when the Athenian legation, including both *Æschines* and *Demosthenes*, came to Pella to treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learned, and delivered, inresponse with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the Grecian dramas.

At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose father *Nikomachus* had been both friend and physician of Philip's father *Amyntas*. What course of study Alexander was made to go through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted himself to it with ardor, contracting a strong attachment to his preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his purpose; moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.

At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that once, when quite a youth, he received some Persian envoys during the absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of his demeanor, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of his questions. Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.C. he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in the sieges of *Byzantium* and *Perinthus*. He put down a revolt of the neighboring Thracian tribe called *Mædi*, took one of their towns, and founded it anew under the title of *Alexandria*; the earliest town which bore that name, afterward applied to various other towns planted by him and his successors. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the battle of *Chæroneia*, and is said to have first gained the advantage on his side over the Theban sacred band.

Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and co-operation, other incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and the son. By his wife *Olympias*, Philip had as offspring

Alexander and Kleopatra; by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a son named Aridæus (afterward called Philip Aridæus); he had also daughters named Kynna (or Kynane) and Thessalonike. Olympias, a woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself so odious to him that he repudiated her, and married a new wife named Kleopatra. I have recounted in my ninetieth chapter the indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his son's life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra. Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favor. Her kinsmen and partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.

The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril, up to the very day of Philip's assassination. The succession to the Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house of Macedonia (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary phenomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honorable exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendant; Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command, disqualified him from playing a subordinate part even to his own father. The prudence of Philip when about to depart on his Asiatic expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage festival, then celebrated at Æge, that he was assassinated—Olympias, Kleopatra and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance, jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as much energy and skill as it was afterward prosecuted by Alexander; though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But successful as Philip might have been in

Asia, he would hardly have escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side, feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or quasi-regal competitors.

From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head of Alexander the Great—no one knew what to expect from the young prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden death of Philip in the fullness of glory and ambitious hopes, must have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd assembled—next throughout Macedonia—lastly, upon the foreigners whom he had reduced to dependence from the Danube to the borders of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the powerful organization created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas, the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked as the proper successor.

But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed himself, both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency. He mustered, caressed, and conciliated the divisions of the Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be maintained unimpaired, and that even the Asiatic projects already proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigor as if Philip still lived.

It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained great ascendancy over her son to the end of his life. Three other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices—brothers and persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called Lynkestis—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aeropus. The two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared, and even promoted to important charges as a reward for his useful forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king. Others also, we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have imagined that there still remained some undetected. The Persian king boasted in public letters, with how much truth we cannot say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.

Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the elder brother of the deceased Philip); Amyntas was a boy when his father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna. Nevertheless Alexander now put him to death, on accusation of conspiracy; under what precise circumstances does not appear—but probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip's elder brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterward put to death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus, also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by Hekatæus and Philotas. Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there seem to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas), fled for safety into Asia; probably others who felt themselves to be objects of suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him, were put to death.

By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by dispatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign dependants of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of moving, and the suddenness of Philip's death found them altogether unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any one else, or to abstain from re-electing at all, and even to let the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and in Macedonia, that they had conferred this dignity even on Philip, who had earned it by splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to believe

his rival Æschines), having received private intelligence of the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus, before it was publicly known to others, pretended to have had it revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. He depreciated the abilities of Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have leisure for a foreign march. Such, according to Æschines, was the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip's death. We cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving, in spite of Phokion's opposition, was readily adopted. But though the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian, exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to declare any positive hostility. He tried to open communication with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter to Alexander; while the Persian king, probably relieved by the death of Philip from immediate fear of the Macedonian power, dispatched a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no more money.

Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian states also, the death of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who, though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia. The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city; the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Akarnanian exiles whom he had banished. On the other hand, the Thessalians manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian garrison at Thebes, and the Macedonizing Thebans who now governed that city, were probably the main obstacles to any combined manifestation in favor of Hellenic autonomy.

Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world, Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration immediate, as well as intimidating. His energy and rapidity of proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes. Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible, the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two

months after the death of Philip. He was favorably received by the Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth into Peloponnesus. The details of this march we do not know; but his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The Athenians, recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the votes of their assembly—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls was full both of fugitives and of cattle. At the same time, the assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honors, in terms even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip. The mover, with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian assembly. Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian force, he condemned himself to silence—we cannot say. That he did not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to Athens. We read with astonishment that Æschines and his other enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the conqueror as an expiatory victim, or sent back as a pardoned and humiliated prisoner.

After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus, Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prose-

cuting war against Persia. To the request of a prince at the head of an irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except the Lacedæmonians.

The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince as imperator, or executive head and arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace within Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints; such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary toward the members generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe, and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced, by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous. In each, the existing political constitution was recognized as it stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to second any attack by its hostile exiles. No new despot was to be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored. Each city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible, all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation, spoliation, redivision of land or abolition of debts, factious manumission of slaves, etc. To each was guaranteed freedom of navigation, maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from all. Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbor of any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there. By each, an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any additional city on its subsequent application, though it might not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.

Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as the "public statute of the Greeks," constituting a paramount obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and authorizing him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian world, that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most distant and least danger-

ous, whose headship could hardly be more than nominal, against a neighbor sure to be domineering and compressive, and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity of an isolated independence.

It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys, in procuring new adhesions and in remodeling the governments of various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived. An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes, Hyperides, or one of the contemporary anti Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early summer of 335 B.C.) imparts to us some idea both of the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often repeated. They were always met by Macedonizing Athenians with peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power. In Messene, Sikyon, and Pellene, they had subverted the popular constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public guaranty to enforce the observance of the convention, had been employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the hands of factious partisans. Thus Alexander, in his capacity of Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the separate cities. Even at Athens, this imperial authority had rescinded sentences of the Dikastery, and compelled the adoption of measures contrary to the laws and constitution.

At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the

Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos, where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretenses, in spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, ship-owners, and merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians, addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions, that they passed a decree to equip and dispatch 100 triremes, appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) admiral. By this strenuous manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement would have been given to malcontents against it. Another incident had occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to the Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited armed ships of one city from entering the harbor of another, still a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Peiræus to ask permission that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account. This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as violating the convention, but as a manifest step toward employing the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of the Macedonian navy.

"Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential than scrupulous regard to equity and justice. But the convention itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon. Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed against them nor brought on by your fault. At this juncture, such a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic freedom generally, will not be less opportune and advantageous than it is just. The time is coming for shaking off your disgraceful submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity. If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself directs."

A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the mover a prosecution under the *Graphe Paranomon*. Accordingly, though intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsi-

bility without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment sufficient to give him hopes of a favorable verdict from the *Dikastery*. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold, even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant of the state of feeling in Greece, during the months immediately following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded a theater where public protest could be raised and public sympathy manifested.

It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment that all danger of Asiatic invasion was passed, yet his apprehensions were now revived by Alexander's manifested energy, and by the renewal of the Grecian league under his supremacy. It was apparently during the spring of 335 B.C., that Darius sent money to sustain the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. *Æschines* affirms, and *Deinarchus* afterward repeats (both of them orators hostile to Demosthenes)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300 talents which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own private purse: That public inquiry was afterward instituted on the subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out: at least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius, or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of 335 B.C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against Alexander.

That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received such remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is noway proved that Demosthenes applied the money to his own private purposes. To receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as not only legitimate, but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of another. At this moment, the political interest of Persia coincided with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to

him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against Hellenic enemies—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed her example in doing afterward—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius, at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence than Athens had played hers against Philip.

While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal ascendancy felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward, and north-eastward of Pella—Ilyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians. Under these general names were comprised a number of distinct tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some sensible evidence of his personal energy.

Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis, through the narrow Sappæan pass between Philippi and the sea. In ten days' march he reached the difficult mountain path over which alone he could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan). Here he found a body of the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country assembled to oppose his progress, posted on the high ground with wagons in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their ranks, so as to let the wagons go through freely—or where there was no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with

their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies; so that the wagons, dashing down the steep and coming against the shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the bodies on the space below. All the wagons rolled down without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men killed, and all their women and children made prisoners. The captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the seaports.

Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi; a powerful Thracian tribe—extending (as far as can be determined) from the plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward toward the Danube—whom Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube called Peuke, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of the river Lyginus, about three days' march from the Danube. Being tempted, however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain, but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven horsemen and forty foot slain, according to the statement of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, then one of Alexander's confidential officers, and afterward founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.

Three days' march from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peuke; but his attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes, chiefly horsemen armed with bows, analogous to the Thracians in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river, from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4,000 Getæ, visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and contrived to carry across the river a body of 4,000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, landing on a

part of the bank where there was high standing wheat and no enemy's post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander's army, hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon their poorly fortified town and retire further away from the river. Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to Zeus the Preserver—to Herakles—and to the God Ister (Danube) himself, whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable. On the very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.

The terror spread by Alexander's military operations was so great, that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region westward toward the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander, they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heavens should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly

direction into the territory of the Agrianes and the other Pæonians, between the rivers Strymon and Axios in the highest portion of their course. Here he was met by a body of Agrianes under their prince Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him at Pella before Philip's death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus, son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at Pelion (a strong post south of Lake Lychnidus, on the west side of the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol)—and that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress. He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a point near where it joins the Axios. On approaching Pelion, he found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their sacrifices to the gods; the victims being three boys, three girls, and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying on the spot. Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion, when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry, sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the arrival of Alexander himself with a re-enforcement. In the face of this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or marsh every where around. By a series of bold and skillful maneuvers, and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled the enemy, and brought off his army without loss. Moreover these Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp. Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest, throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced to evacuate

Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the territory of Glaukias.

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the part of the Greeks to Alexander as Emperor, during the preceding autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were well known, even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms. Moreover the energy and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and Ephialtes, who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest force. The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before, the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the Macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens, and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign as well as domestic. A number of Theban citizens, among them the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian leaders. In like manner fifty years before, it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike adventurous, skillful, and heroic, was the model present to the imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable opportunity occurred.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five months, ending at August 335 B.C. Not only was Alexander thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings. Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their dispatches were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished. This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by Demosthenes and Lykurgus, was announced to the Athenian assembly. In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander's defeat and death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign ascendancy, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc., the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested, but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens, immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and money by Demosthenes and other Athenian citizens, and invited by their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms. Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with Timolaus, one of the leading Macedonizing Thebans. They then immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians, and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To this appeal the Thebans cordially

responded. The assembly passed a vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the garrison in the Kadmeia.

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B.C. The Kadmeia was instantly summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harcest had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied. They contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies from within and supplies from without. They then sent envoys in the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others, representing that their recent movement was directed, not against Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage, which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and freemen they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity. They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured both of Alexander's death and of its consequences, before they would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution. Demosthenes further went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance with Antipater, and to send no contingents against Thebes. The Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the isthmus.

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much energy

as she did twelve years afterward during the Lamian war, occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes was not regarded at the time, even by Macedonizing Greeks, as hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterward his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready (Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes (say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes, but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march of the Arcadians. The charge here advanced against Demosthenes appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by Æschines only five years afterward, proves the reports and the feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion, refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against Xerxes and Mardonius.

The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking event of Alexander arriving in person at Onchestus in Bœotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Onchestus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Aeropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi—or even embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learned it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and

Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander's last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downward in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus. He was already within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B.C. against the Phokians.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the news—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach, and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia. The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation, demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix and Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being

convened, the Macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition, contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian remarks) they had gone too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of strong persuasion to the contrary, we see plainly that they had already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans, to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas. Such a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick. He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve. Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas, who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian regiment and the bowmen, carried the first of the two outworks, as well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of Herakles, pursued by the light troops in advance of the rest. Upon these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them

with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however, the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Plateans—had to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward themselves.

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were collected. The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Plateans, Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the ground; that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platea should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been proxeni of the Macedonians: that the Thebans who had escaped should be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from harboring them.

This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a Theban named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar

standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Plataea. Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded 440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of hostility toward the city. Diodorus tells us that this sentence was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had taken part with Alexander; and that the sentence therefore represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Plataeans, etc. Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes for having joined Xerxes against Greece a century and a half before—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction, unparalleled in Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion under the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities, thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy, by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks. But though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came afterward to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow. The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging and provoking the local Gods and heroes. We shall presently find Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium, in order to appease the wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam. By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations of the

offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterward killed Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow him further into India. If Alexander in after days thus repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities. All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief Macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendancy at home. Each tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness for their manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise, that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great festival of Eleusinian Demeter, with its multitudinous procession of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place, at a distance of two days' march from the besieged city. Most Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every one hurried within the walls of Athens, carrying with him his movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica, and under the hurry of preparation for defense, the persons both most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

Shortly afterward, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Poly-euktus, Mærokles, Diotimus, Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia, of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings of the Thebans. This momentous summons, involving the right of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the The-

bans, and the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in the debate. Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting dogs, as a condition of peace—and then devouring the unprotected sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for the purpose of averting public calamity. He added, that he (Phokion) would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if by such sacrifice he could save the city. Lykurgus, one of the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion's advice. By a resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.

On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander, deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them. Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy, headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under Darius.

It was indeed no part of Alexander's plan to undertake a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax,

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander's concessions, thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever, while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the Macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships. To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself, and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case anything should happen to him. Such compliments were suitable to be reported in the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority. Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the isthmus of Corinth, where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth, satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes is said to have replied—"Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine." Both the philosopher and his reply provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character manifested, that he exclaimed—"If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes."

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted from the priestess an answer bearing favorable promise for his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter. The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespie, and Plataea, dividing between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a Macedonian

garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting to learn some details about this process of destruction and restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know anything beyond the general fact.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B.C., and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, of Greek mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitane, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad, compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering the adjoining territory. It is affirmed that Darius was engaged this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military, to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B.C., his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B.C., to his death at Babylon in June 323 B.C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amid unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for further aggrandizement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly grown Oriental empire. During all these

eleven years the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief secretary, Eumenes of Kardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes directly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more by its connection with previous projects, dreams, and legends long antecedent to the aggrandizement of Macedon—as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Phœrean Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-Hellenic pretense of retaliation for the long-past insults of Xerxes. I call it a *pretense*, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalized as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favorable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled

for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general and the Persian king a public enemy.

Hellas, as a political aggregate has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them—"The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments." Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigor, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldierlike qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity—and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring toward one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without

parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect, however, that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenes, addressing the people of Athens in 342 B.C.) has been in advance for some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other's territory, during the four or five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action, winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege batteries.”

I have in several preceding chapters dwelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiery. At Athens, and in most other parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society. Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites. Iphikrates greatly improved and partly rearmed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effectively as to astonish his contemporaries. His innovation was further developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas; who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle-maneuvering, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realized by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms. Such were the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learned and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition of conquest, but even from the necessities of defense,

to turn them to account; and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries afterward.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian *penestæ*): these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites better armed; but foot service was not in honor among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession, they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbors; before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up to the mountains. Their condition was that of poor herdsmen, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating from wooden platters; not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas, the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands. On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterward. These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offense, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found. Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy *Landwehr* of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory neighbors, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the *sarissa*—the Macedonian pike or lance. The *sarissa* was used by both the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regi-

ments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called *Sarissophori* or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavy cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the *xyston* or short pike. The *sarissa* of this cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the *sarissa* or pike constituted the prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files generally of sixteen deep, each called a *Lochus*; with an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the *lochage*, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the *sarissa*, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet was so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence, the *sarissa* of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; those of the fourth and fifth ranks respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press onward the front, did not carry the *sarissa* in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot overhead from the rear ranks of the enemy.

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was further provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a *kausia* or broad-brimmed hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defense as well as of offense. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force, the deep Theban column organized by Epaminondas. This was what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and propulsion

of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Chæronœia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted it mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites.

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the *Pezetæri* or Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special corps d'armée. The largest division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which appears under the command of a general of division, is called a *Taxis*. How many of these *Taxeis* there were in all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: *Orestæ*, *Lynkestæ*, *Elimiotæ*, *Tymphæi*, etc. The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the *Lochus* of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the *Syntagma*, which contained sixteen *Lochi*. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it four supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a herald, and an attendant or orderly. Two of these *Syntagmas* composed a body of 512 men, called a *Pentakosiarchy*, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganized his army at Susa, so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under his *Chiliarch*, and each comprising four *Syntagmas*. All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign

service, no numerical precision could be observed; a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic, perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans.

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers or Guards; originally few in number, and employed for personal defense of the prince—but afterward enlarged into several distinct corps d'armée. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line; they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more. We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next the hypaspists come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches. What was the total number of them we do not know.

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army, as employed by Philip and Alexander, included a numerous assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, etc. They were of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agriænes, a Pæonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or intermingled with his cavalry—as well as for pursuit after the enemy was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander's army was also admirable—at least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his best infantry. I have already mentioned that cavalry was the choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip; by whom it had been extended and improved. The heavy cavalry, wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the denom-

ination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the *Sarissophori*, or Lances, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or scouring the country. The *sarissa* which they carried was probably much shorter than that of the phalanx; but it was long, if compared with the *xyston* or thrusting-pike used by the heavy cavalry for the shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at Arbela, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the Macedonian army at Alexander's accession, is not known. Among the squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular towns or districts of the country—*Bottiaea*, *Amphipolis*, *Apollonia*, *Anthemus*, etc.; there was one or more, distinguished as the *Royal Squadron*—the *Agema* or leading body of cavalry—at the head of which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the actual combatants.

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he remodeled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B.C.) at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two *Lochi*, and to establish the *Lochus* for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry. His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or *Lochus*, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the *Hypaspists* or Guards, also, we find an *Agema* or chosen cohort which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps were, the *Body-Guards*; a small company of tried and confidential men, individually known to Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants or as commanders for special service. These *Body-Guards* appear to have been chosen persons promoted out of the *Royal Youths* or *Pages*; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The *Royal Youths*, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of daily and nightly watch: they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order. The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought

out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander, and to be added to the company at Babylon. At the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself. The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-Guards of Alexander—next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and diversified by Philip, including at his death:—1. The phalanx, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarisso-phori. With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, etc., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, etc., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by organizing what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles, a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign against the Illyrians. Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious and systematized array of actual force, are to be added the civil establishments, the depots, magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and adjutants, etc., indispensable for maintaining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place; at his death, it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent center, war-office, and training quarters, of the greatest military force then known. The military registers as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy. Philip

had employed his life in organizing this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready-made, with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.

This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality except those of soldiiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organize this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still further exalted by the really superhuman career of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship, with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B.C., after the destruction of Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army, with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise, were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of Macedonia during the king's absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage. Alexander overruled these representations, yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra. Of the dependent tribes around, the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquility of Macedonia was intrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still further insured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied

the king's army and person. Though unpopular in his deportment, Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, while she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence, Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigencies and violence.

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abdera and Maroneia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides, made up in large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian cities. The passage of the whole army—infantry, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Eleus at the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hector; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

He then sailed across in the admiral's trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing-place near Ilium called the Harbor of the Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armor, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hector to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athene; and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend, the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam's yet unappeased wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar, for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monu-

mental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked up to it: exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest during life with a faithful friend, and after death with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permanent altars in honor of Zeus, Athene, and Herakles; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and on that of Asia where it had landed.

The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium, are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation which characterized the free Greeks of the city community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks, his warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others of that *Æakid* race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—“*Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis*”—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper, nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much he borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4,500 cavalry, thus distributed:—

INFANTRY.

| | |
|---|--------|
| Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists..... | 12,000 |
| Alies..... | 7,000 |
| Mercenaries..... | 5,000 |
| Under the command of Parmenio..... | 24,000 |
| Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians..... | 5,000 |
| Agrianes and archers..... | 1,000 |
| Total Infantry..... | 30,000 |

CAVALRY.

| | |
|--|-------|
| Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio..... | 1,500 |
| Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas..... | 1,500 |
| Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius..... | 600 |
| Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander..... | 900 |
| Total Cavalry..... | 4,500 |

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4,000 cavalry. Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers, was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Bonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip. Though Plutarch wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him; not to speak of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia; called Orestis; Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Dropides, Parmenio with his two sons Philotas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kænus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus, Meleager, Peukestes, etc., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war, under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater especially, had occupied a high rank.

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenes, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenes, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of

Philip, and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king's life. He conducted most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally intrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike on the part of the Macedonians—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armor-bearer of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment, in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had indulged toward the Macedonians.

Though Alexander had been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagoas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic sea-board. He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip. He further subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus. These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace; that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian

dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B.C., he died poisoned by the eunuch Bagoas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagoas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children: thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Mnemon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagoas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself. In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterward reproached to Darius, the authority of Darius seems to have been recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B.C. 336, when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia, Darius prepared measures of defense at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece. On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander. Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be passed, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia satisfied Darius that the danger was not passed, so that he resumed his preparations for defense. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped; the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the sea-board, was furnished with the means of taking 5,000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events during the nineteen months between Alexander's accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B.C. to March or April 334 B.C.). We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around. The Mace-

donian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitane; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium.

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterward. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rheomithres, Niphates, Petines, etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Bactrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc. In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number, composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in

Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.

Had his plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was further strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burned. Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—"of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country." The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the *Iliad*, and immortalized by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida, near Skepsis, and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth; near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city, situated between Priapus and Parium.

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward toward this position, from Arisbe (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perikote, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermotus; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in ad-

vance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermotus (the fourth day from Arisbe) he marched toward the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six *Taxeis* or divisions, of which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus, Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Melæger, and Kraterus. Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the *hypaspistæ*, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniæ squadron of Companion cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion cavalry, the bowmen and the Agrianian darters, all under Philotas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right. The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus, son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three *Taxeis* or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognized center under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the center, under Arsites and Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes with their divisions. The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence. There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they re-enforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He



VICTORY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT ON THE GRANICUS.

directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the squadrons of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippos) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ. He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry. Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water's edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and center of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility. Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and laid him prostrate on the ground; he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes through the body with his pike. Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigor and success; and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention. He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2,000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry

was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhe-sakes, Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterward by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation. The Persian or Perso Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterward re-assembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander. It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265. If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add further the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2,000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.


After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia there to work as slaves; to which

treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athene in the acropolis with this inscription—"Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedæmonians (*present these offerings*), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia." Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-Hellenic purpose : which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskillfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry; the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterward.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persians of grandees who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atosa, Xerxes, and the Chorus, in the *Persæ* of Æschylus, after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the melee, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects toward Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole sa-



THE TEMPLE OF DIANA.

trapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander's power and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before. He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction toward Sardis—the chief town of Lydia—and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade, which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there was not in Asia any Persian governor of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Masakames and Bages after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions, to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikas, collector of tribute. The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aeropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbor and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrophax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue

of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulcher of Hieropythus the liberator in the agora. Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been dispatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honorable and prudent moderation.

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he dispatched Parmenio with 5,000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian Supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle-array—marched southward toward Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea. He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet, four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus; and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to intrust him with the supreme conduct of

the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince; but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defense of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Lade, which commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4,000 troops across to the island of Lade, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykale. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land operations. This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defense, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping

into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defense, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service. To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of Mykale, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and insure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward of Miletus, toward Karia, and especially toward Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausolus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausolus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still retained some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now in-

vested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep, had been still further strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon; lastly there were two citadels, a fortified harbor with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or north-east of the city, which led toward Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, toward the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter further westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at the same time attempted a night attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by movable pent-houses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch around the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition was successfully prosecuted: notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed, though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city wall, together with two intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles. It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas. These men, elate with wine, rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylæan gate, and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, re-enforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then have been assaulted and taken, had measures been pre-

pared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity, that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main woodwork of one of them, was burned. It was not without difficulty that Philotas and Hellenikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in until Alexander himself appeared with re-enforcements. Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtes.

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtes especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally. He took immediately near him 2,000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtes with his division, marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valor, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades, cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtes,

foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the king's body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city. The loss of the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls, under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that no longer defense of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to the neighboring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of Kos. Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good garrisons well provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands. He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3,000 men to guard it.

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage wagons to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow. One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation. On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city, Phaselis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them by the neighboring Pisidian

mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulcher of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektes.

After this brief halt at Phaselis Alexander directed his course to Perge in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, called Klimax, under the mountains by the brink of the sea. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near, the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists. From Perge he marched on to Side, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to buy off by promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Side, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault; which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defense. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Perge; from whence he directed his course toward the greater Phrygia, through the difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000 Karians and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day. Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ, and left there Antigonus (afterward the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was concluded.

APPENDIX.

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.

THE statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and fourteen cubits, as adapted to actual practice"—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν μέγεθος ἐστὶ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκαταίδεκα πηγῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀριουργίαν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσαρίων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς τεσσαρὰς ἀφαιρεῖ το μεταξὺ ταῖν χειρῶν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατοπινὸν σῆκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean, that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later Tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 11) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen *feet* in length—not sixteen *cubits*. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual service was sixteen cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only fourteen cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read *cubits* where we ought to have read *feet*—it will follow that the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be fourteen *feet*, not sixteen *feet*. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him (ἡμιχάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐλάχιστον πρὸς πόδας κατ' ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Further, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of *cubits*, really meant *feet*: because (cap. 12) he speaks of *three feet* as the interval between each rank in the file, and these *three feet* are clearly made equal to *two cubits*. His computation will not come right if in place of *cubits* you substitute *feet*.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it; that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Mace-

donian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might, indeed, be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of. So Livy **xxxi.** 39, "Erant pleraque silvestria circa, incommoda phalaugi maxime Macedonum; quæ, nisi ubi *prælongis* hastis velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo opus est) nullius admodum usus est." Compare also Livy, **xliv.** 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find, "Si carptim aggreddiendo, circumagere *immobitem longitudine et gravitate hastam* cogas, confusa strue implicatur;" also **xxxiii.** 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike *fifteen cubits* long, together with a short sword: he does not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynæki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (*ευστόν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυνακαίει κοσίπηχυν*, Iliad, xv. 678). The spear of Hector is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad, vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading is not settled, whether *ἔγχεος ἔχ' ἐνδεκάπηχυν*, or *ἔγχεος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυν*.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men-at-arms: they were irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike—Machiavelli says of them (Ritratti dell' Alemagna, Opere, t. iv. p. 159; and Dell' Arte della Guerra, p. 232-236), "Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non è possibile entrare tra loro, nè accostarseli, quanto è la picca lunga. Sono ottime genti in campagna, a far giornata: ma per espugnare terre non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l'ordine loro della milizia non vagliano."

CHAPTER XCIII

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER—BATTLE OF ISSUS—SIEGE OF TYRE.

It was about February or March 333 B.C., when Alexander reached Gordium, where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There

was preserved in the citadel an ancient wagon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the Gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibers from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this wagon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief which the Gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the *Ægean* (during the first half of 333 B.C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phœnician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference, declared in his favor; while Mitylene, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column record-

ing alliance with him should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomedes, and established a returned exile named Diogenes as despot. Such breach of faith was ill-calculated to assist the further extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement. But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon, lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet, and to employ the undivided land-force for further inland conquest.

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in. Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men—by others as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and

language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea had come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Kardakes, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the plain of Doriskus, by piling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession. Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance—accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength—the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a God on earth, certain to trample down all before—just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes, and by stronger reason Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus; who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed toward Xerxes), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all

were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still further exasperated by the clamors of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian) the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defense as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defense (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time dispatched Thymodes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served abroad, to be incorporated with the main Persian army. Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterward proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defense against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defense offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with re-enforcements to the number of 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians. As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) toward Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing further, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap.

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward toward Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render

the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travelers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army. Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon, who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and great indeed was his astonishment to discover that the habitual recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast, was shut in by precipitous rocks on each side. Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsames, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander, the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost insuperable barrier without the loss of a man. On the ensuing day he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsames.

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended. Either from excessive fatigue, or from bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river Kydnus, he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was despaired of. Amid the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer remedies, from fear of being held responsible for what threatened to be a fatal result. One alone among them, an Akarnanian named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of the physician were such as completely to reas-

sure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door; but after a certain interval, its healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army. A reasonable time sufficed to restore him to his former health and vigor.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army, for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus, were found guarded, but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time, Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philotas, being sent by a more direct route across the Aleian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphilochus as patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilochus, exempted Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus, about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favorable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander, well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and

wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels. A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross. Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward toward them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so. At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic counselors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack.

Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymodes indeed, and other intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councilors as traitorous. Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia. To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible. Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia. Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms. He then marched forward—along the same road by the shore of the gulf which had already been followed by Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.


The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he that he refused to believe the news until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent northward along the coast of the gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favorable auspices under which a battle would now take place. His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles. By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak

northward toward Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so confined as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Konus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or somewhat more than one English mile and a half. From fear of being out-flanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio.

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry, to insure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river. He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the center, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the center of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering



THE BATTLE OF ISSUS. (FRESCO IN POMPEII).

detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or *sarrissophori*, as well as the light infantry, *Præonians* and archers, to the front of his right. The *Agrianians*, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to out-flank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the *Agrianians* to attack them, and to drive them further away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the *Agrianians* and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the *Pinarus* to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, *hypaspists*, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the *Kardakes* or *Asiatic* hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these *Kardakes* scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the center, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives. He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the center of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the *Asiatic* hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of

Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the center and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left center (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.

Meanwhile on the Persian right, toward the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the *right* flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives were prodigious. Amid so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; inasmuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it. The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of

3,000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees—Arsames, Rheomithres, and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakes, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander's order with the utmost consideration and respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia. Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behavior to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought it necessary to contradict in a letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius managed to get together 4,000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defense after the battle, consisted of 8,000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymodes. These men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly toward the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest, to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus and from thence to Egypt. With this single exception, the enor-

mous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or re-form, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterward. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, reappearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no further resistance to Alexander, during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, toward the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground, unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defense, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish; nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him. But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skillful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect. Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal

courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia, was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios, as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates to Halikarnassus. It appears, however, that he afterward went to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians. On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the period of the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Kœle-Syria to the Phœnician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy. There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury, belonging to the court and the grandees. Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Da-

rius—the daughter of Darius's brother Oxarthes—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsine, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of that name. The captive Iphikrates, not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterward from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former chapter that the elder Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia, as the saviour of their throne. Probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either toward Athens or toward the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism. The father, a distinguished officer moving amid a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the *Ægean*; but his son Strato, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach. Their sentiments were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceeding which (about eighteen

years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus. Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius further attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defense. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—everything short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretense. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis) which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their

ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one toward the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward toward Tyre; the most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded. In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle. The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Per-

sians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders. They added that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Palatyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than their own. Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish willfulness, have not fully considered how much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle array. We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken. The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was, in fact, hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without necessity of besieging the town. The great value of the Phœnician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea. Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest was still undecided. Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy, and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland; the channel between the two being shallow toward the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest por-

tion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height of not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base. Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions and other things essential to defense.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of Alexander as he then stood; they might have held out successfully, for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phœnician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the *Ægean* under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phœnician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen, if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the *Ægean*, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phœnician cities—next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defense of his own city; the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did) had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phœnician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies, though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were further encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet, the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole 200 feet broad, reaching across the half mile of channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he had

stones in abundance from Paketyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts, the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city wall, when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt, the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places, and a large part of the structure came to pieces.

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in front, and for better defense against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus, therefore, to reconstruct the mole and build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phenician towns—Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus—now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long afterward, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war. He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part, and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled; since, by successful operations on land, he had conquered and brought into his power a superior fleet.

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put

himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard. On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4,000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation, having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, toward Sidon, by the Cyprians; that on the south, toward Egypt, by the Phenicians.

From this time forward the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls; movable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet, though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander's engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side toward Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one, and Admetus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admetus rushed forward with their respective storming parties. Admetus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shel-

ter in the temple of Herakles were spared by Alexander, from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror. But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2,000 of them who survived either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander. The females, the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that God, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400, which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.

Toward the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into further peril."—"So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect:—"I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I *shall* marry her—whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship." Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language toward them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander

marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any further expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold; and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the *Ægean*, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail. During the summer of 332 B.C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and insured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3,000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterward, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbor and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylene, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2,000 men: who, however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on the condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.

These successes were in full progress when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defense was derived from the deep sand immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza.

The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breast-plate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands. During the treatment of his wound he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea, and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad; the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still further breaching of the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted with unabated spirit to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonnatus and Philotas into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labor, and undergone so many repulses before he suc-

ceeded, that the palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to the multitude of victors. Too such disappointment which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk, received a severe wound, besides his narrow escape from the dagger of the pretended Arabian deserter. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover still further exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2,000 surviving combatants; here to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amid the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army. Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the *Iliad* as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine months, were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days' march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet under the command of Hephaestion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him. He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap, Mazakes, surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here

Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanopus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareotis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city. Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian. It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which, however, the founder never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place between the sea and the Lake Mareotis, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareotis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior. As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by the intendant Kleomenes, transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town of Kanopus, and probably of other towns besides.

Alexandria became afterward the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all around the Ægean, and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or

five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career. He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Herakles to find a worthy prototype. Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous—was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favor of the gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kalisthenes, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterward, announces his positive conviction that there was divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details. The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander as being the son of the god, and further assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honors to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was further confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus. Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with skeptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his empire. But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philotas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king, in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of humanity,

appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found reappearing hereafter.

The last month of Alexander's stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the permanent administration of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots of the various Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent to Elephantine in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death. Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burned alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus. In addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles, and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honor to the son of Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of choregus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior. He had already sent forward a detachment to Thapsakus, the usual ford of the Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3,000 men, 2,000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius. But this march (as

we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in retreating had taken a north-easterly direction toward the upper part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing. A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone, than in what they actually did.

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favored the Greeks, and Selene the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian

exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost, and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander. Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigor.

But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition of one who had given hostages for good behavior to his enemy. The Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet. Bound by the like chains himself, toward one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

The conduct of Alexander toward the regal hostages honorable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation. It was essential that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris; to him also, it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfor-

tune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus. Contingents arrived from the furthest extremities of the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian Sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbela—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or headquarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighborhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumodus, about thirty miles west of Arbela, toward the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient. There seemed everything in the ground to favor the operation, both of the vast total and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbela might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 scythed chariots, and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat, together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen. He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together with three

sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbela, where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river Lykus of Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachoti, under command of Barsaentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating,—the Susians, under Oxathres,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrathaphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the center, with the choice troops of the army near and around him—the Persian select horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians—inhabitants of Sittake down to the Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the center.

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade, and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith. Though most of them pronounced for the af-

firmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position which they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitered. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment. He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitering both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night, and since their camp had no defense. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could, Darius fairly and in open daylight. Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7,000 horse, in two lines. The first or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philotas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the *Agema* or chosen band of the *Hypaspistæ*—then the remaining *Hypaspistæ*, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kænus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively. Next on the left of the phalanx, were arranged the allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the *Pæonians*, under Aretes and Aristo—half the *Agrianes*, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brison—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the

rigad, azad under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters, under Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and the baggage.

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry. He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any further movement in this direction, the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length, however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to bear down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave

orders to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly silent, to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace; at the same time directing Aretes with the Pæonians to repel the assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned toward the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight toward the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack. They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate, and it might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, etc., were here posted,—had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbela. Darius, who had been long in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy on the neighboring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops, pressing toward and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood. The sight and hearing of this terrific *mêlée*, combined with the prestige already attaching to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight.

From this moment the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king's flight, followed of course immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither center of command, nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers of his army, being those immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front, were obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During

the same time, Arctes with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank, so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amid this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed. It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and center, the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots (which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack them on their left flank. Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander. Hence there arose a gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage. At first this movement was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander. But while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who, though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain, the rest got off as they could.

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigor in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other hand, sui-

mated by the turn of fortune in their favor, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy, and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succors from Alexander reached him.

In conducting those succors, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides, contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part. The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the passage of the river Lykus; where he was obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as could follow him, to Arbela, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached Arbela the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of wounded. The estimate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that

the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed at the battle of Arbela. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again mustered in mass.

The defeat of Arbela was in fact the death-blow of the Persian empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe, that the defeat of Arbela, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythe chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingencies. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no

account his vast real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldaean priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander. The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great; sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry. But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents (=about £11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics; the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have preserved both his life and his crown.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amid the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldaean priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be rebuilt. Treating the Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took with him 3,000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus. The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At

Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages. The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east toward Persis proper, the ancient heart or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued. Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygamis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still worse—called the Susian or Persian gates, in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the center of Persis proper. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides, from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise

as impracticable, was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On further inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter, and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses, yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defense, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison, fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulcher of Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors even by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority. Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes,

with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing and cattle.

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes a century and a half before. He was now amid the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus to the *Ægean*. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbātāna, were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in the country. After appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver (= £27,600,000 sterling)—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules, with 5,000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ekbātāna. Six thousand

talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added to the spoil. The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the license of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain, the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves, much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occasional bloodshed. As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2,000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis and Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division traversed the interior of Persis proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages. The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of 3,000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridates, who had surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbela after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer. He calculated that once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

FROM this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 344, B. C. to March 330, B. C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial scepter. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined a century and a half before to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing. Toward the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings—who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler, too, the ablest general, the most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance.

To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbela.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbela to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana, the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren east. As soon as he learned that Alexander was in movement toward him, he sent forward his harem and baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7,000 talents = £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian gates into the territory of Parthyene. His only chance was to escape to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been further prolonged, partly by necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Paratakeni, partly by rumors exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal depot; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6,000 or 7,000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents, = £41,400,000, sterling. Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6,000 Grecian mercenaries, who had marched from Ililikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessulian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been

serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home. He distributed among them the sum of 2,000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defense chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now, therefore, for the first time established a regular *Taxis*, or division of horse-bowmen.

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus, toward Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learned that Darius had already passed the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day's march on the other side of them he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibelus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.

The conspirators by whom this had been done were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Barsantes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organize an

energetic resistance, under their own joint command for the defense of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire. Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri, bordering on Hyrkania toward the Caspian Sea.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanes had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet, learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined, however, that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name

would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight. His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words, wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the great king as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all further resistance in the extensive and imperfectly-known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror, who was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand, therefore, that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried, with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchers of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendor to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a

defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence toward him than his conqueror, for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus, in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighboring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius. In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure allowed, were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions, by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardor of all. His first march was across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes, together with Nabarzanes, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favorably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be dispatched to conduct them to him in safety. The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly

borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz, a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats—overcame them, when they stood on their defense, with great slaughter—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinope, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinope to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic syndol. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece, and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received. Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia, submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly east toward Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria. His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seistan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having sought safety among some of the Indians.

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern

satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depot and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before; the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalas-tra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice. Nikomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, everything rested on the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose freespoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity,—coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigone, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradates, was afterward taken amid the spoils of Damascus by the Macedo-

nians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigone, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communication of a treacherous mistress. Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigone—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendancy of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanor, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers. But whatever may have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents—his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancor. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual. In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled

sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused. They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defense, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was noway connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—whom there was, as yet, nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the

cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles. All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted, cruel in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used toward Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depot at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or *aide de camp*, of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king's presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important dispatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse. Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he

delivered his dispatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in persual, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs or reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio's body. Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancor worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services. When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favor and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions. Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army. Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one, and Kleitus to that of the other.

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing

Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seistan, Afghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelar on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation. Near the southern termination of one of the ~~passes~~ of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul, he founded a new city, called Alexandria at Caucasum, where he planted 7,000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists. Toward the close of winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarcely any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos, he marched northward toward the river Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen. Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favorable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenes and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader. They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretense he had first arrested, and afterward slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra—where we shall again hear of him.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near

Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dishellenized, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor anything except solitude and sterility. Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the god. The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidae the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3,000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years before.

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next to the river Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia and Europe. In his march, he left garrisons in various towns, but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterward on a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them, at the

head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in sealing and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three-fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg. But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity. He was however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigor and celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighboring Sogdian towns (founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterward. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around. An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhoea which endangered his life. This chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

Shortly afterward, a Macedonian detachment, unskillfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region near the river Polytimetus (the Konik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops. Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amid a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this

condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians. Mutilation was a practise altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is toward his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king's person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity. For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrines, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favor and promotion.

The rude, but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the neighborhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the presence of Spitamenes as a leader. Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns, in convenient places. After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lanike, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If therefore there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's past achievements. They exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Herakles, which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit

for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods. The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amid a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands; whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganized, and had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the course language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offense to Alexander; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand toward Alexander, he exclaimed: "Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus.

Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor toward the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humor to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio."

No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Kleitus and Lanike with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder. His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order. The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening

perversion intentionally brought on by the god Dionysus to **avenge** the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld. Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without. Kallisthenes the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offense rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects, justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days, Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenes, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses held by a native chief named Sisymithres, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force. The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitamenes, and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.

After a short rest at Nautaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the Baktrian chief Oxyartes; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife. He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighboring territory Paratakene, where there was another inex-

pugnable site called the Rock of Chorienes, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakene, he himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amid the repose and festivities connected with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject; but a manœuver was concerted, with his privity, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Herakles. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine honors from the Macedonians; who (he said) would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favorable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banquetting hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Kallisthenes of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenes had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned toward the

composition of history—and to the history of recent times. Alexander, full of ardor for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men of letters; there were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds he invited several of them to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favor for Stageira. Kallisthenes had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits, which certainly reached to the battle of Arbela, and may perhaps have gone down further. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him out as the chosen favorite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. In so far as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander himself had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as toward a god.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequences; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgment; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander's reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of *his* history. Of personal vanity,—a common quality among literary Greeks,—Kallisthenes probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that *his* character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offense to Alexander during the earlier years; nor would it have given offense now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Kallisthenes had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed toward Alexander; and Hephæstion

afterward alleged, that he had promised to comply. But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived the most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the highest honors compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a god would be both an injury to him and an offense to the gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.

Kallisthenes here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all further discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenes, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him for the purpose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes."

Kallisthenes was imprudent, and even blamable, in making this last observation, which, without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offense already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look simply to his own personal safety, in standing forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honors to that prince and in thus creating the main offense which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabby preconcerted maneuver, affected to leave to the free decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honor by entering public protest against it; more espe-

cally since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms noway insulting, but full of respectful admiration toward Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone; for the Macedonian officers would feel indifference if not contempt, toward a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while toward Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenes. Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless such is his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenes for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition. He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenes would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offense) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenes was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest against it was both reasonable and dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Kallisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognize it in the altered demeanor of Alexander toward him. He was, from that day, a marked man in two senses; first to Alexander himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretense such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not long wanting.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenes, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages,—the band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages and deprived him of his horse. Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge. He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were

all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulcation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Charikles, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Charikles, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture; under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Kallisthenes—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required. As yet, there was not a shadow of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves; but against Kallisthenes they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch.

Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterward, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions — "The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbor in their cities conspirators against me." The sophist Kallisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle, who is there designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes; hatred toward that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Kallisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged. His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas with a large force of 10,000 foot and 3,500 horse, to keep these intractable territories in subjugation. His march over the mountains occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxiles, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, toward the territory called Peukelaotis (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered, after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaotis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of thirty days.

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, etc., except perhaps

the remarkable rock of Aornos, near the Indus—can be more exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads. But their defense was conducted with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very superior arms, offensive as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Herakles—and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amid all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers, before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B.C. It is presumed, probably enough, that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers. His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole neighboring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippos as satrap, with a garrison and depot at Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skillfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only pre-

served by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing. Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus. Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved toward Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendor and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent.

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods, and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes, where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern bank, and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favorite horse, who died here of age and fatigue. Leaving Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction toward the river Akesines (Chenab). His recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, submitted and were placed under the dominion of Porus; while embassies of submission were also received from two considerable princes—Abisares, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesines, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotes or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesines, was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility. Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of wagons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by night, but the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighboring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sagala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present, with a contingent of 5,000 Indians.

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march, extending to a still greater river called the Ganges, beyond which dwelt the Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants. The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardor. He gave orders for the crossing. But here, for the first time, his army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness; murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not whither. They had already overpassed the limits where Dionysus and Herakles were said to have stopped: they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment; the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced. Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavoring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own. But he entirely failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods; and gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the gods, with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then, having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotes and Akesines, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage. The

heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the Hydaspes.

On coming back to this river Alexander received a large re-enforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of medicines. Had these re-enforcements reached him on the Hyphasis, it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his further advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes, and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2,000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage. Kraterus marched with one division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephaestion on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the river to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesines—with the Hydraotes—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring in one united stream into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months, from November 326 B.C. to August 325 B.C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked, to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation against the common invader. Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigor, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns. There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already driven out and forced to retire to the citadel. Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander himself being among the foremost, with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted up a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestes and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel, and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He received, however, a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting when his soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took the place. Every person within—man, woman and child—was slain.

The wound of Alexander was so severe that he was at first reported to be dead, to the great consternation and distress of the army.

However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at the point of junction between the Hydraotes (Ravee) and Akesines (Chenab). His voyage down the river, though delayed by the cure of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesines (Punjuud) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation. Having no further occasion now for so large a land-force, he sent a large portion of it under Kraterus westward (seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania. He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided, and he then sailed with a portion of his fleet down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm.

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of the Tigris; a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity. Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and afterward through the deserts of Gedrosia. Pura, the principal town of the Gedrosians, was sixty days' march from the boundary of the Oritæ.

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings; their march being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of food, and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle, from thirst, fatigue, and disease, was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number. At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned; several of his comrades were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress in Gedrosia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus, who had brought the fleet round from

the mouth of the Indus to the harbor called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians, and the Ichthyophagi. Nearchus, highly commended and honored, was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road, though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter season; but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain. Orsines, satrap of Persis, was, however, accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander; in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favorite eunuch Bagoas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsines to be hanged; naming as satrap Peukestes, whose favor was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the Malli—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language, more completely than any other Macedonian.

It was about February, in 324 B.C., that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris. It is probable that the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the separation in Karmania.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one; nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of

their vast empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return; an anticipation no way unreasonable, since his own impulse toward forward march was so insatiate, that he was only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrosia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia. Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of violence toward individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in, to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigor, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death. Among those executed, were Abrites, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathres; the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a sarissa—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst of exasperated temper. He also dispatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay. This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers. Serious alarm was felt among all the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenes in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian cos-

tume and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana in Baktria; he next took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them. He made presents besides to all those Macedonians who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favorites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally toward these Asiatic marriages, Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment; a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained toward him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp, and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents—according to Arrian, to not less than 20,000 talents or £4,600,000 sterling.

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with fictitious debts. A new mortification moreover was in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, etc.—contingents of young and fresh native troops amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India, Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organize an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly dispatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen. Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great sat-

isfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most honorable service in the army; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military organization was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans; a change evident enough to them as well as to him.

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east side of Susa) he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris and then sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the army, marched by land in concert with his voyage and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who were unfit for service, either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside, as worn out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favor of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the common labors, hardships, wounds and perils. Reproaching them as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in his character—Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his immedi-

ate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no further orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications, they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learned that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with the chief military commands, distributing the newly-arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander's pardon. Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian prophets, the Persian magi, and all the guests present, united in prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire, between the two nations.

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life; carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a re-enforcement of troops. Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organizing a land force half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition toward his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both nautical exploration and aggrandizement from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He dispatched orders to the Phœnician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus on the Euphrates, whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he di-

rected the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous harbor in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks of the celebrated breed called Nisæan horses—now greatly reduced in number. On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his personal favorite, Hephæstion,—and his secretary, Eumenes, the most able, dexterous, and long sighted man in his service. Eumenes, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion: Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenes, but much with Hephæstion. During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were further enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amid these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigor of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theater; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles mourning for Patroklos, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighboring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship toward the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenes set the

example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendor of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries. At length he roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting. Between Media and Persia, dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amid a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Iiephæstion.

Not long afterward, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon; but in slow marches, further retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Libya—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power. But there were other names yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls, from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles. It was remarked that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god. The proofs which Alexander received, even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favor, were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him soon after he crossed the Tigris,

that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard. The ships of cypresswood, and the large docks, which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land force and naval force co-operating. From various naval officers, who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf, and now made their reports, he learned, that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia,—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable. But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offense that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phenicia.

Amid preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings, for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat further down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes, together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on his head, and the regal diadem above it, he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a convenient spot.

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large re-enforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas from Lydia and Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestes the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these

files was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike or sarissa wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man, being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and attested valor—and those second and third in the file, as well as the rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained the first three ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man; so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two other chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the rear. In this Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting pikes, instead of five, which the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military force.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The order was actually given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to fulfill. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded with costly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to produce at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous. The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000. sterling. Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honor he might properly and piously show to his departed friend. The answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be worshiped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle. He further directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honor of Hephæstion, at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia, and probably in other cities also.

Respecting the honors intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he addressed to Kleomenes the satrap of Egypt a dispatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenes

was among the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal dispatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret in the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus: "If coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad treatment from me." This dispatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrongdoings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations toward the gods, and personal attachment toward friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigor as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephæstion, fell more and more into discredit; while his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian re-enforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests, Alexander had been persuaded to distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander presided in person at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet further drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks *Komus* or *Revelry*. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night in the like unmeasured indulgence. It appears that he already had the seeds of a fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedi-



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tion, and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would sail on the fifth day. In the evening he was carried on a couch across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the second of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, "*To the strongest*;" one of his last acts was to take the signet ring from his finger, and hand it to Perdikkas.

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy; Alexander knew them and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could; but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he expired—June 323 B.C.—after a life of thirty-two years and eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the

plenitude of health, vigor, and aspirations, was an event impressive as well as important in the highest possible degree, to his contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the orator Demades exclaimed—"It cannot be true: if Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelled of his carcass." This coarse, but emphatic comparison, illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future. The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chæronœia, from an embarrassed secondary state into the first of all known powers, had excited the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip's organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the King of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Cræsus; the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Æschines expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius)—"What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself in public epistles master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not *he* now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?"

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B.C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet further. He had mastered, in defiance of

fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxes, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome; two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests. His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and, what was still more important, his appetite for further conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known; and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat or fatigue. The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army the same cannot be said of Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defense and for close combat.

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. Amid constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organizer, and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent, methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athene. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amid tribes of utter strangers we perceive that not only those who stand on their defense, but also those who abandon their property, and flee to the mountains are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly favorable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent; while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the Pillars of Herakles, were consigned in the orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus. Italy, Gaul and Spain, would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Bactria by the Chorasmian prince, Pharasmanes, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus Maeotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus. There remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused

to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more: "You are a man like all of us, Alexander (said the naked Indian to him)—except that you abandon your home like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others." Now, how an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior advantages to subjects it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march—would occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and army-levying system, under Macedonians in large proportion, as his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to reappoint Persian *grands* (putting their armed force however under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required. In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control. Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in

my opinion, for prejudices still worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common scepter to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach, according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandes, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse. Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority. It is rash to speculate on unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favorable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of impulse, unmeasured self-will, and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind—is, in my judgment, an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice, but even to hate him bitterly. Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader, or president, or limited chief—and to the barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master; a distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by England in the American colonies and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free

civil polity upon which the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognized no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike—not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favor of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle toward the Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-colored than even the army of Xerxes, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power toward the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkansians, Arachosians, and Sogdians. But Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia. So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow from the list of foundations really established by his successors. Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly all were planted among the remote, warlike and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army, but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army, while active military operations were still going on, and while further advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks, whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away in mutiny immediately on the news of his death. Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty. But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The ab-

vorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the east, west, south, and north; the cities which he planted were established, for the most part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate; and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realized.

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military ascendancy which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonos, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, etc.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalizing their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the Jaxartes and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new Hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became more and more calamitous—besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian military organization, discipline, and administration, were maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Antiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B.C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself.

When it is said, however, that Asia became hellenized under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of autonomy—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, nor even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the overruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of

his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not Hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference, as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and Alexander; an elaborate scheme of discipline and maneuvering, which could not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achaemenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidae and the other contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located here, often brought by compulsion from neighboring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a center of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighborhood; all together, they were the main Hellenic, or quasi-Hellenic, element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalized. Their feelings, judgments, and habits of action, ceased to be Hellenic. Polybius, when he

visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-Hellenic population, whom he considered worthless. Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed with the Hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Sokrates.

Thus much is necessary, in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the Hellenic population, but upon Hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes, and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Herakles. He had intended to found a new maritime city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean, and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth

of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes; yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800 talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches. These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem toward him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. The intellectual turn of Alexander was toward literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the *Iliad* especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestes and the histories of Phlistus.

CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

EVEN in 334 B.C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander's purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle

in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are "in the hands of the king." A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city—"the streets and fountains which we are whitening," to use a phrase of Demosthenes—the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

During the winter of 334–333 B.C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean, and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him further westward in Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenes and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B.C., to March or April 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defense, without the least attempt to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no

demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison. Moreover, besides that garrison, the Boeotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands. In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

At Athens the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenes or Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens. For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him further as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally. There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his

advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible and poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.

It deserves particular notice, that though the Macedonizing policy was now decidedly in the ascendant—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples,—enlarged or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people. The main cause of his first hold upon the public mind, was his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very significant fact. The indictment against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry made of it before the death of Philip—which event occurred in August 336 B.C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330, B.C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the Macedonizers seemed in full triumph he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it

requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens. It seems, however, that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offense to Alexander between 334 and 330 B.C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband, Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B.C. This assertion of Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise. In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king, Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans,—had afterward withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Messapians. He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athene, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription that they were dedicated “by Alexander and the Greeks, *excepting the Lacedæmonians.*” Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Toward the close of summer 333 B.C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus. At that moment, they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander at Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterward went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B.C. At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Ægean had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recov-

ered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

In October 331 B.C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander's force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement during the spring of 330 B.C., must have been obviously hopeless, and even insane. Yet it was just then that king Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia, and therefore incurred little additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small bands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tanarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia. An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the limits of the habitable world. Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared to attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellene), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demades, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution. Even Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recom-

mend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy. Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3,500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war. But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy. We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterward, at Baktra; what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown stands higher, only because the banner which he upheld ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece; which will

appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the Macedonizing statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterward, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and dishonoring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defense of Demosthenes, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337–336 B.C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the (*probouleuma*) preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterward, that Æschines attacked the proposition under the *Graphe Paranomon*, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations. More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honor upon Demosthenes, and had been indicted under the *Graphe Paranomon*; but with such signal ill-success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the *Dikasts*, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the *Graphe Paranomon*), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went

against him, stand publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B.C., when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes with several other citizens.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also. Amid the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still further, Æschines could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenes, and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341–340 B.C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following. Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too indis-

putable. *Æschines* even makes this a part of his case; arraiging the traitorous mismanagement of *Demosthenes* as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment on no better plea than a series of public calamities. Having thus animadverted on the conduct of *Demosthenes* prior to the battle of *Chæroneia*, *Æschines* proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that *Demosthenes* cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to *Alexander*, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the earliest was, when *Alexander* first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of *Issus*; the third, during the flush of success obtained by *Agis* in *Peloponnesus*. On none of these occasions did *Demosthenes* call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to *Æschines*) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last mentioned charges advanced by *Æschines*, there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of *Demosthenes*. The victorious career of *Alexander*, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by *Æschines*, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against *Demosthenes*, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operation. Partly for this reason, probably, *Demosthenes* does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about *Alexander*. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of *Philip*. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of *Philip*, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandize *Philip*, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.

I shall not here touch upon the *Demosthenic* speech *De Corona* in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work belongs as a portion of Grecian history, a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been

recounted in my preceding chapters. Demosthenes here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B.C. (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defense of his whole public life, he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip's aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it, in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B.C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in that event against the charges of Æschines, who he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate in a former chapter. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chaeroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple vindication. He reasserts this policy as matter of pride and honor, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-Hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Plataea and Salamis. To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonor.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chaeroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action of every Greek city, as well as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force, there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chaeroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since

thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of temper in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pal-Hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amid the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one-fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.

We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his own defense—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self praise, and contemptuous bitterness toward his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demos-

thenes must have received a public coronation. In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterward, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, *De Corona*. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. "What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!"—exclaimed Æschines.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B.C. to January 324 B.C.) during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander's march into Bactria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in Lakonia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B.C.) that Harpalus, the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5,000 soldiers. While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionike and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory: one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria. To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship. Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionike, with a large remittance of money for the purpose. The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the goodwill of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it

convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B.C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satyric drama called *Agén*, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B.C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander's mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person. But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was instructed to adopt precautions for defense of the harbor. But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told, to upward of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation. To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperides, an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for believing that,

at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset. Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered. The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands. Now it was Demosthenes who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money; whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound. Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its mag-

nitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise, and outcry were excited. It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and Hyperides both included.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married. At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6,000 golden staters—and other citizens with different sums attached to their names. Upon this report, ten public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens, who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Træzen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander. What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demades—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents, but how their trial ended, does not appear.

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian

antiquity—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defense, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him, so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them, there are several which go to show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterward, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woolen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice, upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring. So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been disabled by sore-throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate. But that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true, for we know from his accusers, Deinarchus and Hyperides, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes as having, from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects. Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred and probably the best Athenians of all parties were desirous of favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. In so far as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes, and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the per-

sons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.

The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two accusers, that he received money *from* Harpalus, is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge.

Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged, in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis, a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer, and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof—and in my judgment no probability—that Demosthenes was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above £80,000—not in banknotes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetra-drachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burden up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence, from the remaining inscriptions, that the details of transferring and verifying the public property at Athens were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought, and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guaranty for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his speech—“*You* told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now *you* produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenes could learn it only from them, and it

might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given, but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus, which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them was chargeable. It appears to have been made *ex-parte*, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defense, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.

One further consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled; receiving from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiades, took a leading part in the management of the war, and perished on its disastrous termination along with his accuser, Hyperides.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients. Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment

turned—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming. It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party discussions as in investigating facts; that dissident parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties; with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party intrigues within.

During the half year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least of

considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nikanor to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: "King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities. We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord."

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders further, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian cities; and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the Hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order. It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theory or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.

In the winter or early spring of 323 B.C. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them, but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect. There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (322 B.C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tanarus; where Leosthenes, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of

them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Ætolians. Of the money, said to be 5,000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

Such was the general position of affairs when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B.C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus: Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbors.

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a warlike feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans. The rich men for the most part took the side of Phokion; but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent around to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation. Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals. But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tanarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward toward Thermopyke and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænians, Athamanes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Ceteans, Thessa-

lians, and Achæans of Phthiotis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Træzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa. These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like manner to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B.C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Plataea, Orchomenus and other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pres-

sure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and Megalopolis; moreover that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer; for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at Thermopylæ; a citizen force of 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2,000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bæotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Bæotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He dispatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting reinforcements; but in the meantime he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated; and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia. No better resource was left to him than the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town. But its fortifications were strong with a garrison ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train or engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore, found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings. Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him, remarked—"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course." At this critical moment,

Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city walls, and expired in two days. A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels. But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes, had displayed military genius and ardor along with Pan-Hellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who, after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended. When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected. But during this interval, there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together. Hence the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion—with which condition he refused to comply.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain; and the Macedonian phalanx, having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up, bringing the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the

combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained. Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Æniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætoliens; and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Pan-Hellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antipater in Thessaly became much thinned, though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful re-enforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B.C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsine. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amid the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married, to be entrapped and assas-

sinated along with her sister. There was however at Babylon a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, toward whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander's mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynane, another sister widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now open for power.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philotas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonos; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus. We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of vizir, and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity of the empire, contending against severalty and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.

At the moment of Alexander's death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had

been directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia with fresh re-enforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of. Kraterus and Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amid the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra, at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekataeus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the defect preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra. This scheme remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater, to whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 3,000 archers and slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency. The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry, the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of Antipater's infantry and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult neighboring ground, where they were soon

joined by their victorious cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of the Macedonians, 120.

The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B.C.) was no way decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit of Leosthenes, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding council, declined to await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater; who however returned for answer, that he would not recognize or treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke re-enforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such re-enforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days' march of Athens.

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defense. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina. Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the *Graphē Paranomon*; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people having no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater, Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time, they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokrates—the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding

teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokrates had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokrates did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added, to his honor, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution, and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dispossessed, and the island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demades heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokrates entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted, when he said—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe." To Phokion's entreaty, that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians; while Kallimedes also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2,000 drachmæ were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9,000 richest citizens, the "party of order," were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including

Agnonides, the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures. At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonides among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnesus. We shall see him presently contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having preceded his *Seisachtheia*, or measure for the relief of debtors. What rules the 9,000 remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the God Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis.

One the earliest measures of the 9,000 was to condemn to death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himereus, brother of the citizen afterward celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the Exile-Hunters, were everywhere on the lookout to seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them. One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators—Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himereus—dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of

Æakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenes. The temple of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration that Archias, hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary. The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways. Eratosthenes (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenes carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amid these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain, that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterward. Demochares asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterward prevalent, that Archias the Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonor and wretchedness.

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public *Dikasteries*, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile Hunters—are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Of Hyperides as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his persecution of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable.

Of Demosthenes, we know more—enough to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic delivered thirty years before (352–351 B.C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterward, in 341 B.C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down to the battle of Cheroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Cheroneia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Pan-Hellenic also. It was not Athens alone that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism; trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence—but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But condemned as he was to

comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardor, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond the sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues, on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as enacting and working reality.

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

THE death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a

city half depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonor of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Aridaeus. Occupying this obnoxious elevation Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokrates, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman; but Xenokrates declined the offer, remarking, that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy. This mark of courageous independence, not a little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodeled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens. Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire. His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amid the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future period their design of deport-

ing that people—and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had given birth to a posthumous son called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridaeus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella—Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, the widow of the Molossian Alexander—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynane (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydike. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenes. Kynane also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydike for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridaeus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynane to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydike.

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas, who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made

his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile maneuvers of Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far as they effect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of fortune, throughout the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also. Until the battle of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralyzed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Ætolians. Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy; leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenes as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas, discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenes, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory, in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenes with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself. After the victory, he

found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honorably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigor of Eumenes, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus, proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanor toward the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiatic branch of the Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him. His troops joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behavior gained their goodwill. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news, arriving at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was, however, exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydike, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of

Perdikkas; most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonos, first against Eumenes in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished. Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonos.

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavored to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfillment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offense to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offense to his son Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude. All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the same time we have no specific facts to prove it.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as chiliarch or general of the body-guard. He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses; all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydike—were energetic characters; and

the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity toward Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander dispatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander, Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia. It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the great real powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the supreme command—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only

friend and savior to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honorable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother to the great conqueror, raised a strong favorable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonos against them. His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Paratakene—continued for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonos, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops. They do not belong to Grecian history. They are, however, among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While, even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued. He was betrayed to Antigonos by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is, perhaps, to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over Eumenes to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander. In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenes, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favor of free Hellenic community.

On learning the death of Antipater most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella. To all the governments of these cities composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost

moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counselors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

After reciting the steady good-will of Philip and Alexander toward Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings were now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or deported by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act of recall were excluded the exiles of Amphissa, Trikkia, Pharkadon, and Hierakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Oropus; in all other respects she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. ‘All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him—as we have before written to you to do, for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation.

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a death-blow, and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as

envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death; the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece, sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations under his son Alexander.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming, while to Phokion with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death. The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander, the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties, each distinct in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each other.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munchia, which they required him to evacuate pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater. He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favor—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a large proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion, who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus—and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the

proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor, while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping, even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia, and when he found that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians, he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbor of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and harbor on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighboring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree was passed enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbor under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms; but Phokion as general damped their ardor, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went, however, with Konon (son of Timotheus) to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application. He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon, upon whom, therefore, the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general, had he been forewarned of the

danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favoring the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander, which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes however were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavored to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place. When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march toward Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus, nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without foreign controlling force—was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet

unfinished,—and offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself. Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops along with the exiles, as friends and allies within the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project was impracticable, in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charikles, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philokles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Charikles, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding. Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him. Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant toward him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On

the proposition of Agnonides and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Demarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favorable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridaüs in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonides,—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—"Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the Athenians." The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens. Now, on the last of these two heads, Polysperchon was no way disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defense with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognizant of his (the speaker's) good disposition toward the Athenian people (he had been probably sent to Pella, as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed—"Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king." Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear, with which he would have run Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners

to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts; through sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theater, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy toward him. The assembly was mainly composed of Phokion's keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles, chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised the severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus, consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of

antipathy against him burst out in furious manifestations. Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiraus to Nikanor constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phokion was called on for his defense; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair; and exclaimed, "For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct: but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?" "Because they are your friends, Phokion"—was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree, to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them, doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythokles, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who turned to the public officers and exclaimed—"Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theater to the prison, amid the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the

month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments) celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honor of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burned by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address—"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity toward him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honor, and put to death Agnonides by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion's son.

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honored. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater's work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theater is nothing better than a cruel impos-

ture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and toward which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Pan-Hellenic sentiment of Aristides, Kallikratidas, and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistokles, Aristides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia. The brilliant, though checkered, century and more of independent politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendancy as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. In so far as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was strategus during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschines and the philippizers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired—by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion

received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterward, marks of esteem not shown toward any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honorable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favor toward himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.

The Lamian war, and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his known Macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonorable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by courting Polysperchon, the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation (along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable, than these maneuvers, which still further darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march toward Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance. At any rate, he was tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4,000 soldiers obtained from Antigonos. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4,000 Greek allies, 1000 cavalry and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens. In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them, and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterward defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonos.

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionately strengthened. The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistokles, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself. The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, etc., of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens /disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves,

and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships, and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upward; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (*i.e.* an Athenian of the Deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion; who had gone into volunatry exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened, holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens; moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2,000 drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendancy in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness toward the Athenian people.

Toward this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits; toward which he devoted the most of the Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of funerals. He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens. But we learn from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period of distress and humilia-

tion, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and that Athenians as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrene) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practise as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others. But the fact that 360 statues were erected in honor of Demetrius while his administration was still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves. Of this important enumeration we know the bare fact, without its special purpose or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Ætolians and others.

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation toward the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither he proceeded with his army. Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenseless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls. This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwall'd city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of Lykurgæan traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as not to leave them even safety at home.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Aridaus and his wife Eurydike, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at his disposal. In this, however, they failed. Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince

Æakides, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Aridæus and Eurydike to resist her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydike became her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor; while the sepulcher of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child Alexander, and Thessalonike, daughter of her late husband Philip son of Amyntas. Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æakides to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently, however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except the injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonike to wife—confining Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenes (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympia) removed the last faithful

partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of Antigonos such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia at the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene and near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighborhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before. He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post in the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Bœotia and Greece.

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced toward Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia. His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonos, who endeavored to come to terms

with him, but in vain. Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them. Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money, Antigonus dispatched the Milesian Aristodemus to strengthen Alexander against Kassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus further proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation. It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterward, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself. These promises, neither executed, nor intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had reanimated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself. Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally—and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyon. Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy. These Ætolians became the allies of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbors the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adri-

atic Gulf. His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander; Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria, and Karystus—entered Attica, and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrios the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion. The affairs of Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the god.

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free. Toward the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterward, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined. The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in co-operation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the

treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.

Polysperchon—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed in Messene and other towns—was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Herakles (son of Alexander by Barsine), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Herakles, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favorable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Herakles, and withdrew his army toward Peloponnesus. But he found such unexpected opposition in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Lokris (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander; whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphiloehia on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

The assassination of Herakles was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death. All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonike wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) had now successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian

cities themselves against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth. The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defense, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

The Grecian ascendancy of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketes, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbor of Peiraus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbor, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished the Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favor of Demetrius Poliorketes; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, leveling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketes made his **triumphant** entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a further boon from his father Antigonos and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration toward the young conqueror, but also in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratokles (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonos and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviors: a high priest of these saviors was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrium—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten:—the annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonos and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athene, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in honor of Demetrius Katabates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as gods, the saviors Antigonos and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphrodite, in honor of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leana and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers. At the same time the numerous statues, which had been erected in honor of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler. The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, toward Demetrius Poliorketes, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Charoneia, and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the practical ascendancy, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been

continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes (322–307 B.C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During these thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketes, had taken part in the battle of Charoneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations of Demosthenes in the war which preceded that disaster! Of the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenes in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B.C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonos, Lysimachos, etc. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies, organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Two centuries before (510 B.C.), when the Lacedæmonians expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all dangers in defense of their newly acquired liberty. At that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened, were Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair. Very different were the facts in 307 B.C., when De-

metrius Poliorketes removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation—was an enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Perikles. “Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow!” but the Athenians had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius Poliorketes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honor of Demetrius Poliorketes by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenes—Demochares, who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratokles ended in banishment, four years afterward. He appears to have discharged the functions of general during this period—to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted; so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratokles also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant. Among those who accompanied the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus.

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, toward the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophizing. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophokles, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and appre-

hension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon—impeaching Sophokles, the author of the law, under the *Graphé Paranomon*—prevailed on the *Dikastery* to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned. It is remarkable that Demochares stood forward as one of its advocates; defending Sophokles against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Demochares, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.

Athenian envoys were dispatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece. It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus, in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketes. All their efforts however would have been in vain had they not been assisted

by large re-enforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise: the Rhodians submitted to enroll themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy. Toward the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a god. Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterward by the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighborhood. We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations. The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat. But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.C. he was blockading, or threatening to blockade Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorketes, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia. He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honor equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled his garrison from the two frontier fortresses of Attica—Phyle and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantinea), and various other towns in Peloponnesus. He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heraea at Argos; on which occasion he married Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias. At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been con-

ferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries. He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revelers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the feet.

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet, addressing Demetrius as a God, boasts that two of the greatest and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment—Demeter (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphrodite. “To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other Gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do not exist—or care nothing about us; but *thee* we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian, who (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbors; but now, they rob far as well as near.”

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience toward Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenseless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defense, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians—Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless. When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the

Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as a guest of the Goddess Athene. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians toward him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratokles, declaring that everything which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the Gods and just in regard to men. The banishment of Demochares is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree. In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander; but before his departure he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was, however, not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive, in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities. But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonos to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honorable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed. In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B.C. 300) by Antigonos and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonos was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendant, from the coast of Syria eastward

to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, further eastward, nearly to the Indus.

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honorable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still further mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece. His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles, driven out by his tyranny, invited Demetrius Poliorketes, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lachares having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself (B.C. 298).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonike, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready

first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence. Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia, once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenes. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonos (afterward called Antigonos Gonatas) son of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterward remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenes—Antigonos Gonatas regained it in 277 B.C. His descendants the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonos; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defense of Thermopylæ in 279 B.C. So intolerable was the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonos were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them. A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighborhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonos Gonatas continued to

hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighborhood—planting in most of them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of garrisons. Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achaean league too developed itself afterward as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty, though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own, but as an appendage attached to some foreign center and principal among its neighbors—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbors acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the self-prompted co-operations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition, and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of Helles, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion born in a state of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidences of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into which the countrymen of Aristides and Perikles had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from without.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices; he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public

monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterward, Demochares himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honor. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Demochares merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.

When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS.—AGATHOKLES.

IT has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks, at the death of their champion, the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B.C.), by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large re-enforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosis-

tratus and Herakleides appear as leaders. We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbors and assailants the Bruttians.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline, similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbors in the interior were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding chapters recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast. Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italian Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338 B.C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother city, to entreat assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæroneia (338 B.C.).

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed by the same formidable neighbors, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never before enjoyed. Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendancy) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander—or as regent after his death.

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition from Italy; doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than the Persians

at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He further endeavored to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities, which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years afterward, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathokles first comes before us—seemingly about 320 B.C. The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose brother Agathokles served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathokles—respecting which romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathokles learned also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse. Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his

youthful habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favor of a wealthy Syracuse named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was, moreover, ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathokles acquired great reputation for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathokles married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides, were unprincipled and sanguinary men. By this government an expedition was dispatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast to assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbors the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathokles, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathokles himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue of this expedition. But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathokles to display his adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valor; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathokles incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed. Next he joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defense of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government. Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterward a revolution

took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Under the new government Agathokles obtained his recall, and soon gained increased ascendancy. The dispossessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathokles took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet, by an able maneuver, he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs to the Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathokles was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathokles, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself. This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathokles escaped by favor of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.

Not long afterward, another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of 600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans and Agathokles. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amid the numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathokles, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behavior of that exile. Agathokles, and the other exiles along with him, were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathokles swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing government, and carry out the enaga-

ments of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the prevailing aspirations toward harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathokles with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathokles had the direction of the military force. Under pretense of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3,000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a re-enforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in the Timoleonion (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Dekles, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathokles suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardor, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the streets with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathokles; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6,000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amid this scene of horror. Deinokrates, one among the prisoners, was liberated by Agathokles from motives of former friendship: he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathokles convened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own soldiers. Agathokles—addressing them in terms of congratulation on the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general's cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathokles, with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed authority, without any colleagues or counselors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathokles took pains to proclaim that he would tolerate no further massacre or plunder, and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion

over a large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighboring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deinokrates), partly at Messene. About the year 314 B.C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messene, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guaranty of the Carthaginians. Though thus disappointed at Messene, Agathokles seized Abakenum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles there harbored, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted. The people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messene for the purpose.

But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at home, and well disposed toward foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Kerkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavorable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathokles. He reached Agrigentum with favorable hopes, was received with all the honors due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height, when he caused Sosistrata, the leader of

the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations against Agathokles. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous yet under the hegemony of Agathokles; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messene was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore, still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favorable to Agathokles, that they were much disapproved at Carthage. Agathokles, recognized as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messene, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two points from the Messenians. Agathokles, having thus broken the force of Messene, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six hundred.

It only remained for Agathokles to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messene, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of Agathokles. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathokles, was preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides, and Agathokles kept no further measures with the Carthaginians. He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbor of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing

more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting off the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathokles.

The defense of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathokles approached to offer them battle—having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria. So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to remain in their camp; and Agathokles returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the dispatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2,000 native Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sank with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with Agathokles. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the re-enforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. At the same time, a Carthaginian armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messene, fell in with twenty armed ships belonging to Agathokles, and captured them all with their crews. The Sicilian cities we reheld to Agathokles principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached thither, on various pretenses, several small parties of soldiers, who presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize the town. Agathokles then marched into Gela with his main force. Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives to bring in to him

all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward toward the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it. The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At length Agathokles gained what he thought a favorable opportunity. A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in ambush, who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar's army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Grecian armor was an inadequate defense. Still Agathokles, no way discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once, and with apparent success, when a re-enforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack. These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actually pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry, 5,000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks. At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7,000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defense. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it

prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the purpose of strengthening his party at Sicily. His great victory at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathokles by no other bonds except those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops toward the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messene, Abakanum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar toward all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbor of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathokles collected the corn from the neighborhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defense. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and re-enforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful defense.

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war. He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea. Agathokles had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera: he could not transport horses, but he put

the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear toward him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathokles publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those who felt themselves unequal to the effort might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated at 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathokles set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself. By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathokles; nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathokles named Atander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnos.

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbor. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbor being thus left unguarded, Agathokles took the opportunity of striking with his armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Toward nightfall however they neared him so much, that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon, that all the artifice and ascendancy of Agathokles were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture in the direction toward Africa; and they appeared in sight just as

Agathokles was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathokles secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defense that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarkation of his own soldiers, at a point called the *Latomie* or Stone-quarries.

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathokles was to burn his vessels; a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Demeter and Persephone—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honor, if they would preserve him safe across to Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had further, by favorably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects; it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfill his vow with exactness. Torches being now brought, Agathokles took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral's ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amid the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.

Though Agathokles had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable—thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell, and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathokles conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megale-Polis. His march lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm-buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, etc., all excited the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathokles and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and

unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast. The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression. The Liby-Phenicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it. Agathokles, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megale-Polis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathokles easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within, to his soldiers, who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced further southward to the town called Tunes (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunes as a permanent position; but he kept his main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to fight.

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathokles during his crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and even burned his fleet, they at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military array against Megalopolis, they divined his real purposes, and were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of his burned and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathokles had been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from their fleet; whereby they learned the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist Agathokles. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were named generals conjointly.

They were bitter political rivals,—but this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each would serve as a check upon the other, and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other. These two generals, unable to wait for distant succors, led out the native forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry—derived altogether from citizens and residents—with 2,000 war-chariots. They took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunes and Carthage) not far from Agathokles;

Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2,500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.

Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships' crews were even without arms—a deficiency which Agathokles could supply only in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers, however, were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of Athene, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno's death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.

This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships

of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunes, and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugetana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterward denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred toward the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty toward the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Toward Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus—placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath—was fed at that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children. By this monstrous holocaust the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians dispatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a re-enforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunes. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute

operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then advanced further southward toward Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunes; drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defenses of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—half-way between Adrumetum and Tunes, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires. The effect of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from the army before Tunes on the other, was to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunes fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large re-enforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles both relieved Tunes, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet further south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward. He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the eastern coast. He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he had advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunes, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain. The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly intrenched, between Carthage and Tunes.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathokles at Syracuse had taken a turn

unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow-ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow-ornaments—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander and the other authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnion the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8,000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learned the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathokles. There was no further talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously resisted—withdrew his army and detached from it a re-enforcement of 5,000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated at 120,000 men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well

acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Eurylaus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias. Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ. The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskillfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled and even mistook each others for enemies, while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious, and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse, and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror. He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the same time the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid

him, and, in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments. Enna, Erbessus, Echetta, Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles, while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians, and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet, though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.

The ascendancy of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily; but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding and mournful to them. While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathokles at Tunes, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus, which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army, who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunes with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favorably entertained that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success, when Agathokles, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future. Agathokles gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack forthwith the Carthaginians, who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son in command at Tunes, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless, Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage, however, was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathokles.

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader, that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his. We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect re-enforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrene, and dispatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.

To Kyrene and what was afterward called its Pentapolis (i.e., the five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrene, its port Apollonia, Barka, Tencheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has already been devoted. Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers, were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B.C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the

Athenian siege. About 401 B.C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard-pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrene, a large proportion of them perished. Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, was divided between Kyrene (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrene. We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrene and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

In the year 331 B.C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrene sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects. We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B.C. to 323 B.C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrene and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B.C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6,000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap. Thimbron willingly carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrene, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage. His schemes were, however, frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasiakles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citi-

zens of Kyrene as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrene itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid these two cities, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's fleet could not be long maintained without a harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet, though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teuchaira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2,500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This re-enforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrene and the harbor so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the mere popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron, some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teuchaira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikides, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions, and placed under the government of Ophellas.

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrene, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterward (B.C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this

citadel; but being again put down by an army and meet which Ptolemy dispatched under Agis from Egypt, Kyrene passed once more under the viceroyalty of Ophellas.

To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydike—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion.

To Ophellas, such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look-out for aggrandizement toward the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar. Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterward acquired; the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathokles. Having learned in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrene on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enroll themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrene, some even with wives and children. The total number is

stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well-appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automole—the westernmost factory of Kyrene. From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted. He passed through the territory of the natives called *Lotophagi*, near the lesser Syrtis; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded. Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in the Carthaginian territory; with what abatement of number we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn them to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any commander or fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service. He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse. Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar. This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanna, against Agathokles—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4,000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city; dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defense against the assailants, combated them in the streets, and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market place, having first undergone severe tortures.

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time against their enemy without; while Agathokles, on the other hand, re-enforced by the army from Kyrene, was stronger than ever. So late did he feel, that he assumed the title of king, following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica—the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the gulf on land. The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere. Agathokles marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of

Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defense, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defense, experienced the like pitiless treatment. The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathokles, firmly established in Tunes as a center of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations. He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendancy in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2,000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phelline, Meschekæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavoring to carry his arms yet further into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltine, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshiped as gods.

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hannibal, Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast.

Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunes, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two under himself and Æschrión, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno contriving to surprise the division of Æschrión, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrión himself with more than 4,000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated fight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunes, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phœnician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established fortified camps around Tunes, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.

The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island, his generals Leptines and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defense, under the presidency of Agrigentum. The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaleidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia, he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During all this interval, the Syracusan harbor had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity. But there was no blockading army on land; nor had the dominion of Agathokles, upheld as it was by his brother Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy; while on land, his forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokrates; who made profession of taking up that generous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy throughout Sicily. Deinokrates received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected against Agathokles. He was soon at the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practiced soldiers for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra. For military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the field against Agathokles, but several times offered him battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathokles could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amid this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathokles received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate enough to obtain a re-enforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of the Syracusan harbor. A clear passage to Africa was thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported provisions for the Syracusans. Though still unable to combat Deinokrates in the field, Agathokles was emboldened by his recent naval victory to send for Leptines with a force to invade the Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of Deinokrates. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom Leptines had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by Leptines, had made arms a profession and were used to fighting as

well as to hardships. Here, as elsewhere in Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional soldier-ship, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument for administrative details.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force, was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptines, and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing, for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathokles passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunes in great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of pay. They still amounted to 6,000 Grecian mercenaries, 6,000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 8,000 (if the number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the vicinity of Tunes, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their intrenchments. But, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured. During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods, close to the altar as well as to the general's tent, accidentally took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burned, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathokles, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.

His position at Tunes had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunes, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger son Herakleides; abandoning Archagathus and the army

to their fate. But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumor that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amid the general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking his services indispensable for defense, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment toward him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles was again at liberty. But, insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other towns besides Tunes; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves.

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathokles to Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the *vana mirantes*, who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas. Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy of Agathokles, we must not

forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor is it to be overlooked, that Agathokles missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily. He imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, in the long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subservient.

After his passage from Africa, Agathokles landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a re-enforcement. But he was hard pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egesteans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathokles caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathokles changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him. This atrocity, more suitable to Africa than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learned that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunes, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander his brother (viceroys of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition. This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age nor sex—grand sire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.

Still Agathokles tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had

produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokrates. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathokles, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the island—Therma and Kephalaïdion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this proposition, Deinokrates, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free city-government. Had Deinokrates been another Timoleon, the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and license such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the proposition of Agathokles, requiring still larger concessions; until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathokles himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathokles, being repudiated by Deinokrates, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a large supply of corn.

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathokles presently ventured to march against the army of Deinokrates. The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathokles had established among them correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathokles, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokrates was completely dispersed. Shortly afterward a considerable body among them (4,000 men, or 7,000 men according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathokles, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.

It appears as if the secret victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathokles and Deinokrates; and as if the prisoners massacred by Agathokles were those of whom Deinokrates wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathokles admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokrates not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathokles the revolted general Pasiphilus, with the town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular,

that Agathokles, generally faithless and unscrupulous toward both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Deinokrates to the end of his life.

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles—the Italian cities and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable attack by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But Kleonymus found enough to occupy himself elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behavior was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy. He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketes and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain. At a subsequent period Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathokles with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself. On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain to the number of 2,000.

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathokles, we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy, establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketes, and giving his daughter Janassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-two still in the plenitude of vigor as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named Agathokles; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who

had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities, had already been singled out for the most important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathokles, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favored son Agathokles to Ætna, with written orders directing that Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, no way disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathokles to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon, a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathokles massacred most of the Egestean population. The beauty of his person procured him much favor with Agathokles; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathokles, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner. Combining together the various accounts, it seems probable that Agathokles was at the time sick—that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenseless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and his two young children, by dispatching them on shipboard with all his rich movable treasures, to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amid extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.

The great lines in the character of Agathokles are well marked. He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power,—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals formed in Alexander's school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathokles were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge. Apart from this enterprising genius employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathokles except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands pre-eminent above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors. Notwithstanding his often proved perfidy, he seems to have had a

geniality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.

Agathokles, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathokles indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he, as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the death of Agathokles; but it continues no longer. After his death Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathokles) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next between the Carthaginians and Romans—until at length they dwindle into subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathokles.

CHAPTER XCVIII

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES

1. *In Gaul and Spain.*
2. *On the Coast of the Euxine.*

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign ele-

ments, and often adulterated by them. It is, indeed, little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my twenty-seventh chapter, I briefly noticed the foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles), on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokreans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship, or hostility with their barbaric neighbors, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for defense, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbors. That they were found equal to this necessity, appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details is unknown.

Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well fortified, and possessing a convenient harbor securely closed against enemies. The domain around it, however, appears not to have been large, nor did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul. It was on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their colonial expansion were obtained. In an age when piracy was common, the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defense not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning the temples. The city contained docks and arsenals admirably provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments of naval war. Except the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western Mediterranean; from the year 500 B.C. downward, after the energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landmen, not occupying permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying neighbors to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their depredations by land. To all these landmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the Massaliots, with their colonies,

were the only ministers, along the Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontiers of Tuscany) to the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain. It was not until the first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbors, exalted into Roman colonies.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron Goddess, the Ephesian Artemis. Toward the east were Taurocentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monæki; toward the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alone, Hemeroskopium, and Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depots for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of spreading inland and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet of the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new walled circuit there established. This new circuit, however, was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night one-third of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary, we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one community. It is not often that we are allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as laborers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors. The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era.

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called *Timuchi*), elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties. The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage ceremonies. They

were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose History closed about 340 B.C.) respected the Gauls as especially phil-Hellenic; an impression which he could hardly have derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliotics (who in the first century before Christ were trilingues, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterward became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea and in traffic, the Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favorable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization upon ruder neighbors. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so much of the present volume; force admirably organized and wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented; and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330-320 B.C.), with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan, sailed through the Pillars of Herakles and from thence northward along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet further. Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved except the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that the publication of his "Survey of the Earth"—much consulted by Eratosthenes, though the criticisms which have reached us through Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kalatis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so called (now Dniester)—we have little to record; though Istrus and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his examination. But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapeum or Bosphorus between the Euxine and the *Palus Mæotis* (now sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history;

nor can Sinope (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Pan-Hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrene) adulterated partially—Olbia and Bosphorus considerably—by admixture of a non-Hellenic element.

Of Sinope, and its three dependent colonies Kotyora, Kerasus and Trapezus, I have already said something, in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinope enjoyed not merely partial independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behavior toward the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation. Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable fact, that envoys from Sinope were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable. The position of Sinope placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achæmenidæ), who ultimately ripened into the kings of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakes, in the second century before Christ. Sinope then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the intermediate events.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city—much nearer than Sinope to the mouth of the Thracian Bosphorus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day's voyage of a row boat—was established by Megarians and Boeotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and

reduced to a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast. We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical; perhaps in the hands of the descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon, prince of the Kimmerian Bosphorus. They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridates, a prince of the ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.

Toward 380-370 B.C. the Herakleots became disturbed by violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves; some of whom opposed and partially threw open a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands. A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries, the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them) while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrollment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and sympathizing with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once agitated by the hope of liberty were with difficulty appeased. The government, though greatly democratized, found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was there, indeed any motive to tempt them. At length application was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokrates—and had watched with emulous curiosity the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest. During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighboring prince Mithridates, and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of the soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridates a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under color of keeping them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack. Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridates to the city to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as a prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated still more grossly the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the new exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves, some having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years, during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty toward the citizens. He further indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanor, adopting an oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaim

ing himself the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amid all these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession. Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonides (they too having been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the scepter and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his predecessor in intelligence and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered. Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid begetting children of his own wife. After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings toward the citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all around. With his younger brother Dionysius, he maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously toward the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighborhood; for his three predecessors had been all enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of his reign, indeed, the ascendancy of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court.

But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving viceroys behind him—new hopes of independence or aggrandizement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia. The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighboring Sinope (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleopatra. He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.

By the favor of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B.C. All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how, in June 324 B.C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alexander in June 323 B.C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy,

that he fell into a swoon; and he commemorated it by erecting a statue in honor of Euthymia, or the tranquilizing goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas; who favored their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct his march toward the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition against Egypt, wherein he perished.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favor of Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his neighborhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this juncture to suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him a splendid exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendancy in Bithynia and the neighborhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonía in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake. Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B.C.). To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and he even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like. He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathres and a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled to avoid taking part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B.C.) wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession of Antigonía, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa.

After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoë, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighboring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine. These young men, Klearchus and Oxathres, assumed the government of Herakleia, and entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterward obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathres) of killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B.C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathres to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoë to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoë sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleides, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoë was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathokles, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia, too, its effect was so powerful that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleides, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were thus enabled to discard Herakleides, and regain their popular government. They signalized their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastion—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism. The city,

now again a free commonwealth, was further re-enforced by the junction of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated. To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing of the newly emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia, in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kierus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterward by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but Eumenes, who held it, hated them so much that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanes. That their maritime power was at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridates (B.C. 69). In Asia Minor, the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia (B.C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbors, who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian cities on the coast. Sinope, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbors almost at their gates—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was, however, frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists,

actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odessus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis. About the year 312 B.C., we hear of them as under the power of Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke, obtaining assistance from some of the neighboring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonos. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection. Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosphorus. It was in pushing his conquests yet further northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichaetes; by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released. I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B.C.). By his death the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbors became more and more formidable, being re-enforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus' time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterward, even south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians and Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterward, from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents. Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town, there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins or leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads pitchers of water.

By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in their

neighborhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides to the prince and his immediate favorites; and on these conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The Scythian prince Skyles (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had familiarized him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates without molesting any one. It is true that this proceeding cost Skyles his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks. To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 410 to 430 B.C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterward (about 340 B.C.) appears to have been not materially different. But after that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, etc. Olbia was in an open plain, with no defense except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthene) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second century B.C. At this latter period, the city was diminished in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnes with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass, called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill-treatment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay a semi-Hellenic population in their neighborhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defense less, through the uncertain fidelity of

these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior. In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbors—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to become for a time abandoned. Presently, however, the fugitives partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale. For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them, still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from the care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighboring tribes derived their supply of salt. Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenize both the speech and the personal names in the town.

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighborhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid.

In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the *Iliad* from memory. Achilles (localized under the surname of Pontarches, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers. Amid Grecian life, degraded and verging toward its extinction, and stripped even of the purity of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Respecting Bosphorus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by Milesian settlers on the European side of the Kimmerian Bosphorus (near Kertch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxes was repulsed from Greece (480–479 B.C.). It was the center of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktide, for forty-two years (480–438 B.C.).

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Selenkus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I. (407–393 B.C.); Leukon ((393–353 B.C.); Spartokus III. (353–348 B.C.); Parisades I. (348–310 B.C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eunelus (310–304 B.C.); Spartokus IV. (304–284 B.C.); Parisades II. During the reigns of these princes, a connection of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosphorus; a connection not political, since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was well suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Maeotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers, were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous, while oil and wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosphorus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went to Bosphorus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus) to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413

B.C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile center for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterward find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenes.

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosphorus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually. Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosphoric princes; betrayed (according to Æschines) by the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens. We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst of the Bosphoric dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by the Bosphoric prince, who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances, —both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens. Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosphorus.

The Bosphoric prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens, and even seems to have had authorized representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention. He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosphorus with equity and even favor, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all. His son Leukon not only continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about $1\frac{1}{2}$ bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosphorus to Athens in a full year being 400,000 medimni. It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favor by public votes of gratitude and honor, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burdens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon; who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptines) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed *Antidosis*. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosphorus appears to have been further extended; for we learn that he established an export

from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapeum. His successor Parisades I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honors than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenes. The connection of Bosphorus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favor, from the kings of Bosphorus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behavior of Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosphorus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus, from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Maeotis, as a protection against incursions. Their dominion did not extend further west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feeblér and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Maeotæ or Mæetæ—the Sindi, Toreti, Dandarii, Thates, etc. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisades I., record him as king of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosphorus and Theodosia. His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosphorus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries, was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.

Parisades I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbors—among them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnes—to espouse his cause. At the head of an army, said to consist of 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2,000 Grecian mercenaries, and 2,000 Thracians of his own, re-enforced by a numerous body of Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in wagons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnes to retreat

and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the scepter, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favor of Eumelus; who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to Kepi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth alone—Parisades, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the Scythian prince Agarus.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals, yet his recent cruelties had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosphoric citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation. Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi (among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandizement, when an accident terminated his life, after a reign

of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapeum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or wagon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him toward a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot. He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B.C.); afterward came the son of Spartokus, Parisades II.; with whose name our information breaks off.

This dynasty, the Spartokidae, though they ruled the Greeks of Bosphorus as despots by means of a mercenary force—yet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation. Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B.C. the then reigning prince, Parisades III., found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians, that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence, and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridates Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject, however, after no long interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.

The Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of Bosphorus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrene with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapeum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopiian works piled up with prodigious labor and cost—have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electrum, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. “The contents of the tumuli already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchers of Pantikapeum alone, we might become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life.” Statues, reliefs, and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, etc.,

of precious metal—several with colored beads attached. The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments, indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for whom they were destined. But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in the fourth century B.C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this history to present.

I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of time marked out in the preface to my first volume—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch from whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence which the fourth century B.C. had seen exhibited in Plato and Demosthenes. The contents of this last volume indicate but too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer exists; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander and his conquests—*ἀγχιον αἰχμητῆν, κρατερόν μηδ' ὅσῳ φόβῳ*—that non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by the day of slavery.

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been scarcely adverted to in this History. Among these names, indeed, there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially before the reader, because both of them belong to general history as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion of Sokrates at his trial, and counselor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expecta-

tions of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something toward supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B.C.

APPENDIX.

ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBORHOOD AS CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE.

THE exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented. The Plan, of the country round the Gulf of Issus, will enable the reader to follow easily what is certain, and to understand the debate about what is matter of hypothesis.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander's left and Darius's right rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and to re-occupy a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance *south* of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7, 2)—*ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν προήγαγε* (Darius from Issus) *ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πινάρου*—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was *upon* the river Pinarus, which he even calls *the Issus river* (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2 pp. 1797-1806). We know also that this river was at some distance *north* of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexander passed and repassed.

But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his History, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mitzell's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde published only this year (1855); ch. xxvii. p. 1778 *seqq.*

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyramus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinope or Amisus to Issus—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination at Issus (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell (Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, pp. 42-48) places it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, toward the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xeno-

phon's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea—and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary toward Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B.C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighboring ground, upon which Xenophon has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—"The Gates of Kilikia and Syria"—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that name, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road *over hills and rocks*; a point which Major Rennell (Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a river called *Merkes, Mahersu*, or *Kava-su*, flows across from the mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützell; as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p. 1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops with unusual steepness toward it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion of the mountain, and descends again afterward to the low ground skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens toward Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered, I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the *Merkes* with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützell ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called the *Amanian Gates*, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the *maritime* passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the *inland* passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian, and Kallisthenes. Strabo uses the phrase *Amanian Gates*, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a *maritime pass*, and not a pass *over* the mountain—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Egeze and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751 he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu, and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates.

But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1) *ὑπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρείος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ Ἴσσον προήλθε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθών*. Here, let it be observed, we do not read *ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας* nor can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them "*transit Amanum, eundo per Pylas Amanicas*." The words rather signify, that Darius "crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates"—i.e. where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the gulf, and lying between those two extreme points which Strabo denominates *Amanian Gates*. Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a col over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenes (if he is rightly represented by Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words *Amanian Gates* to signify the passage by which Darius entered Kilikia—that is, the passage over the mountain. That which Xenophon and Arrian call the *Gates of Kilikia and Syria*—and which Strabo calls *Amanian Gates*—is described by Polybius as *τὰ στενά, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας*.

I have marked on the Plan the pass by which Darius crossed Mount Amanus, as it stands on Kiepert's Map, and on Chesney's Map; in the line from Aintab to the head of the Gulf, near the 37th parallel. It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus *before* he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel, are indeed called in question by Müttzell (ad Curtium, pp. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Beyas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the Pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the *usual* road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea-ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat—it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other sea-ports.

In the approaching month, we shall find him just as careful to make sure of the Phœnician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Further, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging

his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell, p. 56, and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of *Ἀλεξανδρεία κατ' Ἴσσον*, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for the trade of the East with Egypt." The importance of the site of Scanderoon in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbor of Aleppo; a city (Berœa) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.



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